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Abstract 
King Abdulaziz stood out as a major figure in Saudi domestics and foreign policy. He 
laid the foundation for Saudi foreign policy and international relations. Available 
studies on King Abdulaziz's foreign policy either concentrated on earlier periods or 
dealt with part of his era. This study deals with the whole period of King Abdulaziz, 
approaches his foreign policy as a case study of a newly-emerging state and assesses 
the problems associated with this case. 
The study is organised as follows: chapter one discusses the rise of King Abdulaziz 
and the Saudi achievement of a sense of statehood. Chapter two explores the 
problems which confront newly-emerging states in the formulation and 
implementation of their foreign policy. Chapter three discusses the genesis of Saudi 
foreign policy structure. Chapter four focuses on Saudi Arabia's policy towards the 
affairs of the Arabian Peninsula. Chapter five examines the policy of King Abdulaziz 
towards the Arab World. Chapter six adresses the King's policy in the area of Islamic 
affairs. Chapter seven analyzes the King's relations with Britain after the Treaty of 
Jeddah of 1927. Chapter eight deals with Saudi policy towards the U. S. 
The study hopes to provide a better understanding of the process of Saudi foreign 
policy making under King Abdulaziz. A major finding of this study is throwing light 
on the problems experienced by Saudi Arabia as a newly-emerging state while 
making and implementing its foreign policy, particularly, in relation to a number of 
specific and general factors underlying the making and execution of this foreign 
policy. In this sense the study hopes to make a modest contribution to the available 
literature on King Abdulaziz's foreign policy. 
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1 
Introduction 
Although several studies have been carried out on Saudi foreign policy and its 
international relations, most of them covered either earlier or more modern periods or 
only part of King Abdulaziz's reign, such as The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The 
formative years, 1902-1918, by Jacob Goldberg, and The Foreign Policy of Saudi 
Arabia since 1945, by Ghassan Salama. Other studies covered Saudi relations with a 
specific country such as The Relations of Ibn Saud with Great Britain, 1902-1953, by 
Tayeb, Mohammad. However, not much work has been done on King Abdulaziz's 
reign as a whole from the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1927 until 
his death in 1953. The advantage of studying King Abdulaziz's period as a whole 
would reveal the general trends in his foreign policy and its direction. It is hoped that 
this study would constitute a modest contribution towards filling this gap in the 
literature on Saudi foreign policy. 
A major aim of this study is to assess the factors that underlay the making and 
implementation of Saudi foreign policy during the era of King Abdulaziz and 
examine the problems associated with these factors. Since Saudi Arabia is taken as a 
case study of a newly emerging state at that time, the study will also relate these 
problems and factors to those experienced by newly-emerging states in the general 
field of International Relations. 
Through our findings we hope to arrive at a better understanding of the process of 
Saudi foreign policy making during King Abdulaziz period, as a case study, and 
throw light on the situation experienced by newly-emerging states while making and 
implementing their foreign policy. Despite the rise of numerous new states within the 
international community since the 1950s, it is surprising that the foreign policy of 
newly-emerging states is still being under studied. Only a handful of major works 
have been done on this subject in the field of International Relations. This makes it 
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worthwhile to attempt to explore this area further by not only dealing with it in a 
general manner, but with illustration from a case study. 
The case of Saudi Arabia under King Abdulaziz provides a fertile example in the area 
of foreign policy making because of the wide range of personal, domestic, regional 
and international factors involved in this process, which would help to shed further 
light on the foreign policy problems encountered by newly-emerging states. It is so, 
because Saudi Arabia was one of the very few Middle Eastern states to emerge in the 
inter-war period (along with Yemen, Turkey and Iran) prior to the general era of 
independence in the area. The Saudi case would help to explore the dynamics of 
foreign policy making and implementation experienced by various newly emerging 
states in view of the problems encountered by King Abdulaziz as a state builder and 
the opportunities he grasped in his course of leadership. 
This proposed investigation will mainly conduct a documentary analysis of the course 
of King Abdulaziz's foreign policy during the period under study. The research will 
rely on available Saudi, British, American and other primary resources. The Research 
will also cover published academic works, and past and present periodicals in both 
Arabic and English. Evidence will be also gathered from interviews with persons who 
were close to the King, and from others considered to be interested in Saudi foreign 
policy matters. 
This study consists of eight chapters, in addition to conclusions. The first chapter 
discusses the rise of King Abdulaziz and the Saudi achievement of a sense of 
statehood. It explores the early Life of King Abdulaziz, discusses the territorial 
conquests and expansion (the conquest of Riyadh and the rest of Najd, al-Hasa, Asir, 
Hail and the North, al-Hijaz and Jaizan), examines the transformation from tribalism 
towards a concept of community and traces the early international relations of Ibn 
Saud with the Turks and British. 
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The second chapter is an evaluative review of literature and it examines the 
international relations and foreign policy of newly-emerging states. It presents a 
typology of newly-emerging states, assesses the foreign policy problems confronting 
them (such as establishing a new national identity, building political structure and 
foreign policy institutions, finding the right leadership, achieving political stability, 
securing economic resources, coping with the colonial legacy and maintaining 
national security), and outlining the specific features of foreign policy-making in 
newly emerging states. 
Chapter three sheds light on the genesis of Saudi foreign policy structure. It analyses 
the role of King Abdulaziz as a leader, examines the role of his counsellors, traces the 
evolution of Saudi Foreign Ministry and other governmental institutions and 
ascertains the influence of other internal factors (such as the Royal Family, religious 
scholars and the tribes) on King Abdulaziz's foreign policy making. 
Chapter four discusses Saudi Arabia's policy towards the affairs of the Arabian 
Peninsula. It maps the general features of King Abdulaziz's policy towards the 
Peninsula, analyses Ibn Saud's relations with the individual Gulf Shaikhdoms 
(Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Shaikhdoms of the Lower Gulf and the Sultanate of 
Oman) and addresses the Saudi-Yemeni relations. 
The fifth chapter discusses the policy of King Abdulaziz towards the Arab World. It 
deals with the Palestine Problem (The King's action on the Palestinian-Arab front, his 
policy towards Britain as the Mandatory Power in Palestine and his stance towards 
the Zionist activity) and appraises the King's policy towards colonialism in Arab 
countries (his relationship with Arab leaders and the Arab national liberation 
movements and his approach to inter-Arab relations). 
Chapter six focuses on the King's policy regarding Islamic affairs. It examines the 
King's vision of the Islamic identity of Saudi Arabia, attempts to visualise King 
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Abdulaziz's worldview and the role of Islam in it and then discusses King Abdulaziz's 
foreign policy towards the Muslim states. 
The seventh chapter analyses the King's relations with Britain after the Treaty of 
Jeddah of 1927. It addresses the role of the Ikhwan rebellion, Saudi diplomatic crisis 
with the British Ambassador, the question of oil concessions and the Saudi financial 
crisis, the growth of the Italian and German influence around the period of the Second 
World War, the British position on the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry and al-Buraimi oasis 
dispute and Britain's protection of the Gulf Shaikhdoms. 
Chapter eight evaluates the Saudi policy towards the United States of America. It 
discusses the Saudi response towards early American contacts, the factors behind the 
granting of an oil concession to an American company, the importance of the Saudi- 
American summit meeting, the King's attempts to influence U. S. policy on Palestine, 
the mutual Saudi-American security relationship and the American assistance to 
Saudi Arabia in the area of development. 
The conclusions of the study summarise the major findings arrived at through the 
course of this work. 
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Chapter One: Towards Statehood: The Rise of Abdulaziz 
1.1 The Early Life of Abdulaziz Ibn Saud 
Abdulaziz Ibn Abdulrahman Ibn Faisal al-Saudi is known as Ibn Saud (Williams, 
1933: 25; Philby, 1955: 240). A ruler highly regarded by his people, his great 
achievement was the unification of the warring tribes, which had different interests, 
and the creation of the Saudi state, establishing its unity and national identity, and 
laying the foundations of its modern evolution (al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 6). He perceived 
his success to have derived from his faith in Islam and his determination to maintain 
and build on the traditions of the region. It remains this unique combination of faith 
and respect for traditions, while adapting to the technological developments of the 
modern world, which characterizes Saudi Arabia today (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 
156-159). 
Al-Zirikli (1977a: 58) mentions that some writers have cited from Abd al- Aziz as 
saying that he was born in 1880, a date which is supported by the famous British 
writer H. St. John Philby (1952: 1). Many others have given different dates. Some 
believe that he was born as early as 1867 (Muzil, 1928: 301). Others state that he was 
born in 1876, a date confirmed by his brother, Prince Abdullah (al- Zirikli, 1977a: 58), 
and also by his son, Prince Talal (al-Saud, 1990: 26); the latter date of birth is agreed 
upon by the majority of writers on the subject (al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 45). Ibn Saud 
spent his childhood years in Riyadh, and thus witnessed the struggle within the Saudi 
household for the leadership, which ended with them falling under the domination of 
Ibn Rasheed, who conquered Riyadh in 1890-1891, expelling most of Al Saud to Hail 
(Troeller, 1976: 19; Rashid and Shaheen, 1987: 10). Some of Al Saud sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries, as what Imam Abdulrahman did when he emigrated with his 
family, among them his son Abdulaziz, to seek refuge among the neighbouring tribes, 
then on to Qatar for a period of approximately two months, then to Bahrain for a short 
time and finally to Kuwait, where they settled for a decade. Abdulaziz stayed in 
Kuwait until he began his struggle to build his modern state (al-'Asaly, 1999: 33). 
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1.2 Territorial Conquest and Expansion 
1.2.1 The Conquest of Riyadh and the Consolidation of Sovereignty in Najd 
The history of modern Saudi Arabia began in 1902, when Ibn Saud left Kuwait 
during the autumn of 1901, as Philby (1955: 239) writes, with forty of his devoted 
friends, and reached Riyadh in January 1902. Some writers indicated that the total 
number of his men was about sixty (al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 359; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 84). 
The retaking of Riyadh was to be the essential step in re-establishing his ancestors' 
realm and demonstrated his brilliant leadership and his personal boldness. These were 
important factors in convincing the people of Najd to trust and obey him. Goldberg 
(1986: 48) stated "The capture of Riyadh by Ibn Saud on the night of January 15, 
1902, was an almost unprecedented military adventure ". 
Under cover of night, together with several other volunteers, Ibn Saud stealthily made 
his way to a part of the city wall which he knew they could easily scale. The small 
group quietly made its way to an empty house close to the residence of Ajlan (the 
Governor of Riyadh). They entered the empty house, climbed to the roof and, by 
leaping from one roof to the next, quickly reached the Governor's residence. While 
Ibn Saud was waiting, he sent one of his men to his brother Mohammad to ask him to 
bring his group into Riyadh. Shortly after sunrise, Ajlan emerged from the fort of al- 
Musmaq into the street. With his quarry in the open, Abdulaziz gave a loud battle cry 
as a signal to attack. Ajlan fled, and Ibn Saud, with his companions, gave hot pursuit. 
Quickly cornered, Ajlan defended himself briefly until the spear of Abdullah Ibn 
Jelawi cut him down (Howarth, 1964: 20-23; al-'Assaly, 1999: 42; Rashid and 
Shaheen, 1987: 17-22). 
The Rasheedi garrison of Riyadh was utterly demoralized by the unexpected attack 
and the death of their leader. Assuming that only a large and well-equipped force 
could have mounted such an assault, they laid down their arms and surrendered 
ý. ý -ý xýý ý _ý. ý_ .. ý.. _a . ý. <..,,. _. oý 
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without further resistance. Riyadh now belonged to Abdulaziz and Al Saud were once 
more masters in their own home (Lacey, 1981: 52; Rashid and Shaheen, 1987: 21-22). 
At noon of that day, thousands of Riyadh's citizens welcomed the return of Al Saud, 
and gathered to swear an oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to the young hero and pray 
behind him in Riyadh's Grand Mosque (Lacey, 1981: 52). 
After the retaking of Riyadh, Ibn Saud wasted no time in expanding his authority. His 
drive for consolidation was successful and he managed to break the stranglehold of 
al-Rasheed and push them as far as Jabal Shammar in northern Najd. At this point, 
however, al-Rasheed made a desperate appeal to the Turks, who sent them 
reinforcements. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud's desert fighters kept control of the situation 
in Najd. Through diplomatic negotiations at one time, and guerrilla warfare at 
another, Ibn Saud forced the Ottoman Empire to recall its troops from Najd. It could 
be said that Ibn Saud, at the end of 1911, enjoyed complete control over most of the 
Najd area including al-Kharj, al-Washm, Sudair and al-Qaseem (Vassiliev, 1998: 
212-225). According to Ghazal (1984: 113), Ibn Saud had consolidated his authority 
in central Najd by the end of 1911. He then took advantage of the temporary peace 
and shifted his attention to internal affairs. 
1.2.2 Expansion into al-Hasa 
Having accomplished his objective of consolidating the region of Najd, Ibn Saud 
turned his attention to al-Hasa and the area of the Arabian Gulf, which was still under 
Turkish rule. The Turks kept up their pressure on Ibn Saud and supported the other 
forces ranged against him, such as Sharif Husain and Ibn Rasheed, and also some of 
the tribes that had formerly been his followers (al-Rayhani, 1988: 205). Also, the 
Turks tightened the economic embargo on Ibn Saud by imposing restrictions on 
commercial exchange with al-Hijaz and al-Hasa (Hamzah, 1968: 376). In addition, Ibn 
Saud believed that al-Hasa was part of the Saudi state and shared its long history; but 
the Turks had occupied it in violation of his rights (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 261- 
162). 
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Most of the people of al-Hasa, including some powerful and influential chiefs, such 
as Ibraheem al-Qusaibi, Hassan Ibn Jabur, Abdulrahman al-Rashid, Abdullah al- 
Mulla and Abdulrahman al-Jughaiman, wrote to Ibn Saud asking him to free them 
and their region from the Turks. ' Ibn Saud saw that the time was right to expel the 
Turks from al-Hasa, because their continuing presence there would threaten his state 
from the East. By removing them he would secure a passage to the sea. He therefore 
began preparing for a bold and well-planned offensive (Nakhlah, 1980: 231-232; 
Rashid and Shaheen, 1987: 27). Calculating that the Ottoman Empire would be 
preoccupied with uprisings in Europe, and that Britain would remain neutral, Ibn 
Saud launched a successful assault in May 1913, and succeeded in consolidating his 
authority in al-Hasa (Rashid and Shaheen, 1987: 27; McLoughlin, 1993: 36). As a 
result, negotiations started between the Turks and Ibn Saud and ended with Ibn 
Saud's recognition of the Ottoman Caliph suzerainty over Ibn Saud's territories, and 
the Turks recognised Ibn Saud's authority. They signed this treaty on 15 May 19142 
(Troeller, 1976: 43-61; Vassiliev, 1998: 231-233; Aghlag, 2002: 127-129&200). 
1.2.3 Ibn Saud Conquers Asir 
The Battle of Turabah, in which Ibn Saud's followers defeated those of Sharif Husain 
in 1919,3 was one of the most decisive battles in the history of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Kostiner (1993: 31) writes: "Turabah led to an unprecedented collision course 
between the Nejdi and Sharifi forces ". Ibn Saud's victory against an army which was 
well prepared and well equipped with modern weapons, ended the Sharif's ambition 
This information was supplied by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in 
Riyadh on 17 January 2004. Shaikh Ahmad represented his country, Saudi Arabia, as an Ambassador 
in several places before his retirement in 1995. His latest position was the Saudi Ambassador in Qatar. 
2 India Office, L/P&S/10/385, despatch from Terence H. Keyes, the British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to Stuart G. Knox, the Deputy British Political Resident in Bushire, on 30 June 1914; India Office, 
L/P&S/12/2134, copy of the treaty of 1914 between Ibn Saud and the Turks. 
3 American Archives, 890 F. 00/8, despatch from the American Consul in Aden to the American 
Secretary of State on 20 September 1919. 
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in Najd and enhanced the morale of Ibn Saud and his army, increasing their strength 
and fearlessness (Graves, 1950: 181-182; al-Salloom, 1995: 35). 
After Ibn Saud's victory at Turabah, the majority of the people of the Asir region, 
especially the tribes of the Asir Mountains, began to complain about the policy of al- 
'Ayids, the rulers of Asir. Some of the tribal representatives made their complaints to 
Ibn Saud, because he was the rising leader in this region, and the only one who would 
be able to liberate them from their unsatisfactory leaders. The people of Asir were 
also aware of the religious tie binding them to the people of Najd, who had followed 
the same beliefs (al- Madhhab al-Salafi) from the early days (al-Saud, 1992: 30). 
There was also a long-standing political, economic and social relationship between 
Najd and Asir. Some of the tribes, such as Qahtan, Shahran, Ghamid and Zahran, 
resisted al-'Ayids. They also continued to demand Ibn Saud's protection, declaring 
their full recognition of his leadership and respect for his support (Hamzah, 1968: 389; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 259). 
Ibn Saud sent a group of scholars from Najd to mediate, but the Asir Governor 
rejected this intervention, regarding it as interference in his internal affairs. Ibn Saud 
was then obliged to intervene directly to help those people who had sought his aid, 
fearing the advance of Sharif Husain to the region. In 1920, Ibn Saud sent his army, 
under the command of his cousin, Abdulaziz Ibn Musa'ad, and entered Abha after al- 
'Ayids' defeat in Battle of Hijla. He then captured the heads of the al-'Ayids family 
and moved them to Riyadh, but later returned them to Asir as a sign of respect. 
Despite this courtesy, they eventually rebelled against him, which endangered his 
dominance in the region in danger (al-Rayhani, 1988: 300-302). However, in 1922, 
just a few months after conquering Hail and strengthening his control of Asir, Ibn 
Saud sent to these regions his son, Prince Faisal, and six thousand fighters, who were 
later joined by another four thousand from Qahtan, Shahran and Zahran. Prince Faisal 
and his army continued their advance until they reached Abha. After that, Prince 
Faisal then completed his offensive against al-'Ayids and consolidated Saudi 
sovereignty in Asir before the end of 1922, by appointing Sa'ad Ibn `Ufaisan as 
Governor of the Province. After Ibn `Ufaisan's death, Abdulaziz Ibn Ibraheem, who 
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was known for his wisdom, was appointed, and later succeeded in convincing al- 
'Ayids of their wrongdoing and moved them to Riyadh, thus ending their rebellion in 
the region (al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 178-180). 
1.2.4 The Taking of Hail and the North 
In 1920, the household of al-Rasheed started to damage and undermine their own 
position through organized crimes and acts of murders within their Royal House. The 
Prince of Hail was killed by one of his relatives, who was himself immediately killed. 
A thirteen-year-old boy was then made head of the family (Troeller, 1976: 168; al- 
Rasheed, 1998: 235). Harmed by these events, the Hail region had also been 
weakened economically and militarily by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 
First World War. Ibn Saud was apprehensive that the weakness of the Hail region 
might invite other forces to intervene in its internal affairs, specially the Sharif in al- 
Hijaz, which could threaten his military position. He therefore resolved to end the 
independence of the Hail region and to add it to the other provinces of the Arabian 
Peninsula (al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 167-169; al-Rasheed, 1998: 232-235). So, in 1920, 
Ibn Saud lunched an attack against Hail and its surrounding area, by sending his 
brother, Prince Mohammad, and his son, Prince Saud, with approximately six 
thousand fighters. They created a sustained blockade around Hail. Prince Mohammad 
returned to Riyadh but Prince Saud stayed in the region until the Governor of Hail 
surrendered in person to him, fearing that he would be killed by his cousin, 
Mohammad Ibn Talal, who had come back to Hail from al-Jawf, claiming Hail's 
leadership (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 254). 
In mid-August 1921, Ibn Saud went to Hail at the head of a large army. He intensified 
his siege of Hail until it surrendered in November, thus ending the rule of the al- 
Rasheed Family. Ibn Saud designated Ibraheem Ibn Sabhan, as Governor of Hail; Ibn 
Sabhan was known for his role in convincing the people of Hail to end their 
opposition. He was then replaced by Prince Abdulaziz Ibn Musa'ad as Governor of 
Hail and the Northern Regions (al-Salloom, 1995: 40-41). In 1922, Ibn Saud expanded 
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his western and northern borders by adding Taima, Khaibar, al-Jawf and the al- 
Sarhan valley area, thus strengthening his domination and sovereignty over the region 
as a whole (Hamzah, 1968: 388). 
1.2.5 The Conquest of al-Hijaz 
Ibn Saud became convinced that the three neighbouring governments of al-Hijaz, 
Trans-Jordan and Iraq entertained ambitions regarding his territories and were 
working together to threaten the stability of his Government. ' This conspiracy 
became evident during the Kuwait Conference which was organized by the British 
Government to resolve the border disputes and the tribal problems existing between 
Najd and Its Dependencies, with Iraq, Trans-Jordan and al-Hijaz. The Conference 
took place in Kuwait in 1923-1924 as a neutral land (Troeller, 1976: 198; Wahbah, 
1964: 148). 
At this time, Sharif Husain was also condemned by the people of al-Hijaz for his 
policies. He even differed with his sons, his counsellors, and most of the Arabs and 
non-Arab Muslims, particularly when he declared war against the Turks (the Caliphs 
of Islam), under the banner of the Arab Revolt in 1916 (Graves, 1950: 187; Baker, 
1979: 173; al-Salloom, 1995: 46; Wahbah 1964: 147). In the eyes of many, he was 
responsible for the increased Western colonial presence, which had replaced the 
Ottoman power. By involving the Arabs in the war, he forced them into internal 
disputes and, moreover, created a dangerous problem for the Arab countries, whose 
citizens now were compelled to deal with two alien imperial powers, Britain and 
1 This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter, during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. A1-Khuwaiter is a Saudi Minister of State and member of the Saudi Council of 
Ministers. He was the former Minister of Education; 'Umm al-Oura Newspaer, Issue No. 236,5 July 
1929, and Issue No. 389,27 May 1932. 
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France. His policy angered the Arabs and provoked them to seek revenge' (al- 
Salloom, 1995: 46). 
Furthermore, Sharif Husain's religious position was also precarious, due to the 
absence of security in the Holy Places, and the failure to provide the pilgrims with the 
basic facilities they needed when performing Hajj. For example, medical services 
were either lacking or difficult to obtain. Baker (1979: 177) described al-Hijaz at that 
time as the hunting ground of charlatans, rogues, adventurers and carpetbaggers of 
every hue. 2 This made the people of al-Hijaz long for strong leadership and so they 
began to contact Ibn Saud secretly, which led the Great Powers' legations in Jeddah, 
including Britain's, to adopt a neutral position between Sharif Husain and Ibn Saud. 3 
Gradually, the legations of Great Powers in Jeddah became convinced that security in 
the Holy Places would be threatened more under Sharif Husain's leadership and that a 
strong and influential leader was needed to guarantee peace and security for their 
Muslim followers during the Hajj. 4 There were also disagreements between the Sharif 
and some Arab delegations, which led the Egyptian delegation to leave al-Hijaz in 
1921. Disagreement also grew between the Sharif and Indian pilgrims, then under 
British control, over many issues, such as the higher taxes, and the poor sanitary and 
medical facilities provided for them ('Abduh, 1945: 109; Wahbah, 1964: 146-147; 
Howarth, 1964: 140; Vassiliev, 1998: 260). 
1 This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; Bakur al-'Amri also supported this idea during my interview with him in Jeddah on 1 
January 2004. Bakur al 'Amri was former Professor of the Political Sciences in the University of King 
Abdulaziz in Jeddah. Now he is the Head of Customs Appellate Court in the Makkah Province. 
2 This was supported by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz, Head of the Saudi Centre 
for Strategic Studies. This was during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
3 This was supported by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz and Bakur al-'Amri during 
my interview with them in Jeddah on 31 December 2003; this was also supported by Abdulaziz al- 
Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
4 This was supported by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz during my interview with 
him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003; this also was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my 
interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
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Adding to the Sharif s loss of his religious and international position were the taxes 
and fees imposed on pilgrims during their different Hajj phases. Sharif Husain relied 
on those taxes as a primary income, benefiting him personally and enriching his state. 
This situation led to the breakdown of relationships between him and the consulates 
of the countries that had large numbers of pilgrims, including some African countries, 
India and Indonesia, and those of the colonial powers, Britain and Holland (Graves, 
1950: 182; Howarth, 1964: 140; Lacey, 1981: 88-89; Vassiliev, 1998: 206). In addition, 
proclaiming himself as the Caliph, in March 1924, brought regional and international 
pressures to bear on him, since this act was rejected by many Muslim leaders, such as 
the King of Egypt, and the Islamic governments in South Asia and Iran (Vassiliev, 
1998: 261; Alangari, 1998: 128-141; Howarth, 1964: 141). The Sharif also lacked 
recognition by Ibn Saud and his followers in Najd (Vassiliev, 1998: 261; Howarth, 
1964: 141). Baker (1979: 184-187) regarded this act by Sharif Husain as a form of 
political suicide and added that the Sharif was finished as the ruler of the Arabs, 
Muslims, and even Hijazis. In addition, the Sharifs act alienated him from Britain, 
which realized it had lost control over him (Vassiliev, 1998: 261; Alangari, 1998: 128- 
141; Howarth, 1964: 141). 
It has been maintained that Ibn Saud was convinced of his military ability to take al- 
Hijaz since the victory at Turabah in 1919, but he waited for a suitable time, 
(Howarth, 1964: 141). In 1924 all circumstances were suitable for Ibn Saud to take the 
initiative against Sharif Husain since the Sharif alienated himself from all his 
neighbours and allies. This was in view of his policies and attitudes, such as the 
diplomatic dispute with Britain over several issues, among them were the question of 
the Caliphate, 2 the issue of Palestine and the Mandate policies, the dispute with 
France over Syria, the problem with India over its pilgrims, the problem with King 
Fuad of Egypt, when the Sharif called himself the King of Arabs and the Caliph, the 
1 This was confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on II January 2004. 
Lateefah al-Salloom is the Delegate Member to the Assessment Centre for Girls' Colleges, Ministry of 
Education in Saudi Arabia. 
2 This was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
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problem with Ibn Saud for the same reason and also over the boundaries between 
them, and the disagreements with his sons regarding their conception of what 
constitute Arab interests including their attitudes towards Britain policy in the area. 
Day by day, Sharif Husain isolated himself from the international community, while, 
domestically, the situation with the people of al-Hijaz and his internal affairs was far 
worse' (Baker, 1979: 173). 
Ibn Saud had all the available reasons to justify launching his offensive against the 
Sharif. Ibn Saud suffered a great deal from the Sharifs standing in the way of Ikhwan 
(Ibn Saud's followers) who wanted to attack al-Hijaz, having been refused permission 
to perform the Hajj by the Sharif since the famous Battle of Turabah in 1919.2 That 
was one of the major reasons behind Abdulaziz's conquest of al-Hijaz. 3 The Ikhwan 
urged Ibn Saud, through their leaders, to allow them to go on Hajj, and even to use 
force if the Sharif did not permit them into al-Hijaz. The religious scholars decided 
upon a Fatwa (legal opinion) to go on Hajj. By an agreement with them, Ibn Saud 
officially announced his intention to conquer al-Hijaz (al-Rayhani, 1988: 326). It has 
been maintained that the lkhwan, sooner or later, would have invaded al-Hijaz to 
perform the Hajj. 4 This fact was seen as an important factor for British neutrality in 
the Najdi-Hijazi dispute. ' Another important reason for Britain's neutral position was 
1 This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004. 
2 This was supported by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak, during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; this was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in 
Riyadh, on 19 January 2004. 
3 His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz insists that this was the major reason for Ibn 
Saud's occupation of al-Hijaz. This was indicated during my interviews with him in Jeddah on 31 
December 2003 and 1 January 2004; also this was supported by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my 
interview with him in Riyadh on 17 January 2004; See also 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 236,5 
July 1929, and Issue No. 389,27 May 1932. 
4 This was supported by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; this was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in 
Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
5 This was supported by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004 
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its realization that the Hijazi people, including part of the Sharifs Royal Family, were 
welcoming Ibn Saud. ' However, as has been maintained, Britain, at this time, was not 
able to stop the advance of Ibn Saud and his followers, due to the fact that they could 
not, economically or militarily, support Sharif Husain any longer. 2 
The army started moving in 1924 from Turabah, with approximately three thousand 
fighters, led by Sultan Ibn Bijad and Khalid Ibn Luway. They arrived at al-Hawiyyah 
and then at al-Taif, where they were encountered by the Hashemite army under the 
command of Sabri Basha al-'Azzawi. The Hashemite army retreated and, after two 
days, Prince Ali and the main Hijazi army reached al-Hada. After a few skirmishes 
with the Saudis, the Saudi fighters broke through al-Taif. They plundered it and many 
people were murdered, 3 until the arrival of Ibn Bijad three days later. These acts left a 
negative impact on the Hijazi and the Najdian communities as well. Ibn Saud 
denounced such acts and ordered his army not to repeat them. He also gave his 
promise to protect the people of al-Hijaz and their properties and to compensate those 
affected in al-Taif (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 330-331; Vassiliev, 1998: 261). 
The fighting continued until the defeat of Prince Ali al-Sharif, who then went to 
Makkah to meet his father and then to Jeddah. In those circumstances, and in the light 
of the shock of the defeat of Sharif Husain's forces, the people in Makkah and Jeddah, 
fearing the consequences of his policy, asked him to step down from the Hashemite 
throne and let his son, Sharif Ali, take over. He refused, at first, then agreed; so his 
son came to Makkah, and then Sharif Husain left for Jeddah and went by sea to al- 
`Agabah in Jordan. At the same time, the Saudi army had stopped in al-Taif and 
written to Ibn Saud asking for his permission to advance and capture Makkah. He 
1 This was indicated by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz and Bakur al-'Amri during 
my interview with them in Jeddah on 31 December 2003; this was also supported by Abdulaziz al- 
Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
2 This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
3 American Archives, 890 F. 00/43, despatch from J. L. Park, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to the 
American Secretary of State, on 7 October 1924. 
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ordered them not to go into the Holy Place until he arrived, or, if there was no 
resistance at all against them, to go in. That was exactly what happened. When Sharif 
Ali found that he could not defend Makkah, he left, allowing the Saudi forces to enter 
Makkah in October 1924, promising the people there peace and security (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 332-333; al-Rayhani, 1988: 336-351). As soon as his followers entered 
Makkah, Ibn Saud left Riyadh for Makkah at the head of five thousand of his 
followers. He entered the city on 5 December 1924 (Vassiliev, 1998: 262). 
It is important to note that the Consuls representing the foreign governments in 
Jeddah wrote to Khalid Ibn Luway, Prince of Makkah, who had been appointed by 
Ibn Saud, confirming to him their neutral position regarding the war between Najd 
and al-Hijaz. They wrote asking for a guarantee of safety for their citizens in case the 
war continued. Khalid Ibn Luway agreed and let Ibn Saud know of this good news 
while he was on his way to Makkah. Ibn Saud welcomed the neutral position of these 
countries and felt that al-Hijaz now belonged to him although he suspected that 
Britain might intervene to the benefit of his enemies (ibid: 262). 
Jeddah had been under siege since January 1925. After the end of the Hajj, the Saudi 
army began to tighten the siege on Jeddah, fearing that Sharif Ali might attack again 
to liberate al-Hijaz from the Saudis. Although Ibn Saud had the power to enter 
Jeddah, he preferred to sustain the siege until the city surrendered and not to cause 
more bloodshed. The same happened to al-Madinah. The Saudi army, under Faisal al- 
Dawish, besieged it for ten months. After the people of al-Madinah gave themselves 
up, they asked Ibn Saud if they could be governed by one of his sons rather than al- 
Dawish. He agreed and appointed his son, Prince Mohammad, in December 1925, as 
Prince of al-Madinah. However, the situation in Jeddah was different. Prince Ali 
found that he could not get help from his brothers in Iraq and Trans-Jordan when 
additional Saudi forces arrived at al-Raghamah, under the command of Princes 
Abdullah Ibn Abdulrahman and Faisal Ibn Abdulaziz. So, Sharif Ali asked the British 
Consul to mediate between him and Ibn Saud so that he could surrender and leave the 
city. Ibn Saud agreed and let Sharif Ali leave with his belongings for any place he 
chose, and also agreed to guarantee the safety of the people of Jeddah. Ibn Saud 
17 
entered Jeddah after Sharif Ali had left in December 1925, thus proclaiming his 
sovereignty over al-Hijaz and becoming the new King of al-Hijaz (al-Salloom, 
1995: 55-56; Vassiliev, 1998: 264). 
1.2.6 Ibn Saud adds Jaizan 
The Jaizan region was governed by al-Idreesi, who had been committed to a 
neighbourhood treaty with Ibn Saud since the latter occupied Asir in 1920. The Imam 
of Yemen did not dispute this treaty, although he would have liked to take control of 
Jaizan. Rivalry within the al-Idreesi family started after the death of Mohammad al- 
Idreesi; this resulted in a power vacuum in Jaizan. This situation encouraged the 
Imam of Yemen to attack Jaizan at a time when Ibn Saud was preoccupied in al- 
Hijaz. The advancing Yemeni army occupied al-Hudaidah and its northern regions 
(al-Zirikli, 1977a: 535; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 205-207). 
In this situation, al-Hasan al-Idreesi took the leadership of Jaizan and asked for 
support from the Italians and British, which they did not give. This coincided with the 
difficulties Ibn Saud was facing in al-Hijaz. Al-Idreesi saw that the only way to stop 
the advance of the Yemenis into his region and save what was left was to ask for the 
protection of Ibn Saud. So, in 1926, ' he signed a treaty with Ibn Saud, giving Ibn 
Saud the right to control foreign affairs and stop any aggression against this region, 
leaving the Idreesi in control of internal affairs. When al-Idreesi resigned in 1930,2 
full control over this region was exercised by Ibn Saud, who then integrated it into the 
rest of his kingdom (Wenner, 1967: 144; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 535-536; al-'Uthaimeen, 
1999: 206-207). 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 014, despatch from Henry P. Fletcher at the American Embassy in Rome 
to the American Secretary of State, on 25 February 1927. 
2 This was supported by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; this was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 
January 2004. 
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It has been explained that al-Idreesi Governor resigned completely in favour of Ibn 
Saud for several reasons, among which was the internal dispute within the Idreesi 
family itself and also with their people. ' Also, the threat from Imam Yahya of Yemen 
was a main reason, which convinced al-Idreesi to give in completely to Ibn Saud, for 
he would have lost everything if Ibn Saud had decided to take over and do what he 
had done with Sharif Husain. 2 With the consolidation of his sovereignty in Jaizan, Ibn 
Saud accomplished the unification of most of the Arabian Peninsula under his 
leadership as one political unit, which came to be known, from 1932 onwards, as "the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia". 
1.3 Transformation from Tribalism Towards a Sense of Community 
Under Ibn Saud's Leadership 
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud was one of the most influential leaders in modem Arab history in 
view of his unification of various regions of the Arabian Peninsula and his creation of 
a modem state, bringing its people from internal factionalism, isolation and a 
nomadic way of life to be citizens of a modern urban society, in the context of a 
unified political system. By doing so, he believed that he had achieved his goal of 
promoting the word of Allah and the unification of his nation, with divine help and 
relying on his faith, good character and confidence. Ibn Saud was able to create a 
balance between his belief in Allah and the noble Islamic teachings on the one hand, 
and his loyalty to the customs and traditions of his people, which, he believed, did not 
conflict with Islam, on the other. This helped him to gain the confidence of his 
people, who came to trust his leadership, a trust which enabled him to create his 
modern state (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 156-159; al-Khuwaiter, 1998: 30-36). 
1 This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
2 This was stated by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
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Armstrong (1934: 291-292) stated "Ibn Saud is Lord of Arabia ruling by the force of 
his personality and the strength of his own right arm ". He added, "He stands, basing 
himself four square on his trust in God, straddled across Arabia holding the whole 
land and its people between his clenched fist. He is inspired by a driving Belief, the 
belief that he has been entrusted by God with a mission to knit all Arabs into one 
People, to lead them back to the greatness of their forefathers, and to make the Word 
of God Supreme. " In addition to Ibn Saud's strict belief in God, he had a charismatic 
authority, manifested in his physical features and behaviour, which convinced his 
followers of his powerful leadership and his courage. Several writers have remarked 
that Ibn Saud was more then six feet tall, with a good physique, handsome features 
and fair skin. In addition to this, he had excellent political and diplomatic abilities, 
which impressed his tribal followers (al-'Aqqad, N. D.: 24-35; Almana, 1980: 243-245; 
al-Zirikli, 1977a: 735; Holden and Johns, 1981: 64). 
Ibn Saud was well-known for being frank, clear and modest in his dealings with 
others, which the people of the Arabian Peninsula appreciated, especially the men of 
the tribes. He was keen to avoid the use of force or to adopt a dictatorial manner in 
his leadership. His belief in God, sincerity in his religion and his modesty, enabled his 
people to get direct access to him; they would call him by his first name and he would 
almost always know them personally' (De Gaury, 1946: 83). In addition, his unlimited 
generosity had a great impact on his followers, because in the Arab world generosity 
is an important aspect of leadership. Ibn Saud was also transparent in his speeches, 
with a clear and understandable language, using the most direct words. He would 
come straight to the point, which was what his people liked in him. 2 Ibn Saud was 
also patient and slow to anger, which earned him much credit among his people and 
this helped him in his decision-making. It could be said that Ibn Saud was born a 
leader and that no leader in the Peninsula was better equipped than him in his 
profound religiousness, generosity, humanity and simplicity (Williams, 1933: 253- 
259; Almana, 1980: 229-242; al-Khuwaiter, 1998: 19-36). McLoughlin (1993: 67) 
' 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 283,5 May 1930; al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, October, 
1987, pp. 48-49. 
21 [ýmm al-Dora Newspaper, Issue No. 283,5 May 1930. 
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notes that after al-Rayhani met Ibn Saud he stated clearly his opinion of him, "I have 
now met all the Kings of Arabia and I find no one among them bigger than this man. 
He is big in word and gesture and style as well as in purpose and self-confidence. " 
The confidence of the people of the Arabian Peninsula in Ibn Saud's leadership and 
the clarity and dignity of his objectives lay behind their obedience to him and their 
welcoming of his leadership from the first time he entered Riyadh. They stood with 
him to achieve his goals, one of which was the unification of the Arabian Peninsula, 
and asked him for help against their local leaders, in provinces such as al-Hasa, Asir 
and Jaizan. It was within only four years of entering Riyadh that he found himself the 
most influential and powerful leader in the heart of Najd. Philby (1930: 199) wrote 
that, by the end of 1906, Ibn Saud found himself in a stronger political position in 
Najd, since his two opponents (al-Rasheed and the Turks) were no longer a threat to 
him. As a result, he worked to strengthen his power and develop his administration of 
the regions under his authority. These regions at that time were without the 
administrative or governmental foundations of a modern state. The reason for this 
was that Najd, which was regarded as the heart of the newly emerging state, had not 
been subjected to any foreign rule, ' from which it could have benefited in terms of 
governmental structure and experience (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 29; Harik, 1987: 19). 
It is worth mentioning here that in order to overcome this lack of governmental 
experience, Ibn Saud sought help from a number of Arab experts, who assisted him in 
implementing new ideas and methods in state administration and government 
structure. Ibn Saud also believed in the principle of providing opportunities to anyone 
who wanted to work for the new state. Those who came to him, with the will and the 
determination to work, were given responsible positions in government, whether or 
not they were from the Peninsula. Their abilities, achievements, honesty and respect 
for their duties were rewarded with promotions (Kostiner, 1993: 105; Howarth, 
1964: 116; al-Mareq, 1978: 311: 314; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 1011-1014). 
' Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, in 'Ida'at Programme, on al-'Arabiyyah 
TV Channel, on 9 June 2004; also, Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 
December 2003. 
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Ghazal (1984: 113) states that the year 1911 was a quiet period in Ibn Saud's reign 
within Najd. He used this time to attend to internal affairs. This was the right time to 
execute the ambitious project he had planned for so long. This great project was the 
settlement of the Bedouins, which began in 1912 with the creation of the first 
settlement (Hijrah) of al-Artawiyyah, whose population consisted of Bedouins from 
the Harb and Mutair tribes (Mcloughlin, 1993: 42; Vassiliev, 1998: 228). Ibn Saud's 
concern at this time, with administrative development and the creation of a modern 
state dated back to earlier in his reign. His intention was to settle the Bedouin in 
groups, for he wanted to enhance their development and prosperity so that he could 
move towards promoting Islam among them, ' which would enlarge the Saudi 
influence (Mcloughlin, 1993: 43). He wanted the Bedouins to transfer their loyalty 
from the tribe to the newly emerging state and its leader. The creation of the 
settlements was therefore an important step in the construction of the country, and it 
helped Ibn Saud to unify the different regions of Saudi Arabia2 (Helms, 1981: 127). 
This was one of Ibn Saud's most significant achievements in his country's internal 
affairs, because the majority of the inhabitants of the central Arabian Peninsula were 
nomad Bedouins. Ibn Saud chose the policy of settling them in civilized regions so 
that they could learn other ways of living, such as agriculture and other professions 
which would benefit the country, rather than stay as shepherds. To achieve that, he 
ordered the designation of localities for each tribe according to its size and the 
number of its people. The localities had to be close to water resources. He then sent 
Muslim scholars to advise the Bedouin and urge them to live in those localities, and 
educate and teach them the Islamic beliefs and values, and guide them to devote their 
efforts to the political unification of all the regions of the Peninsula. To achieve his 
aim, Ibn Saud used both intimidation and temptation, whereby he made all Bedouins 
in the areas under his influence rush to his call. He gave them instructions for the 
1 This was also argued by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz during my interview with 
him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003; also, this was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my 
interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
2 This was maintained by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 
2003; this was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 
2004. 
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execution of his idea and persuaded them that they would benefit from his big project 
(al-Zirikli, 1977a: 259-268; Howarth, 1964: 16; al-Rayhani, 1988: 258-266). 
At the end of 1920, according to Vassiliev (1998: 228) the number of settlements (al- 
Hijar) had reached 52, and increased to 72 in 1923, and by 1929, there were 120 
settlements. Lacey (1982: 146) and Helms (1981: 137), however, stated that there 
were more than 200 settlements, which provided Ibn Saud with approximately sixty 
thousand fighters. Whatever the truth about the number of settlements, Ibn Saud had 
successfully realised his plan. The localities were more stable and more civilized, far 
better than the previous way of life of the nomad Bedouin. That was confirmed by 
Philby (1930: 227) who stated that in 1927 the number of inhabitants in these 
settlements reached more than one hundred thousand and the number of fighters was 
estimated at approximately fifty thousand. 
After Ibn Saud had achieved the goal of settlement, he was able to achieve several 
further goals, among which was bringing an end to invasion and plundering among 
the tribes and uniting them in larger societies under one central government and 
leadership. He encouraged them to believe in him as a religious (Imam) and political 
leader than as a tribal chieftain. This was due to the creation of mixed communities 
from different tribes. Moreover, the establishment of the nation's military forces from 
different tribes under the leadership of the central government helped to keep life 
more secure within the regions during Abdulaziz's reign (Helms, 1981: 127-128; al- 
`Uthaimeen, 1999: 164). 
Al-'Assaly (1999: 137) described the attempt of Ibn Saud to transform his people into 
a state community as a great success. And it was indeed. Although it was not 
completely accomplished, Ibn Saud worked to ensure continuity in implementing this 
task until the last day of his life. He did not neglect any development in the state 
institutions, and he introduced all the different means of modern life to the society. 
Al-Zirikli (1977a: 571) pointed out that it was during Ibn Saud's reign, in 1926, that 
Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), from which all government rules and laws 
were issued, was created. Moreover, in 1925-1926, most of the important 
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governmental institutions were created, such as the judicial system (al-Nidham al- 
Qada'i), police authority (Mudiriyyat al-Shurtah al-'Ammah), finance department 
(Mudiriyyat al-Maliyyah) and foreign office (Mudiriyyat al-Kharijiyyah). Also, 
offices dealing with public health, ports management, telegraph, telephone and radio 
networks were created. Surely the King was the one who opened the door to 
civilization at all different levels in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Kostiner, 
1993: 104-105; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 576-580). 
Saudi Arabia went through various phases before becoming what is known today as 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of Ibn Saud's authority, the people of 
Najd used to call him the 'Imam' as they had called his predecessors. The people of 
the region later used to call him Sultan even before he himself officially used the title. 
He was also known by other names such as the Prince, al-Basha, Wali Najd and 
Shaikh. Others called him simply Ibn Saud, until 22 August 1921, when the scholars 
and men of influence of Najd gathered at a conference held in Riyadh and agreed to 
name him Sultan of Najd. Britain, from the beginning, acknowledged this title. After 
he captured the regions of Asir and Hail in 1922 the state was called al-Saltanah al- 
Najdiyyah and Its Dependencies (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 650; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 307). 
After his conquest of the region of al-Hijaz in 1924-1926, the scholars and the 
influential people in Makkah and Jeddah gathered and asked Ibn Saud to agree to 
become the King of al-Hijaz, and declared that they would swear their allegiance 
(bay'ah) to him. Ibn Saud agreed to their demand and set a date for a meeting after 
the Friday (Jum'ah) prayer in the Sacred Mosque on 10 January 1926 to make this 
official. Thus Ibn Saud became the new King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and Its 
Dependencies. He was greeted not only by his own people but also by the consuls of 
foreign powers such as Britain, France, Holland, the Soviet Union and Turkey (al- 
Rayhani, 1988: 427-429; Kostiner, 1993: 68-70). 
After the people of al-Hijaz recognized him as their King, and he acquired the title of 
the King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies, Ibn Saud returned to 
Riyadh in 1927, having already organized affairs in al-Hijaz and consolidated his 
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authority in this important region. As a result of the events in al-Hijaz, the people of 
Riyadh organized a conference in 1927, attended by a great number of scholars and 
the chiefs of the different regions of al-Saltanah al-Najdiyyah and Its Dependencies. 
There it was decided to change 'al-Saltanah al-Najdiyyah and Its Dependencies' to the 
'Kingdom of Najd and Its Dependencies' and to call King Abdulaziz of al-Hijaz its 
King also. On 19 January, King Abdulaziz agreed and issued an order accepting that 
his title would be the King of Hijaz and Najd and Its Dependencies, and the news was 
forwarded to all consuls in his country (al-Salloom, 1995: 64; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 650- 
651). 
1.4 The Middle East in International Relations from the End of the 
First World War 
The Middle East as it is defined today began to take shape in the years following 
the First World War. Most of the Middle East would be the Afro-Asian area of 
the former Ottoman territories. As a result of the Ottoman Empire's defeat, most 
of this region lay under Western colonial rule. However, no single state, either 
from within the area or from outside, was able to establish effective hegemony 
and thus to organise the entire Middle East. In fact, there was not a single 
imperial power, but three. Britain and France divided the bulk of the spoils; Italy 
had to be satisfied with Libya (Brown, 1984: 85-88). 
In general, the weakness of Italy permitted British and French influence to 
dominate the Arab World after 1918. Germany was beaten, the USSR was 
absorbed in revolutionary reconstruction, and USA, after a brief period of 
involvement under Woodrow Wilson, returned to isolationism. Generally 
speaking, the Middle Eastern states were too weak to be true players in the 
international stage. They operated within a framework built and maintained 
primarily by Britain and France (Yapp, 1991: 379-380). In the immediate post- 
war period, the more Westernised Fertile Crescent had no independent states; 
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these existed only in the Arabian Peninsula, where Ibn Saud was creating Saudi 
Arabia and Imam Yahya maintained a precarious independence in Yemen 
(Brown, 1984: 96-97). 
Of the two major powers, Britain's greatest interest was the preservation of peace, 
which it sought through the League of Nation. It claimed that it had no intention 
of defending any part of the region by arms, relying instead on diplomacy, which 
meant, among other tactics, the conciliation of Italy, until Italy's invasion on 
Ethiopia in 1935 created contradictions in British policy (Yapp, 1991: 380-381). 
Britain also was to attempt to appease the Arab states over Palestine (Ibid, 381). 
Communication and oil were also major British interests. With the former centred 
on the Suez Canal, Britain was concerned to guard the eastern shore of the Red 
Sea and the Gulf. Egypt was the key here, being the great junction of sea and air 
communications to Africa, India and the entire East. Despite considerable 
difficulties, Britain succeeded, by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, in securing 
the continuation of the British garrison there and the use of Egyptian facilities in 
time of war (Ibid, 381-383). Thus, Britain exerted its hegemony in Egypt and 
Sudan, and from Kuwait to Aden (Brown, 1984: 113). Furthermore, Britain had 
strong relations with Sharif Husain since the Arab Revolt in 1916, and supported 
the appointment of his sons (Faisal and Abdullah) as rulers in Iraq and Trans- 
Jordan in 1921(Brown, 1984: 121; Kostiner, 1993: 79). 
In general, British-French rivalry dominated the region from roughly the end of 
the First World War until the fall of France in 1940, and their place were taken by 
the USA and the USSR after the Second World War. The French had good reason 
to believe that the British were seeking to undermine France's position in the 
Middle East through their promotion of the Hashemite's designs on Syria. 
France's conduct in Syria was extremely heavy-handed but was prompted by its 
fear that Britain was plotting to dominate the entire region. Britain, while 
supporting the Hashemite thrones, also nurtured ties with Ibn Saud through 
several treaties and aspired to adjudicating disputes between the two families 
(Brown, 1984: 116-113). Thus, France lost to Britain diplomatically (Ibid: 123). 
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As for oil, Iran and Iraq were the most important producers in British eyes. 
France shared this view, and by the 1930s was the principal buyer of Iraqi oil. 
France however, was mainly concerned with the Western Mediterranean and with 
the maintenance of its position in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For this reason, 
France was concerned that political developments in Syria and Lebanon might 
influence Muslims in North Africa. Like Britain, France worked to establish good 
relations with strong regional powers and safeguarded its interests by treaties 
(Yapp, 1991: 384-385). 
Italy emerged from the War with few gains. Its main interests lay in Libya, the 
Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and until the 1930s no attempt was made to 
challenge the British-French's hegemony. After the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, 
Italy grew more ambitions, but Mussolini was concerned not to offend Britain, 
and in 1938 the two countries signed the Treaty of Rome designed to settle their 
differences (Yapp, 1991: 386). Only after the fall of France did Italy's ambitions 
became significant for the region (Ibid: 387). 
There are similarities in the involvements of Germany and the USSR during these 
years. Germany avoided direct political involvement in the Middle East during 
the 1920s and even under the Nazis its main interest was in Eastern Europe. In 
the late 1930s, German trade in the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan) 
grew rapidly but was not particularly important to Germany. Germany was 
uninterested in the region's oil and was unwilling to be drawn into quarrels with 
Britain, France and Italy (Yapp, 1991: 387). The Nazis were also initially 
sympathetic to Zionism, thinking that Palestine would absorb Germany's 
unwanted Jews (Ibid: 387-388). 
A clear distinction should be 
drawn between Soviet policy in the Northern Tier 
and in the Arab World. The 
USSR had strong interests in the former. Its main 
concern was not to foment revolution 
but to expand trade and ensure that no 
powerful enemy could gain a 
foothold. By contrast their interest in the Arab 
World was weak during the 
inter-war years. Diplomatic relations were opened 
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with Hijaz in 1924, with Ibn Saud in 1926 and with Yemen in 1928, but little 
came of these and the missions were closed in 1938 (Yapp, 1991: 388-389). In 
general, the USSR's policy remained without major changes until the Second 
World War. 
The Second World War was by no means as important for the Middle East as the 
First had been (Yapp, 1991: 389). After the War France found itself 
outmanoeuvred and was forced to quit Syria and Lebanon, which were admitted 
by the new UN (Brown, 1984: 133). Indeed, the War merely hastened the end of 
French influence, briefly prolonged that of Britain, and gave an impetus to the 
advance of the USSR and the USA in the region (Brown, 1984: 104-105; Yapp, 
1991: 390). At the end of the War, the leading great powers in the region were 
Britain and the USSR. Both powers tried and failed to consolidate their positions 
and, in so doing, drew the USA, which had not been greatly involved hitherto, 
into playing a much more substantial role (Yapp, 1991: 394). It has been claimed 
that the USA avoided becoming deeply involved in the area as a great power until 
the Second World War (Brown, 1984: 105). 
The Soviet Union had ambitions to gain greater control over Turkey, and pressed 
claims to Turkish territory. Turkey and Britain appealed to the USA, which 
reluctantly lent its support, and in October 1946 the USSR backed down. Also, 
the USSR had invaded northern Iran in 1941 and was reluctant to leave. The USA 
merely supported Iran at the UN; but Iran outmanoeuvred the Soviets, persuading 
them to leave in exchange for an oil concession, which never materialised. The 
USA was not yet ready to involve itself fully in the region, but Soviet influence in 
the Northern Tier was drastically weakened (Yapp, 1991: 396-397). 
Reacting to the Soviet threat, Britain hoped to secure a military and trade 
confederacy under its leadership, but the key to this strategy, Egypt, refused due 
to a disagreement over Sudan. Also, popular protests made Iraq equally 
uncooperative, the British position in Palestine became untenable, and it has been 
argued that nationalist opposition, more than any other factor, brought about 
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British failure in the region. Furthermore, Britain had paid a great economic price 
for victory in the Second World War, and had simply lost the will to maintain its 
position in the Middle East (Yapp, 1991: 399-402). Britain's weakness compelled 
it to seek the support of the USA, which gave the Americans the opportunity to 
exert to the full its power and influence in the region (Brown, 1984: 105; Yapp, 
1991: 399). 
1.5 Ibn Saud's Early International Relations 
1.5.1 Ibn Saud and the Turks 
After Ibn Saud created his state in the heart of Najd, he was concerned that foreign 
powers, such as the Ottomans and the British might have an influence on him, 
although he tried to avoid their intervention in his internal affairs. Philby (1955: 265) 
mentioned that in 1912 the Turks were surrounding Ibn Saud from more than one 
position. They were occupying al-Hasa in the east and al-Hijaz in the west and 
surrounding him from the north with their strong ally Ibn Rasheed in Hail, and behind 
Hail with their presence in Syria and Iraq. This was in addition to their presence in 
Asir and Yemen. 
From the beginning, Ibn Saud was keen not to provoke the Turks for fear that he 
might repeat what happened to his predecessors when they confronted the powerful 
Ottoman Empire. However, Turkish policy was, from the beginning, hostile towards 
Ibn Saud. From the moment he recaptured Riyadh, they considered his action as 
defiance of their authority and of the authority of their regional ally, Ibn Rasheed, in 
the region. They feared that the expansion of Ibn Saud's authority might threaten their 
presence in the occupied regions. This hostile policy was clear from the beginning 
when the Governor of Basra agreed to support Ibn Rasheed against Ibn Saud in 
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suppressing what the Governor called the revolution at Najd (Goldberg, 1986: 48-66; 
al-Ghannam, 1999: 56). 
The Turkish hatred of Ibn Saud became manifest not only through the financial and 
militarily support given to his enemy, Ibn Rasheed, but also through the intervention 
in the conflict between them by sending more than 4500-strong Turkish force, which 
was well equipped and supported with artillery. They came from Iraq and Hijaz to 
reinforce Ibn Rasheed against Ibn Saud and to resolve the struggle between them in 
north Najd, particularly in the al-Qaseem region. The Turks tried to keep al-Qaseem 
as a neutral province and put it under the direct authority of the Governor of Basra 
during this struggle. ' Ibn Rasheed agreed to this because he did not want al-Qaseem 
to be under Ibn Saud's authority, and his view was shared by some of the al-Qaseem 
leaders. 2 However, Ibn Saud and the majority of al-Qaseem's population refused this 
and, as a result, many battles were waged between Ibn Saud, on one side, and the 
Turks with Ibn Rasheed, on the other, which ended in victory for Ibn Saud. 
3 As a 
result, he achieved complete authority over the whole of the al-Qaseem region and the 
lands to the north as far as the Shammar mountain frontier (al- Zirikli, 1977a: 156- 
175; Vassiliev, 1998: 214-221; al-Ghannam, 1999: 61-65). 
In 1906, eager to end the Turkish occupation, Ibn Saud was decisive when he 
discovered the intention of the Turkish commander to move with his army to Hail so 
as to join Ibn Rasheed. He asked the Turkish commander, Sami Basha al-Farooqi, to 
choose between two alternatives: either to move with his troops to the south and thus 
not to join Ibn Rasheed, or Ibn Saud himself would repatriate the Turks who came 
from Iraq and Hijaz; Ibn Saud threatened al-Farooqi with war if he refused both 
solutions. This was a very important step that proved the ability of Ibn Saud to act as 
This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. Prince Abdulrahman is a nephew of King Abd a-Aziz and a 
senior member of the Saudi Royal Family; this was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an 
interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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a powerful leader in the centre of the Arabian Peninsula and also to consolidate his 
sovereignty. In the event, the Turkish commander chose to repatriate the Turkish 
troops under the protection of Ibn Saud, who provided them with safe passage and 
transportation. The Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhameed II, appreciated Ibn Saud's 
protection and his sincerity towards the Ottoman soldiers. The Sultan also asked him 
to send one of his people to meet him; Ibn Saud sent Salih al-'Athel. These events in 
this year were considered as an improvement in the relationship between the two 
sides (Vassiliev, 1998: 214-221; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 156-175; al-Rayhani, 1988: 159- 
164). 
After a short period of calm and improvement in the relationship between the Turks 
and Ibn Saud, new fears arose for Ibn Saud due to Turkish intervention in his affairs. 
He was told by his envoy, Ahmad al-Thunayyan, that the Governor of Baghdad, 
Jamal Basha, threatened to invade Najd from the north and head south with two 
battalions if Ibn Saud did not obey the Turkish will. Ibn Saud then fully understood 
that the Turkish ambition would not end unless he removed the Turks from al-Hasa 
and ended their militarily presence in the region. Ibn Saud informed the British of his 
intention to secure their neutrality in this struggle. When he saw that the time was 
right, especially after the Turks were defeated in the Balkan War, he launched a 
surprise attack at al-Hasa in 1913, ending the presence of the Turks in the Gulf 
region. After the Turks accepted the reality of the situation and acknowledged that 
the power of Ibn Saud could not be overlooked, they decided to win him over 
politically as the signs of the First World War started to appear. At this stage, 
negotiations started between the Turks and Ibn Saud and ended with Ibn Saud's 
recognition of the Ottoman Caliph suzerainty over Ibn Saud's territories, and the 
Turks recognised Ibn Saud's authority over regions under his control and promised to 
help him financially and militarily. They signed this treaty on 15 May 19141 (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 203-214; Troeller, 1976: 43-61; Vassiliev, 1998: 231-233; Aghlag, 
2002: 127-129&200). 
1 India Office, L/P&S/10/385, despatch from Terence H. Keyes, the British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to Stuart G. Knox, the Deputy British Political Resident in Bushire, on 30 June 1914; India Office, 
L/P&S/12/2134, copy of the treaty of 1914 between Ibn Saud and the Turks. 
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The First World War started in 1914; and the Turks and Britain were not only 
powerful opponents in this war, but also the most influential powers in the region. Ibn 
Saud was also a power in the Arabian Peninsula and also had relationships with the 
two powers. Ibn Saud acknowledged that neutrality was the only policy that would 
protect him from the intervention of either of the two powers in his internal affairs, or 
any attack from the victor at the end of the war. Therefore, he adhered to his 
neutrality during the war, despite both sides' attempts to involve him. 
' His attitude 
here reflected his principles in dealing with others and it showed the way he wanted 
to conduct foreign relations. So, initially, in 1914, when Britain tried to get him on its 
side to oppose the Turkish interests in the region and promised to recognize him as 
the Caliph, as a reward for his position, he strongly refused and told them then that 
Sharif Husain deserved to be the Caliph before him, in a bid to stop this attempt to 
entice him although in 1924 Ibn Saud refused to recognize Sharif Husain as a caliph. 
Ibn Saud insisted on remaining neutral and not opposing Sharif Husain if the Sharif 
allied himself with the British against the Turks. Ibn Saud kept his promise with both 
of the two powers and insisted, at the same time, on full neutrality throughout the 
war 2 (al- Zirikli, 1977a: 215-217; al-Rayhani, 1988: 230-231; Goldberg, 1986: 178- 
184). 
In 1918, the First World War ended with the Turkish defeat and, as a result, 
terminated their influence, authority and military presence in the Arabian Peninsula. 
They were replaced by the British and French in the Arab regions, which were under 
their occupation. However, when Ibn Saud entered al-Hijaz and united it under his 
authority and the Hijazi people called him their King, the Republic of Turkey was one 
of the first countries to recognize this in 1926 (al-Rayhani, 1988: 427: 429). 
' This was confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
2 This was supported by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
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1.5.2 Ibn Saud and the British 
When Ibn Saud began to establish his state, there was a strong British presence in the 
Arabian Peninsula, particularly on the east coast. It was then essential for Ibn Saud to 
contact them and consequently build a good relationship with them in order to protect 
his interests and strengthen his authority. Britain observed the struggle between Ibn 
Saud and Ibn Rasheed, but did not want to be involved in it, due to its concern that if 
either one of them were to win, his influence might stretch to the countries under 
British authority in the region, particularly Kuwait. Britain therefore did not want to 
interfere in such internal affairs in order to avoid provoking Turkish anxieties. The 
British ignored all Ibn Saud's early approaches, such as in 1902, when he asked if 
they could sign treaties immediately after the conquest of Riyadh, and advised 
Britain's allies not to support him (Goldberg, 1986: 50-51; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 290; 
Troeller, 1976: 21). 
Britain continued its policy towards Ibn Saud even when, in 1904, he asked for help 
and recognition after his victory in the Battle of al-Bukairiyyah against Ibn Rasheed 
and the Turks. Britain kept the same neutral policy, despite the recommendation of 
Sir Percy Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf that it should deal with Ibn Saud. Ibn 
Saud continued his attempts to gain Britain's recognition and Cox attempted further 
to convince his government to recognize Ibn Saud and deal with him. Despite this, all 
attempts ended in failure, and Britain's response was decisive in 1907, stating that it 
did not see any necessity to create any kind of relationship with Ibn Saud, out of fear 
of angering the Turkish Government (Troeller, 1976: 22-25; Wahbah, 2000: 244-248; 
alghannam, 1999: 58-67). 
The situation remained unchanged, so Ibn Saud continued to strengthen his internal 
position and expand his state 
in Najd and, with time on his side and increasing 
numbers of followers, he worked to consolidate 
his sovereignty and leadership in the 
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area. ' There were no changes in his relationship with the British until 1910 when a 
meeting took place between him and Captain Shakespear, the Political Agent in 
Kuwait, during his visit to the Amir of Kuwait. The following year, they met again in 
Ibn Saud's camp. Ibn Saud told Shakespear about his desire to capture al-Hasa in 
order to end the Turkish presence in the region. He asked Britain to support him and 
to deal with him as they did with the other Gulf leaders. Shakespear confirmed to Ibn 
Saud that Britain was unable to be hostile to Turkey for fear of driving it into an 
alliance with Germany. The British Foreign Office issued orders to the Indian Bureau 
to stay totally neutral and not to intervene directly or indirectly in the affairs of Najd 
(Troeller, 1976: 22-25; al-Rasheed, 1998: 228; Goldberg, 1986,78: 80). 
Goldberg (1986: 47) stated that all attempts by the British politicians in the Gulf and 
India to change Britain's attitude toward Ibn Saud since 1904 were strictly rejected by 
the Foreign Office in London, which favoured the international British interest over 
the Indian local or regional interests until 1913. This policy was changed just prior to 
the outbreak of World War I, when Britain began to give more consideration to Ibn 
Saud and contacted him directly. In fact, the attitude of Britain toward Ibn Saud was a 
very important factor, which convinced him to strengthen his internal authority in 
Najd and also expand his state further, especially to the region of al-Hasa. In 1913 Ibn 
Saud conquered al-Hasa and ended Turkish authority in the east coast region, 
extending his authority to the Gulf Shaikhdoms, which were under the protection of 
the British. By doing so, Ibn Saud convinced Britain of two important things: first, he 
had become the most powerful leader in the area, and secondly, his position was such 
that he could threaten the provinces under the protection of the British. 
Thus, he convinced Britain to change its policy towards him and to take a positive 
stance, particularly as it had been convinced by its representative in the region that 
relations with him were essential to the security of the Gulf Shaikhdoms which were 
under British protection. 2 He was also convinced that he should strengthen his 
' This was confirmed by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 
2003. 
2 This was confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
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relationship with Britain, as it was a great power in the region. However, it can be 
said that the political competition between Britain and Turkey in the region, led both 
of them to seek Ibn Saud's friendship. ' Turkey rushed and signed a treaty with Ibn 
Saud on 15 May 1914. Britain also hastened to radically change its previous stance 
towards Ibn Saud; and the British Political Agent in Kuwait, Captain Shakespear, 
came to Riyadh in March 1914, and Britain became closer to him than ever (Troeller, 
1976: 55-89; Holden and Johns, 1981: 47; Vassiliev, 1998: 237). 
After war between Britain and Turkey was declared in November 1914, the British 
Government sent to Ibn Saud asking him to coordinate with it in capturing Basra from 
Turkey. He insisted on speaking personally to the British Political Agent in Kuwait, 
Captain Shakespear, who met him in December 1914 and who had always been 
impressed by Ibn Saud. Shakespear was keen to strengthen the relationship with Ibn 
Saud, but when he met him he found that he insisted on maintaining his neutral 
position between the Turks and the British. In addition, he also insisted on obtaining a 
formal treaty between him and Britain before changing his position. Shakespear 
advised Ibn Saud to draw up a preliminary treaty setting forth his desires and stating 
what he was ready to accept from Britain. After long discussions they finally signed 
the Treaty of Darin on 26 December 1915,2 from which Ibn Saud, however, benefited 
under the circumstances at the time. 3 One of the articles of this treaty provided for 
Britain's recognition of Ibn Saud as Sultan of Najd, al-Hasa and its Dependencies, 
and also the provision of help and protection to him from any external aggression. He 
committed himself not to conclude treaties with any foreign governments and agreed 
not to interfere in the affairs of the areas under British protection (Troeller, 1976: 55- 
89; Howarth, 1964: 85-89; al-Saud, 2001: 26-30). The major result of this treaty was 
1 This was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
2 India Office, L/P&S/10/387, copy of the Darin Treaty between Ibn Saud and Percy Cox, the British 
Political Resident in Bushire, dated 26 December 1915. 
3 This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004; this was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 
January 2004. 
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Britain's agreement to provide Ibn Saud with military protection (Mcloughlin, 
1993: 87; Wahbah, 2000,248-249 & 318-319; al-Saud, 2001: 28-30 & 207-217). 
During the First World War, unfriendliness in the relations between Britain and Ibn 
Saud occurred due to the British support for Sharif Husain, especially since Sharif 
Husain had proclaimed himself King of the Arabs. Despite this unfriendliness, Britain 
feared that Ibn Saud lend his support to the Turks, or possibly take action against its 
allies, among them Sharif Husain, which would obstruct its plans in the region. 
Britain, therefore, offered Ibn Saud a monthly subsidy of £5000 and gave him 3000 
rifles to maintain the security and protect British interests in the Gulf. This subsidy 
was, however, the cause of a cooling in the relationship between Ibn Saud and 
Britain, as he considered it insufficient, and this was compounded by the fact that 
Sharif Husain received more. These relations remained unchanged throughout the 
years of the First World War (Williams, 1933: 96102; al- Zirikli, 1977a: 285-299; al- 
Saud, 2001: 32-35; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 294-295). 
After the end of the First World War, Britain became the most influential power in 
the region, since Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan now came under its authority. By 
virtue of this strengthened presence, it became the power that influenced relations 
between the leaders of the region and Ibn Saud. At the same time, the tense 
relationship between Ibn Saud and Sharif Husain was coming to a head around al- 
Khurmah, and the British position was supportive and in favour of Sharif Husain. 
Britain also broke many promises of support for Ibn Saud regarding armaments and 
finance and also asked Ibn Saud to leave al-Khurmah to Sharif Husain. Sharif Husain 
took advantage of this and sent 5000 troops equipped with artillery, under the 
leadership of his son Abdullah, which led to the Battle of Turabah in 1919 (Philby, 
1930: 268: 272; Mcloughlin, 1993: 60-63; Vassiliev, 1998: 246-250). 
After the decisive defeat of Sharif Husain by Ibn Saud's followers (Ikhwan), led by 
Khalid Ibn Luway and Sultan Ibn Bijad, and the arrival at Turabah of Ibn Saud at the 
head of an army of 12000 fighters, Britain threatened Ibn Saud with military action 
and asked him to halt his advance towards al-Hijaz and return to Riyadh. Since Ibn 
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Saud had no ambitions in al-Hijaz, ' and still looked for a favourable relationship with 
Britain, fearing it might intervene by force in his interests or his internal affairs, he 
agreed to its demand not to attack al-Hijaz. He also accepted the invitation to 
participate with Britain and its allies in the victory ceremonies, and sent his son Faisal 
with two of his consultants, Ahmad al-Thunayyan and Abdullah al-Qusaibi, to 
London in 1919 (Philby, 1930: 268: 272; Mcloughlin, 1993: 60-63; Vassiliev, 
1998: 246-250). 
From 1920 to 1922, Ibn Saud further consolidated his leadership and sovereignty by 
extending his authority into Hail and Asir, and also into the north to the al-Sarhan 
valley area and as far as the Iraqi frontier, at the time when the British supported the 
appointment of the sons of Sharif Husain (Faisal and Abdullah) as rulers in Iraq and 
Trans-Jordan in 1921. This had the effect of adding to the number of confrontations 
in 1920-1922 between the tribes on the frontiers with Kuwait, Iraq and Trans-Jordan. 
The Saudi forces took part in these confrontations, whether with the agreement of Ibn 
Saud or without it. Britain, as a result, tried to win Ibn Saud's support, knowing that 
these tribes would only obey him and that using force to punish these tribes and stop 
their aggression would cost it much. 2 Britain worked to win him over to secure its 
interests and stop the aggression in the areas under its authority (Philby, 1948: 219- 
222; Troeller, 1976: 159-167; Kostiner, 1993: 79-87). 
All of these issues convinced Ibn Saud and Britain of their need to strengthen their 
relationship. Britain continued its financial support, increasing it further, and also it 
insisted on drawing the borders between Ibn Saud and each of Iraq, Trans-Jordan and 
Kuwait on behalf of which the British were acting. As a result, Sir Percy Cox called 
for a meeting at al-Muhammarah in May 1922. However, Ibn Saud did not accept the 
proposed al-Muhammarah Treaty due to the fact that his representative had gone 
beyond his authorisation. Another meeting was arranged, taking place in al-`Ugair, 
' This was also maintained by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz during my interview 
with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003; also, this was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during 
my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
2 This was confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
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and again chaired by Cox, with Ibn Saud representing Najd and its Dependencies, 
Sabih Bey representing the Iraqi Government and Major More, the Political Agent in 
Kuwait, representing the Kuwaiti Government. The meeting ended with the signing 
of the Treaty of al-'Uqair in November 1922, which drew the borders between the 
three countries, resolving the dispute between them regarding the loyalty of tribes in 
the border areas, and the problems of the shepherds in these areas. One of the most 
important points was that Britain agreed that Qurayyat al-Melh and the al-Sarhan 
valley belonged to Abdulaziz (Troeller, 1976: 159-179; Kostiner, 1993: 79-87). 
The Hashemite families in Iraq, Trans-Jordan and al-Hijaz who were under the 
protection of Britain disagreed with Ibn Saud about the frontiers, despite the al-'Uqair 
Agreement, especially after more frontier confrontations took place with Trans- 
Jordan and Hijaz and also in view of the sympathy felt by King Faisal of Iraq towards 
his father and his brother. This forced Britain to call a conference in Kuwait between 
Ibn Saud and the leaders of these three countries. The conference took place in 
December 1923, but they did not reach a solution, due to the exaggeration of the 
Hashemite demands. Ibn Saud understood from this conference that the three 
countries were working together to destroy him, ' so he decided to take al-Hijaz, as 
described previously (Kostiner, 1993: 87-100; Wahbah, 2000: 257-263). 
Howarth (1964: 141) mentioned that Ibn Saud was hesitant to occupy al-Hijaz even 
though he had been convinced of his ability to do so years before (since the victory of 
Turabah in 1919). He was hesitant because he knew that capturing al-Hijaz would not 
be as easy as the other regions, and he knew that occupying al-Hijaz would end his 
isolation from the world and bring him closer to powerful countries, particularly those 
who had consuls in al-Hijaz. Also, control of the Holy Places would bring him closer 
to the Muslim world, especially during the al-Hajj season, and all of this would turn 
his chieftaincy into a state, bring him into the diplomatic world and enhance his 
communication with the outside world as a head of state. However, some historians 
have argued that the ending of British subsidies to both, Ibn Saud and Sharif Husain, 
1 Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 236,5 July 1929, and Issue No. 389,27 May 1932. 
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was a major reason for Ibn Saud's decision to invade al-Hijaz. 1 In 1923, the British 
Government told them both of its final decision to cut off the payments. With the 
ending of British financial support, Ibn Saud had no reason to be afraid of British 
displeasure (Howarth, 1964: 138-139; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 151; Kostiner, 1993: 
62). Vassiliev (1998: 287) argues that "Britain's increasingly weak economic position 
meant it was unable to establish direct control over a sizeable part of Arabia, which 
now seemed a costly burden: this too was conducive to Ibn Saud's success". 2 He 
might better have said "financial position". 
Sharif Husain's rejection of the Anglo-Hijaz treaty, proposed by London in 1923, was 
one of his fatal mistakes. However his clear opinion against the Mandate, which 
resulted from the Peace Conference at Versailles, and his rejection of the British plan 
regarding Palestine and its people implied in the Balfour Declaration, was the main 
reason behind his refusal to sign the Anglo-Hashemite treaty. Britain attempted many 
times to persuade him to change his position but he completely refused, while 
demanding that Britain should fulfil all its promises to him before and during the 
Arab Revolt. 3 Moreover, Britain saw that his assumption of the title of Caliph in 1924 
might give the impression that Britain supported him in his claim. By doing so, he 
missed the chance to secure his sovereignty and strengthen his relationship with 
Britain so that it would support him against the new threat that he had created by his 
policy of preventing Ibn Saud's followers (Ikhwan) from performing their Hajj. For 4 
' His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz strongly rejected the role of the economic factor 
as a reason for the occupation of al-Hijaz, due to the fact that al-Hijaz was economically poor and 
would place more financial burdens on Ibn Saud. He insisted that the only motivation was a religious 
one. This was during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
2 His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz also rejected this, arguing that Britain was not 
financially weak to such an extent that it would force it to abandon or change its strategies in this 
important area. This was during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003 and 1 January 
2004. 
3 This was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
4 This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak, during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; this was also supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in 
Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
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all these reasons, Britain left him to his fate at a time when he was powerless and 
bankrupt (Mousa, 1978: 183-194; Baker, 1979: 144-170; al-Rayhani, 1988: 342; 
Wahbah, 2000: 199). The elimination of the Hashemite rule in al-Hijaz gave Ibn Saud 
a unique position, which convinced Britain to deal with him as the only effective 
power in the Arabian Peninsula. 
When it was clear to Britain that al-Hijaz was going to fall into the hands of Ibn Saud 
and that he might move north from al-Hijaz, it took the initiative and sent, in October 
1925, Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had earlier been the Chief Secretary to the 
Government in Palestine, to negotiate with Ibn Saud with a view to end the frontier 
problems with Trans-Jordan and Iraq, which had not been resolved during the Kuwait 
Conference. After long negotiations, they finally agreed, in November 1925, to sign 
the Treaty of Bahrah, ' to end the frontier problems between the governments of Najd 
and Iraq and also the problems of the tribes living on the frontiers. They also, in the 
same month, signed the Treaty of Haddah, 2 that drew the frontiers between Najd and 
Trans-Jordan, specifying the relations between them. When Ibn Saud entered Jeddah 
and completed the unification of al-Hijaz, he was accepted as the King of al-Hijaz in 
January 1926. All the consuls in Jeddah recognised him, including the British Consul. 
The unification of al-Hijaz with Najd was the cornerstone in the relations between Ibn 
Saud and Britain. This, and the demise of the other leaders in the area, especially 
Sharif Husain, convinced Britain to develop its relations with Ibn Saud and to 
recognise his independence. So in 1927, Clayton came back to Jeddah and proposed a 
new treaty to be signed by Ibn Saud and Britain. The Treaty of Jeddah was duly 
signed on 20 May 1927,3 abrogating the Treaty of Darin, which had been signed on 
1 The Saudi Government, Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, Makkah, 1922-1951. Pp. 10-13; 
India Office, L/P&S/20/CI58E, copy of the Treaty of Bahrah between Ibn Saud and Sir G. Clayton 
dated 1 November 1925. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 14-18; India Office, 
L/P&S/20/CI58E, copy of the Treaty of Bahrah between Ibn Saud and Sir G. Clayton dated 2 
November 1925. 
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 33-43; India Office, 
LJP&S/10/1166, copy of the Treaty of Jeddah between Ibn Saud and Sir G. Clayton dated 20 May 
1927. 
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26 December 1915. One of the terms of the Jeddah Treaty was the full recognition of 
Ibn Saud's independence by Britain (Vassiliev, 1998: 263-275; Troeller, 1976: 227- 
236). 
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Chapter Two: International Relations and the Foreign 
Policy of New States: An evaluative review of the literature 
"Foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the 
behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international 
environment" (George Modelski in Kegly and Wittkopf, 2001: 54). 
There are over 200 states in the international community. All states confront the 
question, which in Calvert's view (1986: 53) is: "What is a typical country? " Calvert 
(ibid) added: "That is one of the most difficult questions in the world to answer. 
Typical in what respect? In population, in area, in military potential, in economic 
resources, or what? " It would seem that there is no clear answer to this question, 
hence the difficulty in differentiating accurately between states. However, an answer 
to the above question would pose some difficulties, especially regarding newly 
established states. What is clear, however, is that a state would need an atmosphere of 
international acceptability in order to become a member of the international 
community. 
Most debates on foreign policy issues are centred on national interest. The state 
usually defines which interests are important and to be defended at all costs, and 
which could, if necessary, be sacrificed. Hence, the primary task for those responsible 
for formulating foreign policy is, to articulate their national interests in some logical 
order of importance. Newly emerging states need to overcome some major problems 
in order to achieve their foreign policy goals in relation to the international 
community of states, as will be discussed below. 
42 
2.1 Types of Newly Emerging States 
A newly emerging state may fall into one of the following categories. In the first 
category, there are states that split from other states. They could split from fully 
established states, such as in the case of the disintegration of former Czechoslovakia 
into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and that of the states of the former Soviet 
Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan). States could also split from newly established states, such 
as the case of Pakistan and India in 1947. In the former group, states could establish 
their relations with the international community more successfully because they 
would face fewer problems, in view of their long experience after having been part of 
established states. 
In the second category, states may merge together to form a new state. They could be 
already established states like East and West Germany, which formed a unified 
Germany in 1990, or less developed countries such as North and South Yemen, 
united to form one state in 1990. Again, states in the former group usually find it 
easier to adjust to membership of the international community. With certain 
reservations, Saudi Arabia could be included under this category. 
The third category contains states which have achieved independence from a colonial 
master, such as Tunisia in 1956, the Marshall Islands and Palau, both former Trust 
Territories administered by the United States, which gained full independence in 
1991, and Micronesia (formerly known as the Caroline Islands and also administered 
by the United States), which gained complete sovereignty in 1991. 
In the fourth category, two or more newly emerging states may unite together to form 
a newly emerging state, such as the emirates of the Arabian Gulf, when they united 
together to form the United Arab Emirates in 1971. 
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In the fifth category, a national liberation movement may become a new full state 
such as Eritrea, which separated from Ethiopia in 1993, and Namibia, which 
separated from South Africa in 1990. Or a national liberation movement may aspire 
to become a state, such as the Palestinian case. 
States which fall under the fourth and fifth categories confront more political 
problems in their foreign policy, which hinder the establishment of good and effective 
relationships with the international community, while states falling under the third 
category occupy an intermediate position with regard to the effective management of 
their foreign policy. This chapter will discuss the major foreign policy problems that 
confront newly established states and assess their impact on them. 
2.2 Problems of Foreign Policy Confronting Newly Emerging States 
2.2.1 Establishing a New National Identity 
According to Oyvind (1997: 167) the state system expanded through three major 
periods in the twentieth century. The first period came after the collapse of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires as a result of World War One. Eventually, successor 
states multiplied, depending on the different nationalities which were under the 
control of these empires and the policies of the new occupying powers. The second 
period started with decolonisation during the late 1950s. The last period began with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many scholars argue that nationalism has been a 
recent phenomenon, dating mostly from the late eighteenth century. Smith (1991: 71) 
quoted Kedourie: "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century ". The importance of nationalism cannot be underestimated in 
relation to the citizens of the modern era. Nationalism is simply one element of the 
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modern world that must be regarded as essential for the realisation of the social, 
economic, and cultural aspirations of a people. 
Nationalism, arguably, began in Western Europe as a force associated with the 
policies of colonialism and imperialism of Western European countries. Here was 
certainly the first powerful manifestation of this sentiment. One of the significant 
legacies of colonialism, as Breacher indicated (1963: 21) was its spread to other parts 
of the world, from the newly formed countries of Latin America and from Central 
Europe to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, nationalism was spreading its effects on the ancient nations of Asia and 
Africa. Historically, the movement towards nationalism was fostered by a 
combination of various cultural, political, and economic factors. In general, 
nationalism could be described, principally, as a feeling of community among a 
people who share their own particular identity. This feeling of identity and a sense of 
belonging together are based on the fact that this group of people share a common 
descent, common language, common cultural heritage or some combination of these 
or like factors (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2001: 205). However, among the most important 
of these factors were the improvements in communications at the beginning of the 
twentieth century that tended to extend the knowledge of people beyond their village 
or province. In the industrial stage, through the educational system, people learned of 
their common background and tradition and began to identify themselves with the 
historical continuity of the nation. At the same time, new culture-congruent politics 
emerged (Gellner, 1983: 35). Perhaps even more important in the steady rise of 
nationalism was the introduction of national constitutions (which often came about 
through a struggle for political rights) that gave people the necessary help to 
determine their fate as a nation and share responsibility for the future well-being of 
that nation. 
Once the political ideal of nationalism began, it was reinforced, not only by the 
growing strength of central, federalised governments, but by other elements of society 
as well. National education systems began to be established; in addition, poets, artists, 
academics and religious scholars began to emphasise cultural rights and promote 
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nationalism (Kedourie, 1993: 42). Some scholars see nationalism as that sentiment 
which the people strongly feel toward their own nation without any concern for the 
common interest of other nations and states in the world (Kegley and Wittkopf, 
2001: 427). Thus, at the beginning of their life of new states may have to borrow some 
lessons from more developed states. In the realm of nationalism, each nation may 
replicate the steps taken by other nations which had travelled the path to self- 
determination. 
However, in addition to nationalism as an essential element of national identity, 
historical, territorial, economic, and cultural factors play their roles, in some form or 
other, in the development of a state identity (Smith, 1991: 8-15). This can be seen in 
the Arab Gulf States, whereby, in addition to sharing a common Arabic-Islamic 
culture, they also have an individual cultural heritage, history, territory, and economy, 
which have given each state its own distinct identity. After adopting this distinct 
identity, they were able, firstly, to establish themselves as independent states, and 
secondly, as a result of this national identity, were able to formulate and implement 
their respective foreign policies in relation to the international community. 
However, a huge obstacle may be faced by any state in identifying itself through the 
perspective of territorial integrity, especially if it had a historical territorial problem 
with a large neighbour. A good example of this is the state of Kuwait. Since acquiring 
its independence in 1961, it has had a difficult relationship with its large neighbour 
Iraq. Ever since its independence, Kuwait has faced continuous problems from Iraq, 
which led to Kuwait seeking the help from Britain and the League of Arab States. 
This ongoing problem precipitated the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Any state facing 
such a problem would be under pressure in the formulation and implementation of its 
foreign policy. Moreover, as a way of enhancing its identity, a state is likely to 
become more possessive of its economic wealth. A state which has good economic 
resources would have more freedom to assert itself and practise its foreign policy 
according to its economic capability, whilst poorer states would have less freedom 
and might align themselves with other states in implementing their foreign policy. 
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Nevertheless, an identity-enhancing foreign policy has its problems. While there are 
many benefits to an ideology of nationalism, there are certainly many drawbacks as 
well, the most important of which being the fact that nationalist feelings seem to 
propel people toward violence. Kurlansky (1999: 5) states: "Europeans learned in the 
twentieth century to fear themselves and their passions. They distrust nationalism and 
religious belief because pride in nationality leads to dictatorship, war, disaster, and 
religion leads to fanaticism. Europe has become the most secular continent ". In some 
cases, a strong sense of nationalism led some states to feel that, in order to remain 
strong, they had to make other states weak (Primakov, 1996: 58). 
Hence, in the modem era, the establishment of national identity is a difficult road for 
newly established countries to traverse, and it is even more difficult for recently 
independent states, or for those peoples who are still trying to gain national 
autonomy. Nevertheless, a new identity remains an irreplaceable instrument for any 
newly emerging state that would guide its relations with the international community. 
Such a new state, where people are beginning to define themselves in terms of their 
national identity, would initially encounter difficulties in formulating and 
implementing its foreign policy in a clear fashion. 
2.2.2 Political Structure and Foreign Policy Institutions 
In formulating their foreign policy, new states have to contend with both the changing 
role of the nation state and their own limitations. One of these limitations is the lack 
of political structure and full-fledged governmental institutions. The lack of adequate 
governmental institutions in newly emerging states, would make it difficult for them 
to conduct an effective administration. The establishment of institutions is a 
fundamental task of any government at the early stage of any newly emerging state. 
The task becomes more significant in the case of political institutions during the early 
foundation process of the new state. Basically, as Bialer (1980: 70) states: "A higher 
level of institutionalisation of political processes provides a stabilising background 
for the coming succession ". 
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Political institutions would help to gather, interpret and channel information, and, at 
the same time, establish guidelines for foreign policy makers. Political institutions in 
the area of foreign policy, such as foreign ministries, embassies, and all the 
diplomatic structures have been essential elements in the process of foreign policy 
making since the eighteenth century up today (Holsti, 1983: 163). Building 
institutional structures is a very difficult task for a newly emerging state to 
accomplish, because it involves many important elements such as developed political 
parties, legislatures, judicial system, education and human resource development, 
clear rules of conduct, and supporting both national and regional guarantees of human 
rights and consistent, explicit rules of conduct (Lindenberg, 1990: 421). 
States would find it difficult to build their relations with others prior to constructing 
their political institutions. The problems of new nations are magnified in those areas 
of the world in which national movements are still trying to gain their independence. 
An example of this case would be the Palestinian situation. Palestinians are still 
striving to establish their own state. They have the basic elements in terms of a strong 
attachment to their culture, language, history and land, and a strong desire to achieve 
their own independent state. But one of the main obstacles in establishing an 
independent state is the absence of political structure and institutions. It can be seen 
that a major task of Arafat in the West Bank and Gaza strip is to construct a political 
base (Robinson, 1997: 181). 
Some theorists see the political structure as a structure of shared political values, 
which would define the political conditions and support the political goals of the 
members of the state (Pateman, 1971: 295). However, some political theorists insist 
that political structure should start from the very early stages as an important step in 
building societal structures and political orientations. Parsons (1951: 203-208) argues: 
"The major value orientation patterns, including presumably the political 
orientations, are laid down in childhood. These form the core of the basic structure of 
personality ". Political science theorists tend to agree that political socialisation is an 
important process continuing throughout life, but the priority has been for the 
emphasis to be placed on the early years. Dawson and Prewitt (1969: 56) state: "New 
48 
orientations are acquired, but in most instances they occur within bounds established 
by the deep and persistent orientations acquired during childhood". They suggest: 
"The adult is unlikely to alter the more basic orientations such as his conception of 
the legitimate means of selecting political rulers, or broad ideological goals ". 
It is clear then that states formed through separation from or merging with less 
developed states, as well as liberation movements, suffer from a lack of political 
structure and governmental institutions, including foreign policy institutions. This is a 
major problem that hinders the establishment of good and effective relationships with 
the international community. An example of this has been Eritrea after its separation 
from Ethiopia. States emerging from colonial rule face slightly fewer problems with 
regard to political structure and governmental institutions, in view of the fact that the 
colonial powers would have left them with some structures. States formed through the 
merging or separation of developed states benefit from the existing governmental 
institutions and the presence of an established political structure in these countries, 
which would be instrumental in their successfully establishing foreign relations with 
others and becoming full members of the international community. 
It could be said then that the more governmental institutions and the more well- 
established political structure the newly emerging states have, the easier it would be 
for them to successfully establish their relations with others. States without this 
fundamental element of political structure and institutions would not be able to 
conduct their foreign policy successfully. Thus, one of the most difficult and 
important tasks of a newly emerging state is to ensure that it has at least the basic 
political structure and institutions to conduct its foreign policy, which is an essential 
step that would link it to the international community. 
49 
2.2.3 Leadership 
Leadership and foreign policy making are strongly linked. The action of a leader can 
be fairly judged only in relation to his or her context. The international community is 
becoming increasingly complex, interrelated and interdependent, and is characterised 
by diversity of cultures and values. An effective leader is the one who is able to 
successfully handle his or her state's foreign policy in relation to the international 
community. In general, a particular leader emerges because of the political needs of 
the state. The leader is a political specialist who is able to make the political system 
work effectively for the ordinary citizen who has little interest in politics but cannot 
survive without it (Jones, 1979: 48). The leader should, therefore, embrace as many 
qualities as the ordinary citizen needs. He or she is expected to have a broad and 
sound conceptual framework that enables him or her to conduct the country's foreign 
policy. 
In general, national revolutionary movements have the ultimate goal of establishing a 
state and they try to furnish a leadership capable of achieving this goal. Kissinger 
(1969: 17-43) says: "In the early stages of nationhood, these goals can be seen largely 
as an attempt to put into effect the dreams and aspirations of revolutionary leaders, 
supported by strong nationalist movements. Bureaucracies in these states are weak 
and undifferentiated, and lack tradition. Thus, objectives, decisions, and actions 
largely reflect the ideas and whims of single individuals, often leaders of nationalist 
revolutionary movements ". However, national movements have played a significant 
role in political history and continue to do so. When a national movement is 
transformed into a state, the leadership of this movement would already have the 
legitimacy and credibility to direct the foreign policy of the newly formed state. 
Moreover, from the leadership's point of view, the study of national movements and 
their dynamics is fundamental to the study of the political process itself (Tucker, 
1987: 16). 
The political system is complicated and is very difficult to mobilise, but the effective 
leader can make it work through his influence on his people. However, only the 
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leader who understands internal relations within his community can appreciate the 
effect that he has on them. Jones (1979: 48-49) states: "The leader could make it 
work for his lineage and for his individual clients because he had made it his business 
to understand how to manipulate it. He could do this mainly because he could 
influence people, both ordinary folk and other leaders like himself. These people were 
prepared to do what he wanted because they respected his capacity and judgment, 
and because they feared his power ". 
Leadership entails responsibility for self and others, and this responsibility is mutual 
between the leader and members of the community. In dealing with the affairs of his 
people, a leader should endeavour to gain a broad complete picture of all his 
community and work hard to achieve its goals as a whole unit. The leader must gain 
the support of various groups in the community, in order to be 'the leader of all his 
people' (Tucker, 1987: 13). In the context of their debate about leadership, 
international relations scholars discuss, not only different kinds of states, such as 
democracies, transitional democracies, and autocracies, but also how the leadership 
and its relations with domestic political pressures could help to define the state, 
whether it is strong, weak, stable, unstable, cohesive, fragmented, etc., and how all 
these things would effect its foreign policy and its relations with others. 
Some writers focus on particular leaders and evaluations of their leadership. But 
generally, the perspectives of the leaders involved in foreign policy making can have 
more influence on what governments do, and sometimes some of the government 
members shift toward the leader's inclinations just because of his influence as their 
leader (Kesselman, 1961: 285). However, the influence in case of foreign policy 
making is mutual because the leader is also under the pressure of his people or a 
sector of them. Wesson (1977: 183) indicates that "It seems clear that there is or has 
been an elite of very influential persons with the best business, legal, academic, and 
governmental connections, who were again and again called upon to give foreign 
policy directions ". 
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Moreover, any change in top leadership positions, which can be considered as new 
blood in the leadership or at least bringing to power new and younger leaders, 
certainly means new changes in priorities and policies. According to Bunce 
(1981: 255) "New leaders mean new policies and old leaders mean the continuation 
of old priorities- it is almost as simple as that ". Some theorists even believe that a 
difference in the gender of the leader could affect the foreign policy of his or her 
state. In general, Almond (1950: 121) found that "More women than men seem to be 
ignorant of or apathetic to foreign policy issues", but there are always exceptions, 
such as Mrs. Thatcher and Mrs. Ghandi. According to surveys of foreign policy 
views, carried out by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relation, the foreign policy 
beliefs of women and men converge at the leadership positions or at least there are no 
significant differences (Holsti and Rosenau, 1981: 327-328). 
In the case of an emerging state, leadership arguably becomes more important. 
Without a strong and charismatic leader, a new state would essentially have no 
chance of establishing itself on the world stage. One such example was Stalin, who, 
as an early leader of the Soviet Union, shaped its nature and fate for most of the 
twentieth century. Stalin was a quintessential nationalist leader because he spent so 
much energy and effort on crafting a state mechanism. Stalin, more than any other 
individual, shaped the Soviet regime and influenced the direction of post-World War 
II developments in Europe. This influence was global during the early years of the 
Cold War, which was a primary factor in world politics after the Second World War. 
This was because of his ability to provide a reasonable basis for his policies, and from 
it he drew his ultimate conclusions (Bukharin, 1972: 144). One would ask what would 
have been the face of the Soviet Union without Stalin? The answer remains in the 
realm of speculation. 
History is rich with many effective leadership figures. An example of an important 
fighter for the independence of his country was Charles de Gaulle, the man who 
dedicated every ounce of energy and talent that he possessed to securing the freedom 
of a New France after World War II. This supremely self-confident statesman, who 
always was a tireless servant of France, firmly believed himself to have been marked 
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out by destiny to bear France on his shoulders and guide her upwards, while all voices 
continued to call her down (Cairns, 1976: 164). De Gaulle's influence was not limited 
to his people only; it expanded over Europe and all of France's colonies, most of 
which acquired their independence as a result of his new foreign policy. Thus 
charismatic and effective leadership is the cornerstone of a newly emerging state, not 
only in the making of its foreign policy, but also in its playing an influential role in its 
region and in the international community. Arguably, a good example of this was 
President Nasser of Egypt, who advocated Pan-Arabism, and who was quoted by 
Vatikiotis (1961: 107-108) as having emphasised that Arab nationalism had revived 
the aspiration for "independence and freedom" among the Arabs, and supported 
liberation movements. Through this policy, Egypt had a great influence on the Arab 
world during his era (ibid: 107-108 &110). 
Therefore, it must be emphasised that an effective leadership is an essential element 
for any newly emerging state, without which it could not adopt an effective foreign 
policy or enhance its ability to influence the international community. 
2.2.4 Political Instability 
The internal political stability of a newly emerging state will have an important 
impact on its foreign policy conduct. Scholars of international relations have pointed 
to the importance of the impact that domestic factors have on foreign policy making 
and implementation (Rosenau, 1969: 54). Among these factors is the effect of internal 
political stability, which applies to both newly emerging as well as fully established 
states. 
The stability of new states is dependent upon a number of factors; primarily, in the 
case of some, the various relationships among different ethnic groups, and between 
these groups and the state. The state endeavours to melt these various ethnic groups 
into a single block, with the objective of generating a sense of belonging to the newly 
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emerging nation state. Competition between ethnic groups can lead to major problems 
in the implementation of foreign policy (Wesson, 1977: 182). However, factionalism 
between groups can be ethnic or otherwise. For example, in Lebanon during its Civil 
War from 1975-1990, the various factions did not have a common feeling of 
belongingness to the state due to the differences in sectarian affiliations which 
affected their national loyalties. This inevitably led to instability and as a result, war 
and problems in the conducting of Lebanon's foreign policy. 
Relations between ethno-cultural minorities and majorities in societies in different 
countries have always been uneasy and often conflictual. Moreover, such conflicts 
have often been characterised as intractable and deep-rooted, because of problems 
between the majority and the minority, the way they perceive their culture and the 
threats directed towards their existence. Almond and Verba (1965: 33) state: "The 
relationship between political culture and political structure is one of the most 
significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and change ". 
Moreover, the political culture of those fragmented communities refers not only to 
what is happening in the world of politics, but also to what they believe about those 
happenings. Those beliefs could be the goals or values which ought to be pursued by 
their state in its foreign policy (Anyanwu, 1982: 109). Moreover, these beliefs may 
have an important emotional dimension with respect to the external environment, 
which may lead to political instability. External political actors, including other states, 
may have an important influence; they may either cause or restrain political instability 
in any neighbouring state (Lindenberg, 1990: 402). 
The problem of political instability can be serious if the central authority or 
government has not had adequate time and power to enforce its effective control and 
sovereignty over its entire territory. Moreover, the legitimacy of the leadership or 
central government in the eyes of some sectors of its citizens may not yet be 
established. An example of this has been Indonesia and East-Timor. The East- 
Timorese people worked for separation for years, and they asked for help from 
neighbours, which affected Indonesia's internal stability and its foreign policy as 
well. Such a situation gives neighbouring states a chance to interfere. 
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Moreover, conflicts may arise between the interests of different groups or sectors of 
the community. Competition between these groups simply intensifies mutual dislike, 
which further foments political instability. When these interests cannot be reconciled 
through legal constitutional means and channels, especially in the absence of a strong 
government, differences can turn into violent clashes between the groups, sometimes 
leading to civil wars, as has been the case in former Yugoslavia. When this country 
became unstable and was engulfed in civil war between its ethnic groups, it lost its 
strong position in Europe and even its closest former allies. 
Sometimes, regimes face strong internal opposition which could threaten the internal 
stability of the state, such as in Algeria during the civil strife since 1992, and the 
question of the South in Sudan. In order to preserve national unity or secure domestic 
stability, governments may undertake foreign adventures. Wright (1965: 140) states: 
"A ruler prevents seditions by making external wars ". An example of this is the case 
of Pakistan and India. They run their foreign policy with other states normally, but 
they are engaged in a dispute over Kashmir dating back to more than 50 years, which 
has impacted on the internal stability of both nations. If India gave up Kashmir this 
might lead to other ethnic groups calling for independence, which could eventually 
lead to the disintegration of India. India's determination to maintain its internal 
stability has influenced its foreign policy towards its neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan 
and India have been involved in three major wars because of Kashmir, and because of 
this they have developed nuclear weapons. A main reason behind their mutual foreign 
policy behaviour is to maintain their internal stability. 
Moreover, domestic political actors or groups, such as labour organisations, 
multinational corporations, political elites and political parties have identifiable 
preferences about the conduct of their countries' foreign policies. Those domestic 
groups who benefit from international market forces or already have strong 
international ties will favour greater international openness and stability and press 
their governments to enact policies that promote such characteristics. The more such 
groups there are, domestically, the greater would be the pressure on policymakers to 
orient their policies in this direction. Hence, the more stability they have, the more 
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benefits they accrue. Holsti (1983: 335) states: "Some foreign-policy objectives, 
decisions, and actions are formulated or taken to fulfil general social needs and 
advance more specific interests of domestic groups, political parties, and economic 
organizations ". 
Perhaps no feature of the study of foreign policy is more difficult to generalise about 
than the relationship of public opinion to the government's external objectives and 
diplomatic behaviour (Holsti, 1983: 342). This means there will be a greater pressure 
on governments and policymakers regarding their definition and the implementation 
of their foreign policy at the international level. The relationship between government 
and pressure groups shapes the foreign policy preferences of a state and its capacity to 
implement these preferences. As Kissinger (1969: 41) says: "The international arena 
provides an opportunity for taking dramatic foreign-policy measures that are 
impossible at home ". 
Thus, the stability of a new state is an underlying factor upon which its foreign policy 
is built. A state without political stability would not be able to conduct a successful, 
strong and effective foreign policy and establish desirable international relations. 1 
However, according to Bialer (1980: 130) "A politically stable country is not 
necessarily at the same time socially, culturally, or economically stable. The 
instability of leadership does not necessarily assume general political instability ". 
2.2.5 Economic Resources 
Politics and economy have always been related to each other. In general, it can be 
said that there is a strong link between the economy and foreign policy. Scholars 
argue that the economic factor always influences foreign policy making. Since 
1 This view, which is advocated by the present author, has been also supported by Bakur al-'Amri 
during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
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decision makers formulate and execute foreign policy objectives according to the 
images they have of the relative power of their state in comparison with other states, 
the economy of the state becomes an important determinant of foreign policy making 
(Dawisha, 1977: 56). In addition, Smith (1989: 192) says "The wealth and 
sophistication of national societies have always been a significant element in the 
study of foreign policies, and the competition for markets or resources has been a 
major focus offoreign policy activity for centuries ". 
Scholars have therefore focused on the economy in explaining a state's foreign policy 
choices. In many cases, they believe that the right choices are the most important 
factor shaping the nature of international economic relations. For example, in term of 
needs, and in order to protect their economies, states have to choose between setting 
their exchange rates, giving foreign aid, or acting in the light of other states' political 
interests. As Holsti (1983: 151) states "A country that needs something from another 
is vulnerable to its acts of influence ". Moreover, scholars have paid attention as to 
why certain states grow rapidly and develop over time, while others fail to do so or 
decline, and how that affects their power in international affairs. The changing 
positions of states in the world economy would also affect their positions in the 
international community and their ability to influence international affairs, because 
economic affairs are mingled with the political and states cannot entirely shut 
themselves off from the international open economic order (Wesson, 1977: 100-101). 
Thus, some countries are committed to an active role in international affairs under the 
pressure of their needs for economic resources, because a lack of resources is likely to 
cause a shift in their foreign policy, especially in the case of newly emerging states. 
However, even developed countries have come under such pressure. For example, the 
Japanese government came under Arab pressure because of its lack of oil resources; it 
took up a position on the Arab-Israeli conflict which was more acceptable to 
conservative Arab states. This included the recognition of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the long term, Japan has found very 
valuable markets in the Middle East open to it for the first time, but the initial and the 
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most important aim was basically to sustain the flow of Arab oil (Farrands, 1989: 92- 
93). 
The subject of international political economy came into prominence after World War 
II. What became more important in the 1970s and 1980s was the growth of global 
interdependence between the rich countries and the poor. It can be seen that the rich 
countries with highly developed economic institutions and sufficient resources face 
different problems from those newly emerging countries with new and fragile 
economy (Smith, 1989: 192). For less developed countries, the economic issues are 
more crucial for their foreign policy, for they are very directly constrained by the 
need to conserve resources and, in large part, by the external aspects of economic 
policy (Hill, 1977: 5). 
The purposes or goals that states choose to pursue with their resources should not 
come in conflict with international economic policies. The impact of powerful 
economic blocs, such as the European Union, the USA and international economic 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ' World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and World Bank, 2 could affect those states' economies and their 
foreign policies, and the situation could become more serious in case of newly 
emerging states. Such institutions and blocs have the power and means to reshape 
economic flows. However, the US Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, complained at 
the 1999 Summit of high-powered political and business leaders in Davos, 
Switzerland, that there were " no easy answers and no magic wands for overhauling 
financial institutions to make the world safe for global capitalism " (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 2001: 280). 
The economic gap between rich and poor classes and countries is currently widening 
and is creating political tensions within individual nation states and those economic 
blocs mentioned above. This has influenced calls for integration between states of the 
same region, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia- 
http: //www. iie. com/Dublications/papersfnolandO298. htm. 
2 Ibid. 
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Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Mercosur Free-Trade zone in the cone of 
South America, and the Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arabian Gulf States, in 
order to strengthen their position economically and politically (Kegley and Wittkopf, 
2001: 280-281). This shows how domestic economies ought to be run and how they 
ought to relate to the rest of the world economy (Brown, 2001: 188-189). 
All nations, both old and new, today operate from a clear economic reality that there 
is interdependence between national economies. For example, when a nation cuts 
taxes on imports in order to encourage domestic demand, it stimulates the markets in 
other countries or nations, by increasing its own imports and raising the exports of the 
other countries. The stronger the economy of a given nation today, the greater the 
influence it would have on other countries. The global market further confirms the 
need for interdependence in terms of access to capital, information, technology and 
markets. It is extremely difficult for a newly established nation to gain a foothold in a 
large market like the EU or the USA without the negotiating strength that comes from 
having a large economy. However, newly emerging states without the appropriate 
economic institutions and stable foreign policy would find it difficult to enter the 
global market, as the customs and trading rules in modem economy restrict access to 
such global markets. An example of this is the ex-Communist countries, where the 
economic systems are completely different (Coase, 1992: 714). 
The huge flows of capital around the world are also extremely unsettling to any 
national economy. Under the influence of the World Bank, many nations have opened 
themselves up to these international flows of capital with some destructive results. 
For example, the severity of the Asian financial crisis in 1998, which affected the 
economies of most countries in South-East Asia, ' has prompted the World Bank to 
advocate controls on international capital movements. The other way for a newly 
emerging nation state to protect itself from being adversely affected by the operation 
of the international capital markets is to seek protection through a main foreign 
'http: //www. iie. com/publications/papers/nolandO298. htm; http: //www. adb. orR/Documents/EDRC/Staff 
Pavers/ESP060. pdf. 
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currency such as the Dollar or the new Euro. An example of this is the decision of the 
Egyptian Government to link its currency exchange rate with the US Dollar. 
It is thus clear that a state with limited economic resources would be obliged to shape 
its foreign policy in line with other economically powerful states, in order to secure 
and protect its interests. On the other hand, rich countries tend to orient their foreign 
policy towards newly emerging states in ways that promote their foreign interests or 
secure agreements with them in needed areas. 
2.2.6 The Colonial Legacy 
The first wave of colonialism began in the late fifteenth century, as the Dutch, 
English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish used their military power to conquer 
territories for commercial gain (Zavala, 1961: 925). Beginning in the 1870s and 
extending until the outbreak of World War I, a second wave of imperialism expanded 
over different part of the world as Europe, joined later by the United States and Japan, 
aggressively colonized new territories. However, the end of colonialism was one of 
the most remarkable developments in twentieth-century world politics (Smith, 
1989: 192). Since World War II, and by the late 1980s, more than 120 new states have 
emerged, many of them former colonies (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2001: 125-131). 
Although in Lundgren's view (1992: 86), formal colonization does not exist in today's 
newly emerging states, it continues to function in the form of a complex and 
multilevel socialization process, which serves to reinforce colonial unequal relations 
of power and an ideology of the colonizer's superiority. Such a colonization process is 
humanly harmful, unjust, and dangerous (ibid: 87). Historically, the incorporation of 
distinct societies under capitalism proceeded by means of the conquest, domination 
and enslavement of alien peoples, followed by the socioeconomic restructuring of the 
dominated society in order to install new forms of production or exploit former 
productive activities. The fundamental objective of this restructuring was to send the 
60 
incorporated society into the expansionist world economy as part of its productive 
system. This was commonly followed by the diffusion of the colonizer's cultural 
tradition (Magubane, 1979: 169). 
In this context, many scholars have regarded the colonization process as having 
deprived people of their land, their labour, their resources and their dignity. This has 
meant the enrichment of Euro-American and European elites and the corresponding 
under-enrichment of Africans and other Third World peoples (Nadell, 1995: 448; 
Lundgren, 1992: 86). Nadell (1995: 448) cited Fanon as saying: "The wealth of the 
Europeans is our wealth too. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. The 
wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from underdeveloped peoples ". 
Rodney was quoted by Nadell (1995: 448) as arguing that colonialism "meant the 
development of Europe as part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was 
underdeveloped". Moreover, Saakana (1987: 9) states: "The colonial process, like its 
capitalist parentage, is one of massive theft and robbery ". Colonization also 
threatened, through slavery, to rob some colonized peoples of one of their most 
critical resources, the next generation (Lundgren, 1992: 86). 
However, as Osterhammel (1997: 107) notes, one should taken into account the fact 
that "Not all whites in the colony were also colonial rulers ". He also quotes Albert 
Memmi when he pointed out that "Not every coloniser became a colonist; there was 
also the coloniser with good intention, who tried to avoid crass exercise of power or 
who even fought against the colonial system" (Ibid: 107). Hence, instead of seeing 
colonialism simply as a cause of deprival and a means of exploitation, it should be 
acknowledged that some colonial powers have participated in the construction of their 
colonies, as Clapham (1977: 77) indicates, by spreading the colonial language, 
building roads, establishing a cash economy, educating people and even recruiting 
them into the army and civil administration. He adds that the colonial powers created 
groups for whom the colonial territory was a major enabler of social, economic and, 
ultimately, political activity. What is especially significant about this process, from 
the viewpoint of future foreign policy, was the way in which each step increased 
linkage with the outside world, and especially with the metropolitan power. 
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Colonial administrations differed in various areas. However, in each case, the 
administering powers unwittingly created aspirations amongst indigenous populations 
for many of the values they themselves appreciated: independence in political life, 
industrialization of the economy and international prestige. Despite the great variety 
of cultural contexts in which relations between states occur today, some important 
characteristics of the state system represent an extension into new areas of the 
diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military traditions of the Europeans (Holsti, 
1983: 64). 
One of the most important colonial legacies which affected the foreign policy of 
newly emerging states, have been these anti-colonial stances. Third World peoples 
struggled against colonial legacies in their economic, political and spiritual life. Thus, 
these peoples did not submit to the colonial fate. They fought back to regain their 
freedom and control of their land and labour (Saakana, 1987: 10-11). However, the 
different experiences of colonialism affected the degree of the peoples' anti-colonial 
feelings. The calls for an increase in national unity and identity, to be achieved partly 
by specifically nationalist appeals, but partly also by anti-colonial stances, promoted a 
sense of national identity against the most easily perceived threats to that identity, 
which are the colonial powers. In pursuing this goal, governing elites use their 
minimal diplomatic experience and the resources created through their ability to 
combine domestic control with access to the international system, in order to develop 
the newly emerging states' foreign policy orientation (Clapham, 1977: 79-83). 
After the decline of the colonial powers, some regions found that they had a common 
historical colonial legacy. This was most marked in Latin America, where nearly all 
the movements for national independence had the same colonial enemy to overthrow 
(Spain), whereas in Africa and Asia the new nationalistic movements struggled 
against various colonial powers: France, Britain, Holland, Spain, Portugal and 
Belgium (Kaufiran, 1977: 135). However, this common colonial experience, in 
addition to conflicts between hegemonic powers and an increasing superpower 
involvement in the Third World countries during the Cold War era, had an influence 
on the foreign policy making of the newly emerging states at that time, leading to the 
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emergence of the Non-Alignment Movement, a group of about 77 states that had and 
its own institutional forms and conferences (Clapham, 1977: 165-172). 
It could be said that one remarkable legacy of colonialism has been the problem of 
political boundaries, which were drawn for purposes of colonial convenience and cut 
across ethnic, tribal, religious and linguistic ties, dismembered established political 
units, and joined more than one pre-colonial political entity into uneasy 
administrative unions (Ayoob, 1993: 34). Moreover, Dessouki (1993: 79) notes: "In 
most of the Third World, the state is a recent phenomenon; its borders were decided 
by colonial powers and do not represent harmonious cultural or social formations ". 
In general, it can be said that colonisers shifted the terrain of engagement between 
them by occupying and carving out the colonised lands in between the powerful 
command of authority and the powerless silence of the victim (Prakash, 1995: 9). 
Thus, several conflicts in the Third World regions have been caused by the legacies 
of the colonial era, one example being the conflict that was started by the Vietminh in 
1940 in order to force the reluctant French to grant independence to Vietnam, which 
escalated into a major American military intervention. Other prominent examples of 
conflicts which have their roots in the colonial era have been the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
some other African conflicts, such as between Ethiopia and Somalia and between 
Libya and Chad, the India and China border conflict, and the conflict over boundaries 
between Iran and Iraq. Moreover, the recent crisis in the Gulf over the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait also had its roots in colonially arranged boundaries (Ayoob, 1993: 42-43). 
The withdrawal of the colonial powers left a number of states whose legitimacy was 
based not on any geographic, ethnic or religious rationale, but on purely political 
criteria designed to serve the interests of the colonial powers. As result, those states 
have become preoccupied with boundary issues and, as such their foreign policies, 
particularly at the regional level, have been greatly influenced by these problems. 
This has been illustrated by the territorial disputes between Turkey and Syria, Qatar 
and Bahrain, and the African triangular conflict between Algeria, Morocco and 
Mauritania over the Western Sahara (Dawisha, 1977: 52-53). 
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Hence, there is an obvious connection between the colonial legacy and the foreign 
policies of newly emerging states. Robert Good argues that the foreign policies of the 
countries that became independent in the years after the Second World War cannot 
properly be understood in isolation from the rigours of constructing autonomous 
legitimate polities within the territories demarcated by the former imperial powers 
(Lawson, 1993: 100). The achievement of independence did not eliminate the 
consequences of past colonial experience. As Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 125) point 
out: "Despite their legal status as independent entities, sovereignty could not erase 
the colonial heritage and vulnerabilities that the former colonies faced". 
Thus, since the newly emerging states were dominated by the great imperial powers 
at the core of the international system, they viewed the inherited rules and structures 
as barriers to their true independence and growth, which strongly influenced their 
foreign policy towards the international community. Berreman in (Lundgren, 
1992: 87) states: "Inequality between peoples and nations is a major threat to societal 
and even human survival ". 
2.2.7 National Security 
The duty of ensuring national security is incumbent on the government of the state. 
Before studying the link between national security and the foreign policy of newly 
emerging states, we need to define national security. Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 456) 
define national security as "a country's capacity to resist external or internal threats 
to its physical survival or core values". Moreover, Buzan (1991: 116) states: 
"National security is about the ability of states to maintain their independence 
identity and their functional integrity". However, other scholars see the national 
security as a concept used to encompass so many goals that there is no uniform 
agreement on what it encompasses and, hence, no universal understanding of the 
concept. Certainly it involves more than national survival. But what is involved is 
often left vague and indeterminate (Wolfers, 1952: 481-502). 
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The national security approach provides an overall interpretive framework for 
studying foreign policy because it forces historians to analyse the foreign as well as 
domestic factors shaping this policy. Historians believe that diplomatic behaviour 
responds mainly to the distribution of power in the international system; however, 
most revisionist and corporatist scholars assume that domestic economic forces and 
social structures are of overwhelming importance as well (Leffler, 1990: 143). 
However, greater attention has been given to the impact of national security upon 
foreign policy and international relations, as Wesson (1977: 371) states: "National 
security has remained the dominant consideration in the foreign policy ". Lyons 
(1963: 497) added that "Most importantly, there was no longer any doubt about the 
impact of national security problems on the state of international relations ". 
Thus, a state's national security policy is that part of its foreign policy which is 
concerned with the allocation of resources for the production, deployment and 
employment of what we might call the coercive facilities which a nation uses in 
pursuing its interests. These coercive facilities are one among a number of foreign 
policy instrumentalities (Almond, 1956: 371). In studying foreign policy, the national 
security approach demands that analysts distinguish between realities and 
perceptions. This task, as simple as it sounds, is fraught with difficulty because it is 
often hard for historians to agree on what constituted an actual danger than on what 
was a perceived threat (Leffler, 1990: 144). 
Threats to the national security of a state can take different forms. These include not 
only military threat but also economic, political or ideological threats, as well as 
appeals based on historical affiliations or ethnic factors. However, the important point 
here is that states define national security in different terms, depending upon the 
issues, circumstances, events and resources, which they consider more important 
(Wenner, 1993: 169). Some scholars believe that national security is strengthened by 
economic power. Pfeifer (1993: 127-141) states "Self-sufficiency would make the 
country less vulnerable to the international pressure ". For example, food security 
could positively affect national security and lead to development and could, hence, 
reduce vulnerability. 
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However, states focussing on specific issues, such as the water resources problem 
between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, perceive national security threats and could, 
therefore, conduct an unstable foreign policy. Moreover, from the economic point of 
view, Buzan (1991: 99) pointed out that "Weak states may find themselves trapped by 
historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them 
underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the 
economic and political resources necessary to build a strong state ". The relationship 
between Latin American states and the United States is often characterised in these 
terms (Ibid: 99). 
Other scholars see the problem of debt as an indicator of how national security could 
be vulnerable to external threats. Chatelus (1993: 145) argues that "It has become 
manifestly impossible to re-establish the essential equilibrium, necessary for growth 
resumption, through sole use of structural adjustment policies. The proposed debt 
treatment, issued at the inception of the `crisis' in 1982, has weighed heavily on the 
social stability and political security of numerous countries ". Moreover, he added 
that debtors must be provided with the time and the means for a microeconomic 
adjustment, which would prevent short-term social shocks and would guarantee, in 
the long run, the conditions of sustained growth (Ibid, 145). In doing so, the debt 
threat to the national security of less developed countries would be avoided. 
Recognizing the impact of national security upon foreign policy, it must be 
acknowledged that the geographical position and the size of the newly emerging state 
are also essential to its national security. A state would find it difficult to maintain 
political independence when it is situated in a region that is politically and 
economically sensitive (Wenner, 1993: 179-183). If a newly emerging state is also 
situated next to a large state (defined as having a population over 30 million), it 
would be more vulnerable to the intervention of its neighbours in its internal affairs, 
which could put its national security in danger. However, small and newly emerging 
states are more likely to use international organizations as arenas in order to 
accomplish their interests, and they are more apt to initiate joint foreign policy 
ventures. On the other hand, large states are more involved in different areas and 
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issues of international politics and see themselves as having a large number of 
constant tasks and functions abroad than small states (Holsti, 1983: 340). This is 
particularly true, and it becomes more serious, if the newly emerging state has 
boundary problems with its neighbouring states, as in the case of Kuwait and Iraq. 
The current practice of the international community is strongly opposed to the notion 
that the boundaries between states may be changed by force, as they are the dominant 
definition of state sovereignty. Heuser (1997: 88) states "The declarations of the 
United Nations reconstructed sovereignty to underline non-intervention and 
territorial integrity as the highest values ". However, problems relating to borders 
could assume other dimensions that may influence the state's national security. For 
example, migration, refugees and asylum seekers and the associated humanitarian 
interventions have an impact on national security and foreign policy (Brown, 
2001: 248). Also, the type of regime or leadership in a neighbouring state influences 
the national security of the newly emerging state. Strong nationalist leaders exhibit 
more conflictual behaviour in their foreign policies than do states with other types of 
leadership (Holsti, 1983: 340). Hitler was a good example of this, when he invaded his 
neighbouring states during World War Two. 
Moreover, public opinion about national security is an essential element of making 
the newly emerging state's foreign policy. The public opinion can be affected by the 
quality of the media (newspapers, magazines, TV channels, etc) which acquaint the 
people with foreign policy and national security issues. They take an active part in the 
structuring of issues, and participate in foreign policy making continually. The media, 
as Almond (1956: 374) indicates, reaches the formal governmental agencies and the 
non-governmental opinion leaders and helps to create a kind of laboratory atmosphere 
in which foreign policy ideas can be tested out through the use of responsible 
speculation and imagination. The media, Almond adds, also constitutes a feedback 
mechanism on the consequences of policy decisions and furnishes the necessary basis 
for the constant process of modifying decisions which have already been made. 
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At present, the impact of national security on the foreign policy of newly emerging 
states has become more important, due to the growing conflicts between states. 
National security plays a key role in the making of any country's foreign policy and is 
an irreplaceable element in the establishment of international relations within the 
international community. However, as Toynbee maintained, peace could be achieved 
by converting people's thoughts from national competition to national cooperation 
(Thompson, 1956: 387). 
2.3 Specific Features of Foreign Policy-Making in Newly Emerging 
States: Lessons and Implications 
In accordance with what has been previously argued, it is clear that there are strong 
linkages between the national and international elements influencing the foreign 
policy of states (Rosenau, 1969: 44-66). Hence, interdependence is becoming more 
prevalent in this era. It also clear that international relations and foreign policy 
decision-making is far from straightforward and is largely unpredictable. Tooze 
(1985: 97) states: "Foreign policy processes have adapted or have been forced to 
adapt to change, but many uneasy intragovernmental relationships have resulted 
from the blurring boundaries ". 
The foreign policy of states can also be implemented by a series of observable 
decisions and conscious choices as in some sort of game of political competition. But 
any study of a state's foreign policy over a given period quickly reveals that, rather 
than a series of clear decisions, there is a continuous and confusing `flow of action', 
made up of a mixture of political decisions, non-political decisions, bureaucratic 
procedures and continuations of previous policies (Clarke, 1989: 27). The reality of 
foreign policy-making and the desire to maintain an influential role in international 
relations are extremely complex. 
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The situation becomes more complicated for newly emerging states as they conduct 
their foreign policy and establish relations within the international community at the 
early stage of their statehood. A good example on this was the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia during King Abdulaziz's reign, which emerged as a new state after a long 
period of internal struggle. One way of understanding complexity in this context is to 
look for the major problems that confront any newly emerging state during the 
establishment of its relations and the implementation of its foreign policy towards 
others. However, while some succeed in overcoming these problems, many policies 
fail. Most of the failures are due to the complication of implementation procedures; 
this would apply to both newly emerging and fully established states (Clarke and 
Smith, 1989: 179). 
Many foreign policy analysts, cited in this chapter, have studied the problems of 
understanding and analysing foreign policy making. This chapter attempts to focus on 
the major problems that, in general, confront newly emerging states during the early 
formulation and implementation of their foreign policies. However, it is to be 
admitted that the seven factors which have been examined in the previous sections, as 
the major problems facing newly emerging states, do not in any way cover all the 
problems which such states face in the early period of their statehood. Moreover, it 
can be said that the study has revealed the essential lesson that each one of the seven 
factors may have positive or negative influence on the other factors, in addition to 
their combined influence on the foreign policy of newly emerging states towards the 
international community. 
Newly emerging states have to comply with certain national and international 
behaviour criteria in order to achieve their social and political goals. The primary task 
of new states is to have a strong foreign policy. In order to achieve this, newly 
emerging states have to overcome certain problems, which differ from one state to 
another. The seven factors are not relevant to all states. There are some problems 
particular to some states but not others. An example of this was Jordan during its 
early emergence as a state, whereby, the problem of consolidating its national identity 
was its most important task. In contrast, the main problem of the foreign policy of 
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Kuwait during its emergence and even now, has primarily been national security. 
Furthermore, the foreign policy of some countries may be concerned with the 
problems of nation building and nationalism; a sense of being Cambodian may well 
be fostered by pursuing a foreign policy of strict independence, while the unity of 
Nigeria may be served by establishing the country's prominence inside the African 
bloc (Hill, 1977: 5). 
The foreign policy problems of newly emerging states vary in nature, magnitude and 
impact from state to state and from region to region as well. Some scholars emphasise 
that the various political traditions that have developed in different regions, when 
establishing a state's foreign policy, cannot be legislated away; they need to be 
considered in the making of effective policy, domestic as well as foreign (Wenner, 
1993: 181). It is also true that the problems experienced by less developed states or 
regions are completely different from those in industrialised and powerful countries. 
Small states and less developed countries formulate and implement their foreign 
policy in ways that would avoid the threats posed by others, while the foreign policy 
of great powers are conducted in order to consolidate and increase their interests and 
strengthen their positions in the international arena. However, as Smith (1989: 191) 
says: "A state with many international involvements will face distinctive foreign 
policy problems ". 
Newly emerging states are more vulnerable to foreign policy problems. This may be 
because they lack credibility and legitimacy in the international community and are 
often distracted from international relations by their domestic instability, such as 
Somalia. Another distraction relates to the boundary issues, as in the case of Qatar 
and Bahrain, or economic ones, which dominated Yemen's relation with Saudi 
Arabia. However, small states with limited contacts in the international arena may 
have no fewer problems in foreign policy regarding their specific needs and resources 
than major power states with widely dispersed areas of concern entailing major 
commitments and demands (Smith, 1989: 191-192). 
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Each newly emerging state should find out what is the best strategy to adopt in order 
to cope with and successfully manage its foreign policy, especially with the 
influential powers in its region and neighbourhood. This is, of course, not to suggest 
that smaller states should simply imitate and follow their larger or more influential 
neighbour(s); indeed, they should not. It is to suggest that states be prepared to utilize 
effectively and quickly, for their benefit, whatever resources and openings they may 
be able to develop. There is certainly evidence in the modem world that smaller 
states, using flexible tactics and limited resources, have been able to carve substantial 
niches and an independent position for themselves (Wenner, 1993: 181). 
What seems to be required, as a good strategy and a measure of quality in foreign 
policy, is an approach that combines a number of elements and thus enables the 
foreign policy of states to be assessed. As Waltz (1967: 16) has argued: "What is 
wanted in foreign policy is not a set of simple attributes but instead a nice balance of 
qualities: realism and imagination, flexibility and firmness, vigour and moderation, 
continuity of policy when policy is good and the ability to change direction when new 
international conditions make new departures desirable, adaptability of policy 
without destruction of its coherence or dependability ". This shows not only that the 
evaluation of foreign policies is necessary, but also that such evaluation has to be 
conducted in the light of the problems faced and the processes adopted by different 
states. A number of analysts have attempted this kind of analysis. Smith (1989: 205) 
quoted Hanrieder: "For many governments, the fundamental standard of success in 
foreign policy is the extent to which the satisfaction of domestic and governmental 
needs can be combined with adaptation to external demands and the allocation of 
resources to competing activities ". These guidelines are particularly important in the 
case of newly emerging states. 
In this study, an attempt will be made to discuss the Saudi case in the light of the 
general problems that confront newly-emerging states during the course of 
formulating and implementing their foreign policy. Accordingly, the study will 
address the following research questions pertaining to the Saudi case: 
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1. To what extent did King Abdulaziz assume a personal role and leadership in the 
making and implementation of Saudi foreign policy over the period under study, and 
what was the role of institutions and advisors? 
2. What was the impact of the task of integrating the Saudi national community on 
King Abdulaziz's attempt to adopt a cohesive foreign policy posture? 
3. In what ways did the economic constraints and opportunities impact on the 
direction of Saudi foreign policy making during King Abdulaziz's reign? 
4. In what ways did the territorial problems between Saudi Arabia and other 
neighbouring states affect Saudi regional and international foreign policy? 
5. How did other regional (Arab and Middle-Eastern) issues influence the direction of 
Saudi foreign policy and to what extent did such issues attract King Abdulaziz's 
involvement? 
6. How successful and effective was Saudi foreign policy under King Abdulaziz in 
achieving its desired or declared aims? 
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Chapter Three: The Genesis of Saudi Arabia's Foreign 
Policy Structure 
3.1 The Role of the Leader 
Mutual diplomatic representation between states is one of the features of sovereignty 
and international relations, practised by states since the eighteenth century, according 
to their needs and via suitable means to maintain their commercial, political and 
military interests. Diplomatic representation was practised with honour and high 
respect among states, through the exchanging of embassies and consulates, and 
became one of the important steps taken by any new state to demonstrate its 
sovereignty in the modem era (Holsti, 1983: 162-163; Mahmasani, 1972: 125). 
The international relations of a state are influenced by many factors, such as its 
ideological orientation, its geographical position and its place in the international 
community. Thus, the international relations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that 
were established by King Abdulaziz with the international community were 
influenced by the religious position of the Arabian Peninsula, the King's charisma, 
and his wise religious leadership, which was characterised by clarity of objective, 
sticking to principles and supporting the truth (al-Salloom, 1995: 239). 
Al-Zirikli (1977a: 381) stated that none of the parts of the Arabian Peninsula which 
were integrated by King Abdulaziz had a diplomatic representation, as it is known in 
modern times with other states, before the unification of the Kingdom into one 
political unit by him. Prior to unification there were merely a few consulates in al- 
Hijaz and a number of individuals scattered throughout the Arabian Peninsula who 
had no official diplomatic status, despite the titles that they possessed. Nevertheless, 
al-Hijaz was open to the international community and had relations with some states 
through their consulates there, especially those states which had Islamic populations. 
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This was seen by some writers as a form of diplomatic representation, practised by 
the Hijazi people before the conquest of al-Hijaz by Ibn Saud. Moreover, the 
conquest was seen as the main cause for the genesis of Saudi diplomatic relations, 
although Saudi Arabia was not officially recognized by other countries until their 
consulates in Jeddah strongly recommended, directly after the conquest of Jeddah in 
December 1925, that their states recognise Ibn Saud as King of Hijaz and as a 
powerful governor, who had influential authority and was able to ensure peace and 
justice in the area (al-Humoodi, 1998: 144-146; al-Salloom, 1995: 241). 
The charisma of Ibn Saud was an important factor in convincing others of his political 
and religious leadership. He would ask for counsel but at the same time never relied 
on others to play his role or allowed them to participate with him in his leadership. 
McLoughlin (1993: 56) stated that, " When Philby comes to describing Ibn Saud 
himself he emphasises above all what most struck him as a man of action and vigour 
himself. Ibn Saud was a man of inexhaustible energy, a man who put the affairs of his 
state above all other considerations. We learn that Ibn Saud habitually at this stage 
of his life had four hours' sleep a night and rested during the day, usually for two 
hours ". In fact, maintaining the unity of leadership was one of the features of King 
Abdulaziz's rule, which was clearly evident at that time. This was due to the 
difficulties that he had faced in his childhood as a result of the dispute between his 
uncles, which led to the exile of Al Saud from Riyadh, and also to the many crises 
and conspiracies created by numerous enemies. Among these enemies were his own 
relatives, whom he encountered during the early years of regaining his ancestors' 
dominion and building his state (al-Mareq, 1978: 196-197; Dickson, 2002: 300). 
In view of this, and due to the lack or underdevelopment of state institutions at this 
time, King Abdulaziz was accustomed to dealing with all his state affairs himself and 
to issue his orders to his ministers and assistants directly. All his subordinates 
received their authority from him and acted according to his instructions. None of 
them could act before asking his permission first, and none of them was given 
authority of his own; Ibn Saud was the only authority in the Kingdom. It is true that 
his elder sons, especially Saud and Faisal, were appointed as his deputies in Najd and 
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al-Hijaz and that Prince Faisal, with his considerable experience of foreign affairs, 
was assigned as the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia. However, it should be 
understood that their function was always subject to the King's control in all matters 
(Philby, 1955: 297; Howarth, 1964: 116; al-Zirikli, 1977: 354). 
This became more obvious in the decision-making process concerning foreign affairs. 
King Abdulaziz was the one who directly negotiated with foreign commissioners and 
held conferences with them. He also discussed treaties and authorised them himself, 
without using the formal circle of foreign affairs as was usual in other states 
(Wahbah, 1960: 86-87 and 96). In addition, he was accustomed to holding meetings 
with his counsellors to discuss a variety of issues, asking them to give their advice 
and opinions with full freedom, while retaining his right to take the final decision, 
after which they would work to implement his instructions (al-Rasheed, 2002: 87). 
Niblock (1982: 89) gives an indication of the King's approach: "Abdulaziz's attitude 
toward advice offered to him is neatly summarised in a Koranic text which he 
frequently quoted to Philby: `Take counsel among yourselves, and if they agree with 
you, well and good: but if otherwise, then put your trust in God and do that which you 
deem best ". 
There were many of successes in the accomplishment of King Abdulaziz's objective 
to maintain the interests of his country in external as well as internal affairs; these 
were due to King Abdulaziz's leadership and the carrying out of his responsibilities 
with full power. The total dedication and sincerity of his counsellors and assistants in 
implementing his instructions and accomplishing the goals set by him made the 
majority of the results very satisfactory (Philby, 1955 292-297; Wahbah, 2000: 146). 
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3.2 King Abdulaziz's Counsellors 
Al-Zirikli (1977a: 1067) quoted Abdulrahman `Azzam, the General Secretary of the 
Arab League, who said that "one of King Abdulaziz's traits was his ability to deeply 
comprehend the problems that he encountered and produce appropriate solutions, 
after taking advice from his advisors; also one of his merits was his success in 
selecting his counsellors and assistants". `Azzam added that, "The King never issued 
orders regarding any problem without asking for the counsel of the people around 
him, who had much knowledge and experience". However, this does not mean that he 
felt bound to follow their advice; it should be understood that the decision always 
remained with him. Indeed when he considered something right and believed that his 
decision was correct, he would not hesitate to take it, even if it were against the 
opinion of his advisors (al-Mareq, 1978: 252-253). 
At the beginning of the building of the state, most of Ibn Saud's followers, especially 
in Najd, were not skilled enough to help him in the administration of his state, 
particularly in the field of foreign affairs. Due to the lack of local expertise, it was 
necessary for Ibn Saud to open his state to all the Arabs and Muslims who wanted to 
work for him. Thus, many Arab experts who had already acquired administrative 
skills in their countries joined the service of Ibn Saud. Some of these had been driven 
from their countries by the pressure of the colonial powers and found themselves 
refugees in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the King gave all such non-Saudi Arabs the right 
to become Saudi nationals, or to stay and work according to their qualifications and 
professions. Moreover, he welcomed well-qualified Arabs, permitting them to work 
for him in the most important fields in his government, such as the diplomatic circle. 
This was impossible to see in the other countries, which can be added to King 
Abdulaziz merits (Philby, 1955: 293-294; al-Mareq, 1978: 271-314; al-Khuwaiter, 
1998: 138-139; al-Rasheed, 2002: 87). 
It is important here to state that King Abdulaziz at the beginning chose men who had 
stayed a long time in some places as counsellors and also as his representatives 
76 
abroad. Among them was Prince Ahmad al-Thunayyan, who came from Turkey to 
serve King Abdulaziz and represented him on many occasions. There was also 
Abdullah al- Dimluji, who came from Iraq and joined his service in 1915. He also 
drew upon advice from his representatives abroad: Abdullateef al-Mandeel in Iraq, 
Abdullah al-Niffisi in Kuwait, Abdulrahman al-Qusaibi in Bahrain, Abdullah al- 
Fawzan in Bombay, Fawzan al-Sabiq in Cairo and Abu Layla in Damascus. These 
men expended great efforts in serving the King and the country abroad, before the 
establishment of an official counsellors' circle (Almana, 1980: 190-191; al-Sumari et 
al., 1999: 98-99; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 299-300; al-Nafjan, 1992: 24). 
In later years, more Arabs joined the service of King Abdulaziz; among them was 
Hafiz Wahbah from Egypt, who became Plenipotentiary Commissioner, and later, 
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to London. From Syria came Khalid al-Hakeem, Yusuf 
Yasseen, Khayr al-Deen al-Zirikli and Rashad Fir'un. From Lebanon came Fuad 
Hamzah, the first Secretary to Prince Faisal, when he was appointed as Foreign 
Minister. From Libya, there were Khalid al-Ghargani and Basheer al-Sa'dawi. From 
Iraq, there was Rasheed al-Kailani, who came to King Abdulaziz in 1945, after the 
suppression of his revolt against the British mandate in Iraq in 1941 (al-Mareq, 1978: 
272-273; al-Hummoodi, 1998: 143-144; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 300). These individuals 
not only remained in King Abdulaziz's service, but generally continued to run the 
same departments, until the end of his reign, which certainly illustrated his ability to 
select the right men for the functions of state and also indicated that he trusted them 
with these important jobs and felt relaxed with their work and in their company 
(Philby, 1955: 294; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 300). 
In 1932 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially declared and King Abdulaziz 
established a small circle of counsellors to deal with daily matters of state. This circle 
was called the Political Committee (al-Shu'bah al-Siyasiyyah). The Political 
Committee was mainly attended by King Abdulaziz's brother Prince Abdullah, his 
two elder sons Saud and Faisal, Haft Wahbah, Khalid al-Hakeem, Yusuf Yasseen, 
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Fuad Hamzah, Khalid al-Ghargani and John Philby. 1 However, Philby rarely attended 
the Committee as he preferred to meet the King during his relaxed evening meeting 
(Almana, 1980: 191-192; al-Rasheed, 2002: 87). 
Although various opinions have been proposed regarding the relationship of St John 
Philby with the King, it should be remembered that he was one of the King's foreign 
advisers for more than 30 years and he was greatly impressed by the charisma of Ibn 
Saud and by his attitude, which finally convinced him to convert to Islam. According 
to some writers, Philby was seen as very loyal to Ibn Saud and to the Arab cause, 
which sometimes led him to work against the misguided policy of Britain toward the 
Arabs; he eventually resigned from his official position with the British Government 
as a protest against that policy, as he himself acknowledged (Graves, 1950: 225-226; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 143; al-Nafjan, 1992: 25; al-Majid, 2003: 59). However, King 
Abdulaziz described Philby as no more than a merchant and a commissioner2 
(Wahbah, 2000: 283; al- Zirikli, 1977: 1358). Moreover, Howarth (1964: 116) stated 
that, " Philby might also be said to have been an adviser, in so far as he was always 
ready with advice; but it was several years after the fall of Hail when he first joined 
his fortunes to Ibn Saud 's, and at his own wish he never held any paid or official 
position in the court. " 
King Abdulaziz was accustomed to holding an official meeting of the Political 
Committee every day after midday prayer and the only function of the Committee 
was to advise him. The King would raise a subject as he wished and ask for advice; a 
discussion then started, in which all the members of the meeting were quite free to 
give their opinions and make any suggestions. The King would end the discussions 
when he felt that he had heard enough and would then make his own decision about 
His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah insisted that Philby was not allowed to attend the 
meetings of this Committee. This information was given during my interview with him in Riyadh on 7- 
10 January 2004. 
2 This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
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what to do. None of the members was allowed to take the initiative and suggest a 
topic to be discussed; this right was entirely belonged to the King (Almana, 
1980: 179). 
3.3 The Foreign Ministry and the Other Governmental Structures 
3.3.1 The Establishment of the Saudi Foreign Ministry 
The foreign ministry of any country is the institution which the government relies on 
to plan, guide and administer its foreign policy. It organises the government's 
relationship with other countries and international organizations. It is like most other 
government institutions, in the sense that it bears responsibility for what it is charged 
with and implements its governmental policies with any other foreign party. This is 
why ministries and organizations in any country may not have any direct relationship 
or communication with other foreign parties except under the supervision and with 
the advice of their foreign ministry. In other words, the foreign ministry in any 
country is the backbone of the formation of its foreign policy (`Amer, 1976: 266; al- 
Salloom, 1995: 241). 
After the complete unification of al-Hijaz in 1926 and the recognition by several 
foreign countries of Ibn Saud as the King of al-Hijaz, there was a fundamental change 
in his policy in dealing with foreign countries. Thus he developed relationships with 
countries other than Britain. He also increased his cooperation and work with the 
countries and peoples of the Islamic world as a result of his control over the Muslim 
Holy Places and his responsibility for the Hajj affairs. This was in addition to his 
involvement in dealing and negotiating with his neighbours regarding border 
problems created by the new situation. In these circumstances, it became essential to 
find an official institution under the King's authority to deal with these problems and 
put forward solutions and plans, and which would facilitate his organising the 
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international relationships between his country and other countries, based on 
international laws and the principle of mutual exchange of relations and interests. The 
King therefore decided to create the Department of Foreign Affairs (Mudiriyyat al- 
Shu`un al-Kharijiyyah) in 1926 (al-Humoodi, 1998: 144-149; Abu `Ulayyah, 1986: 
99-100). 
The Department of Foreign Affairs was created in accordance a Royal Decree on 30 
August 1926 in Makkah. Article 17 of this order emphasised that the duty of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs was to execute the government foreign policy within 
its core policy. The article also provided that the four branches of this Department 
were to include the Political, Administrative, Legal, and Consular sections. Abdullah 
al- Dimluji, who came from Iraq and joined King Abdulaziz's service from 1915, 
remaining in the service of the Kingdom for more than 25 years in numerous places, 
was appointed Director of Foreign Affairs. However, Article 18 of the Royal Decree 
stated that the Department of Foreign Affairs was linked directly to the King, apart 
from its administrative and consular branches, which were attributed to his viceroy in 
al-Hijaz, his son Prince Faisal (`Amer, 1976: 254-255; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 100- 
101; Shakir, 1948: 67; Sadiq, 1965: 71). 
Although the Department of Foreign Affairs remained as such for four years, before it 
became the Foreign Ministry, it did not establish any embassies for the Kingdom 
abroad, but it did install two Legations. The first, established in Egypt in 1926, was 
led by Fawzan al-Sabiq, even though the Egyptian Government did not recognize him 
as more than a representative of Ibn Saud in Cairo. The second, set up in London in 
1930, was led by Hafiz Wahbah as Plenipotentiary Commissioner. Despite this lack 
of representation, the Department of Foreign Affairs succeeded in making a number 
of treaties and frontier settlements, as well as trade and friendship agreements. These 
included one with the French Government in March 1926, the Jeddah Agreement 
with Britain in 1927, an agreement with the German Government in April 1929, one 
with the Turkish Government in August 1929, and another with the Iranian 
Government in August of the same year (al-Qaba', 1968: 483-495; al-Sumari et al., 
1999: 101-102). 
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On 18 December 1930, a Royal Decree was issued ordering the change of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs to a Foreign Ministry. Prince Faisal, in addition to his 
initial role as Viceroy in al-Hijaz, was appointed Foreign Minister and Fuad Hamzah 
was appointed as Deputy in the Ministry. The location of the Foreign Ministry was in 
Makkah until 1947, when it was moved to Jeddah, which was the location of all 
foreign consulates and legations. Prince Faisal remained the Foreign Minister for the 
whole period of his father's reign. Although the Prince was regarded as the architect 
and the director of Saudi Foreign policy, he always worked under the direct 
supervision of the King. Thus, it was not possible for the Foreign Minister to take a 
decision in any matter regarding foreign policy, as the final decision was made by 
King Abdulaziz. The authority of the Ministry remained narrow and was concerned 
with the consulates and administration only (al-Zirikli, 1977: 368-369; Abu `Ulayyah, 
1986: 104; `Amer, 1976: 266-267). 
The Foreign Ministry was the first ministry established by King Abdulaziz. It was 
also one of the most important steps towards the establishment of government 
institutions on a modem foundation. Its organizational structure was simple at the 
time of its establishment and, in accordance with the economic capability of the 
country at that time, it comprised only five departments: the Private Office, and the 
Oriental, Administrative, Political and Consular departments. In spite of the modest 
start of the Ministry, it continued to develop and expand with time (al-Sumari et al., 
1999: 102-105; al-Humoodi, 1998: 166-167). 
In 1933 a proposal for the development of its structure and plans was forwarded by 
Yusuf Yasseen to the King for consideration, and the King agreed to keep developing 
the Ministry to a level which suited the position which Saudi Arabia had achieved 
among the nations and its relations with other countries. It established more 
departments, such as the Protocol (al-Marasim al-Malakiyyah) and financial 
branches. In fact, the Foreign Ministry succeeded, during King Abdulaziz's reign, in 
implementing Saudi foreign policy in accordance with his advice and supervision, 
from its establishment until his death in 1953. In spite of the Ministry's early 
difficulties and with a limited number of Ministry employees, who did not exceed 
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twenty even in 1947, Saudi diplomatic activities increased in terms of both sending 
and receiving diplomatic representations (al-Sumari et al., 1999: 106-112). 
The first diplomatic delegations to the Saudi Government consisted of only a few 
countries, which had a diplomatic presence in al-Hijaz at the time of its unification by 
Abdulaziz in 1926 and which recognized King Abdulaziz and his Government; these 
were the Soviet Union, Britain, Holland, France and Turkey. During the period 1926- 
1929, the number of diplomatic delegations increased to nine: the new states were 
Switzerland in 1927, Germany in 1928, Iran in 1929 and Poland in 1929. The 
number increased after the establishment of the Foreign Ministry in 1930 and grew to 
29 by the end of 1951.1 The number of Saudi diplomatic delegations with the other 
world governments had also increased before King Abdulaziz's death in 1953 to 
twelve embassies, eight legations and six consulates. The Saudi Foreign Ministry 
deepened its political and economic cooperation with other countries at all levels (al- 
Zirikli, 1977: 383-384; al-Humoodi, 1998: 144-150; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 129-178). 
Among the most important political achievements of Saudi diplomacy during King 
Abdulaziz's reign was the establishment of the Arab League; Saudi Arabia was one 
of the countries that took the lead in its establishment. Al-Humoodi (1998: 531) 
claimed that the idea of the creation of an organization which would look after Arab 
affairs and unite the Arab peoples had been in King Abdulaziz's mind for more than 
thirty years before the establishment of the Arab League. Before the First World War 
began he demanded that Turkey invite the Arab leaders to a conference in a country 
not under its occupation to ascertain whether they shared an ambition to achieve a 
single Arab political unit or to form several political units linked to each other and 
Which would cooperate for their common interests and general welfare (al-Zirikli, 
1977: 1199). Turkey refused and so, after the start of the War, he sent an invitation to 
the major leaders of the Arabian Peninsula, such as Sharif Husain, Ibn Rasheed and 
gong the delegations were those of the United States of America in 1931, Iraq in 1931, Yemen in 
19331, Italy in 1932, Afghanistan in 1932, Jordan in 1933, Ethiopia in 1934, Egypt in 1936, Syria in 
1941, Lebanon in 1944, Chile in 1945, Argentina in 1946, India in 1947, Pakistan in 1947, Indonesia 
1948, 
Spain in 1948 and Palestine in 1948. 
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Mubarak al-Sabah, to exchange views on what they should do in order to avoid the 
destruction and the calamity of this War (ibid). It is undeniable, therefore, that the 
idea was originally his and that the active work to create it was also his chosen task, 
albeit with the participation and support of the other Arab leaders (al-Zirikli, 1977: 
1199; al-Humoodi, 1998: 53 1; Van, der Meulen, 1999: 121). 
There were, however, doubts and fears in King Abdulaziz's mind, regarding some of 
the calls for Arab unity. Among those calling for unity was the British Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, who proposed it in 1941 and 1943. There were also other 
individual suggestions for sub-regional integrations. The most important of these 
projects was the regional integration in Bilad al-Shaam, known as Greater Syria, and 
also the plan for an integration between Iraq and Bilad al-Shaam, known as the Fertile 
Crescent, proposed by Nouri al-Sa'ed, the former Iraqi Prime Minister. King 
Abdulaziz saw that these projects and suggestions would benefit the Hashemite 
House in Iraq and Jordan. He also feared that those kinds of narrower integration 
plans might only benefit individuals and personal interests and purposes rather than 
the Arab people as a whole. Were these plans to succeed, they might have constituted 
a real threat to his unified territories and the sovereignty of his country. This prospect 
increased King Abdulaziz's doubts concerning these proposals for regional 
integration (al-Zirikli, 1977: 1200-1207; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 190-193). 
King Abdulaziz wished, through his Arab foreign policy, to achieve all kinds of 
political, economic and cultural cooperation with the Arabs. When the notion of Arab 
unity or the Arab League became clear, he included his recommendations in a 
message and sent it on 3 January 1945 to the General Arab Conference, which was 
taking place in Alexandria in Egypt. He had in mind an Arab organization that would 
foster coordination and cooperation among its members, based on full respect for the 
sovereignty of all its members. This indeed came about, since the King's view was 
supported and shared by the Egyptian Government, as was made clear during King 
Farooq's visit to Saudi Arabia on 25 January 1945, to dispel Saudi reservations. The 
two Saudi representatives in Cairo, Yusuf Yasseen and al-Zirikli, signed the Arab 
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League Charter on 22 March 1945 (`Assah, 1971: 128-131; al-Zirikli, 1977: 1207- 
1209; al Humoodi, 1998: 528-529; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 193-197). 
In 1945 the Saudi Foreign Ministry accomplished a great mission under the direction 
of King Abdulaziz due to two successful meetings which were held in that year. The 
first meeting was between King Abdulaziz and Franklin Roosevelt, President of the 
United States, on 14 February at the Bitter Lakes, and the second was with Winston 
Churchill, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on 17 February in the Fayyoum 
Oasis, 50 miles south of Cairo. ' This diplomatic activity at the highest level stemmed 
from the King's strong desire to join the United Nations, which was established at the 
end of World War Two. Encouraged by his meeting with Roosevelt, King Abdulaziz 
instructed his Foreign Ministry to send an official letter on 1 March 1945 to the 
United States, asking it to support the Saudi request to become a member state of the 
United Nations. The Saudi request was accepted and he was informed that the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had become the 45`h member of the United Nations (al- 
Zirikli, 1977: 1155-1212; Leatherdale, 1983: 167-183; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 187). 
However, there were two obstacles. The first was that Saudi Arabia should declare 
war against the Axis nations; Saudi Arabia agreed and declared war against Japan and 
Germany on 1 March 1945.2 The second was the Soviet objection to Saudi Arabia 
attending the first meeting of the United Nations, which was overcome by the British 
Secretary of State, Antony Eden, who convinced the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Molotov, of the importance of calling Saudi Arabia to attend (al-Sumari et al., 
1999: 187-188). As a result, Saudi Arabia received an official invitation from the US, 
the UK, the Soviet Union and China to attend the first conference in San Francisco. 
The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal, led the Saudi delegation which 
signed the Charter of the United Nations on 25 April 1945. In his country's official 
address to the conference, Prince Faisal made it clear that the principles which 
' Public Record Office (Now British National Archive), FO 371/45542, despatch from Rupert Stanley 
Jordan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 27 February 
1945. 
2 Ibid. 
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enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations were the same principles that Islamic 
Law calls for and that they had already been adopted by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudi Government ratified the Charter of the United Nations on 2 
October 1945 (al-Zirikli, 1977: 1212; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 188; al-Humoodi, 
1998: 706-707). 
This great diplomatic success was achieved by the Saudi Foreign Ministry despite the 
limited resources and capabilities, and a lack of extensive experience. It should be 
reiterated, however, that the Ministry always referred to King Abdulaziz, in order to 
take instructions from him directly, and implemented his policy, as he instructed, 
even on minor issues. Al-Zirikli (1977a: 369) explains: "The Foreign Ministry of King 
Abdulaziz was not able to take any action in foreign affairs, nor could they bind or 
loosen any tie without referring to him and taking his instruction, either face to face, 
or by telephone, telegram or mail. " 
3.3.2 Other Governmental Institutions 
As a result of the conquest of al-Hijaz, and concerned to apply the Principle of 
Counsel (al-Shura), King Abd al- Aziz established the Domestic Council (al-Majlis 
al-Ahli) on 19 December 1924, to help him deal with the affairs of al-Hijaz. This was 
the nucleus of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) which was established on 
13 January 1926. This was concurrent with assigning King Abdulaziz's second son, 
Prince Faisal, as Viceroy in the region of al-Hijaz and as Chairman of the 
Consultative Council. The Council went through several stages of development in a 
short period, until it took final shape on 12 May 1932. One of the most important 
tasks for the Council was enacting laws and regulations, in addition to monitoring and 
controlling the actions taken by governmental institutions in accomplishing their 
missions. The Council's instructions stated that its task was consultation, legislation 
and supervision. The Consultative Council thus acted as a legislative body regulating 
the activities of the governmental institutions in a way similar to other modem 
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constitutions (al-Zirikli, 1977: 571-573; Vassiliev, 1998: 295-296; al-Salloom, 1995: 
102-108; Al-`Uthaimeen, 1999: 302-304). 
The period 1931-1932 witnessed the emergence of a central administrative system in 
Saudi Arabia. Its mission was to concentrate on internal affairs and its legislative role. 
On 29 December 1931 a Royal Decree was issued establishing the Council of 
Directors (Majlis al-Wukala), which was similar to a council of ministers; it played 
this role for about 23 years. Prince Faisal was appointed as Chairman in addition to 
his other positions (Vassiliev, 1998: 297; al-Salloom, 1995: 109-110). As we have 
noted, the year 1932 witnessed the cessation of internal disturbances and the total 
unification of the country. It became essential to unify the country and the people's 
identity under one name which would be officially recognized when dealing with 
other countries as a government and also at the level of internal affairs. Accordingly, 
a Royal Decree was issued on 18 September 1932, officially unifying the Kingdom 
under the name of the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and it proclaimed Abdulaziz as 
"King of Saudi Arabia" (al-Zirikli, 1977: 651; al-`Uthaimeen, 1999: 308; al-'Alami, 
1999: 3). 
Also, in 1931-1932 more ministries were established, in addition to the Foreign 
Ministry, including the Ministry of the Interior, which was established on 29 
December 1931 and also assigned to Prince Faisal. On 14 August 1932, the Agency 
of Finance was upgraded to a Ministry of Finance and Abdullah al-Sulaiman was 
appointed as its head. It is relevant here to emphasize that many of the governmental 
departments and facilities were under the control of the Ministry of Finance, such as 
those dealing with defence, pilgrimage, agriculture, communications, transportation 
and mining. More ministries and governmental institutions were established later, 
including the Ministry of Defence in March 1946, which was headed by Prince 
Munsoor. Again, each minister received his authorisation directly from King 
Abdulaziz and had to go to him personally regarding all affairs; no one was 
authorized to represent him, not even the Head of the Council of Directors (al-Zirikli, 
1977: 359-379; Hamzah, 1968: 117-118; Vassiliev, 1998: 297; al-Salloom, 1995: 110- 
155). 
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The Consultative Council as a legislative institution and the Council of Directors as 
an administrative and executive institution, together with the other ministries and 
departments, were able to accomplish many of their tasks due to the support of Prince 
Faisal himself, who was notable for his personality, extensive experience, knowledge 
and devotion to his father and his country. Because he was the Viceroy in al-Hijaz 
and the Chairman of both the Consultative Council and Council of Directors, and at 
the same time directing the Ministries of Foreign and Interior Affairs, and because 
most of these institutions were established in al-Hijaz, Prince Faisal was able to 
supervise their activities directly. This concentration of administrative authority 
ensured great coordination and cooperation and resulted in many successes. 
Nevertheless, these two councils had limited authority, especially in foreign affairs. 
They played influential roles in the activities of the Saudi Government for more than 
23 years until the establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953 (al-Zirikli, 
1977: 571-580; Niblock, 1982: 89; al-Salloom, 1995: 107-110). 
On 9 October 1953 a Royal Decree announced the establishment of the Council 
of Ministers. Prince Saud was appointed as Crown Prince and the Head of the 
Council of Ministers, with Prince Faisal as his deputy and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. In that year the real Government of Saudi Arabia was born. The Council 
of Ministers did not convene during King Abdulaziz's reign due to his illness and 
eventual death on 11 November 1953. As a result of the King's death, Prince 
Saud succeeded him as King of Saudi Arabia, and Prince Faisal as a Crown 
Prince and also Head of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister (Wahbah, 
2000: 145). Because of the death of King Abdulaziz before the convening of the 
Council of Ministers, it is not possible to assess the Council's influence over 
government policy and the decision-making process, particularly in foreign affair. 
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3.4 Influence of the Royal, Religious and Tribal Establishments 
3.4.1 The Royal Establishment 
According to many writers, among them al-Saud (N. D: 153) and al-Tuwaijri (1997: 8), 
ten princes participated in the conquest of Riyadh in 1902. It is clear that some of Ibn 
Saud's brothers and cousins had been his companions from the earliest days of his 
long gruelling journey to establish his new state. It is well known that they afforded 
him great support and advice. As a reward to them and in order to take advantage of 
their ability in administration as trustworthy people, he appointed some of them as 
governors to the most important and sensitive provinces. Prince Abdullah Ibn Jelawi 
was sent first to al-Qaseem and later to al-Hasa; he was described as the second most 
important member of the Royal Family after Abdulaziz himself at that time. ' Also, 
Prince Abdulaziz Ibn Musa'ad was first appointed in al-Qaseem and later in Hail, and 
Prince Saud al-Kabeer in al-Qaseem (Williams, 1933: 68; al-Zamil, 1972: 466-473; 
Kostiner, 1993: 73). These appointments related to internal affairs. Regarding foreign 
affairs, however, the situation was completely different. 
In the area of foreign policy making, none of the Royal Family members was 
involved directly nor was he given authority. The King's brother, Prince Abdullah, 
was well known for his wisdom and wide knowledge. He was one of the princes 
closest to the King, and was one of the prominent members of the Political 
Committee (al-Shu`bah al-Siyasiyyah). He was also one of the princes whom King 
Abdulaziz trusted and who, most of the time, offered highly valued advice. Prince 
Abdullah was considered to be the King's permanent and closest counsellor until the 
end of King Abdulaziz's life (al- Zirikli, 1977b: 323; Almana, 1980: 192; 
McLoughlin, 1993: 38). 
' India Office, L/P&S/12/3737, report by Major More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, dated 13 
December 1927. 
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Another prince helpful to Ibn Saud in foreign affairs, especially in the early years of 
King's reign, was Prince Ahmad al-Thunayyan, who descended from a collateral 
branch of Al Saud (Thunayyan was the brother of Mohammad Ibn Saud, the founder 
of the first Saudi state). Ahmad al-Thunayyan was a knowledgeable person. He had 
lived and studied in Istanbul, due to the capture of his family and its transfer to 
Turkey after the Ottoman invasion of the Arabian Peninsula in the nineteenth century. 
He was well educated, had a great knowledge of Europe and spoke several languages. 
He joined the service of King Abdulaziz in the early years and became Ibn Saud's 
confidant, advisor and foreign affairs executive. He was a close companion of Ibn 
Saud and on many occasions represented him in external affairs (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 
365-366; Kostiner, 1993: 73; McLoughlin, 1993: 56; Vassiliev, 1998: 438). 
The last mission assigned to Prince Ahmad al-Thunayyan was when he represented 
Ibn Saud at the Conference of al-Muhammarah in May 1922, called to discuss the 
conflicts over the Saudi-Iraqi border. During the conference, Ahmad al-Thunayyan 
took it upon himself to sign the Treaty of al-Muhammarah, which was rejected by 
King Abdulaziz. This was because his representative had not followed the 
instructions given to him and had acted beyond his authority. Consequently, Ahmad 
al-Thunayyan resigned from the service (Troeller, 1976: 178; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 366). 
The refusal of Ibn Saud to ratify the treaty of al-Muhammarah showed beyond doubt 
that there was only one foreign policy maker in his state and that person was Ibn 
Saud; all the people around him were no more than advisers. Despite his resignation, 
Ibn Thunayyan, until his death in Riyadh in 1923, remained very close to Ibn Saud 
(al-Zirikli, 1977b: 323; al-Rayhani, 1988: 207). 
Among Ibn Saud's sons, there were Prince Saud and Prince Faisal who both helped 
him a great deal, as his viceroys in Najd and al-Hijaz, respectively, in managing the 
affairs of the state. With regard to foreign policy making and international affairs, 
Prince Faisal was most useful to his father due to his considerable experience in this 
field and early contacts with the governments of many Western countries. Still, in 
foreign policy making, even the Princes were no more than advisers and none of them 
was given independent authority. It was understood that their roles would be subject 
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to the King's own control, especially in matters of importance. Ibn Saud himself was 
the only real authority in his state (Philby, 1955: 279; Howarth, 1964: 116; Almana, 
1980: 179). 
Philby (1955: 279) claimed that Ibn Saud, in the early stages of his reign, deliberately 
refrained from giving his sons or any other members of the Royal Family any 
influential position. ' This was probably wise, in order not to risk their exposure to 
criticism or censure. 2 In general, the extensive Royal Family constituted one of the 
most important political entities during King Abdulaziz's reign. In the beginning, 
most of them aided him in the gradual establishment of his realm, but some of them, 
such as the branch of Al Saud Ibn Faisal, headed by Prince Saud al-Kabeer, with a 
few of his cousins, revolted in the early 1910s, claiming seniority over King 
Abdulaziz's branch. Some tribes supported their revolt, and so allied themselves with 
the al-Hazzani family, who backed the rebels in the hope of regaining control of al- 
Hariq (Niblock, 1982: 84; al-Rayhani, 1988: 178-196). 
3.4.2 The Role of Religious Leadership ('Ulama) 
In Saudi Arabia an alliance between the political authority ('Umara) and the religious 
power (`Ulama) was sealed in 1744 due to the great alliance between Mohammad Ibn 
Abdulwahhab 
and Mohammad Ibn Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state. The 
`Umara' were in charge of maintaining security and internal order, and the `Ulama 
were responsible for teaching, upholding the values of Islamic morality and 
interpreting 
the Islamic law (Shari`ah). As a result of this cooperation, these two 
pillars secured and consolidated a greater degree of legitimacy for the Saudi state 
because of the influence they each exerted over their followers in the Arabian 
Peninsula. After more than two hundred years of mutual support, these two powers 
had created a flexible mechanism, which, however, was not exclusive to the Saudi 
This was °pnfrmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. ý Ibid. 
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people. Legal opinion on the Islamic sources of law (fatwa) would reinforce this 
relationship, through interpreting and applying the law, and, as a result, promoting the 
welfare of the Islamic state (al-Rayhani, 1988: 40-43; Kechichian, 1986: 53; Kostiner, 
1993: 73; Ibn Ghannam, 1994: 86-90; Philby, 1997: 9-14). 
The existence of the `Ulama and their influence in Najd had their origins among the 
majority of the people of Najd. They emerged in the context of an already religious 
society, which had followed the instructions and principles of Islam according to the 
precepts of al- Madhhab al-Hanbali (the creed of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) for about five 
centuries. The reformer Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab renewed these instructions at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. Before the time of King Abdulaziz, every 
town and village in Najd had its mosque and also its religious scholar, and perhaps 
several, who practised and taught the principles of Islamic ritual. Their students 
became Imams of the mosque (leaders of prayer), and those who had extensive 
knowledge of Islam acted as judges to implement the Islamic laws (Shari'ah) under 
the supervision and patronage of local governors (al-`Uthaimeen, 1978: 32-40; al- 
Rasheed, 2002: 50-51). 
From the beginning, Ibn Saud acknowledged that the 'Ulama would have a strong 
influence in consolidating the legitimacy of his leadership. The `Ulama, and most of 
the people in Najd, recognized the need for a solid alliance between the religious, 
political and military leaderships. Ibn Saud, as a descendant of the Al Saud family, 
who had continuously supported Islam since the famous alliance of 1744, was 
perceived as the best person for this mission, especially after he conquered Riyadh in 
1902. Thousands of people in Najd welcomed the return of Ibn Saud and swore an 
oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to him, calling him their Imam (leader). The title of Imam 
gave him the same religious and political position which had been given to his 
ancestors. At the same time, the `Ulama emphasised the importance of solidarity with 
the political and military leadership (Lacey, 1981: 52; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 54: al- 
Rasheed, 2002: 50). 
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The `Ulama were very loyal to Ibn Saud as their Imam, and supported him on many 
occasions, such as their declaration of a fatwa (legal opinion) approving the invasion 
of al-Hijaz in June 1924, when Ibn Saud and his followers (Ikhwan) asked for their 
opinion on whether it was permissible to go on Hajj, using force if necessary. He 
needed to legitimise his proposed action and obtain the full support of all his people 
(Armstrong, 1934: 217; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 169-170; al-Rayhani, 1988: 326-327; 
Habib, 1998: 188). Moreover, the `Ulama supported him in the great assembly, held in 
Riyadh in 1928, as a result of the Ikhwan rebellion, when the `Ulama confirmed that 
they had never noticed any weakness or indifference in Ibn Saud's support for Islam. 
They also swore to God that they had never seen him commit any deed contrary to the 
Islamic rules. Indeed, they strongly supported him against the leaders of the rebellion 
(Armstrong, 1934: 274; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 479-484; al-Zamil, 1972: 255; Helms, 
1981: 255). Al-Rasheed (2002: 67-69) pointed out that this was a critical moment in 
the relationship between Ibn Saud and the `Ulama, but, having secured the `Ulama's 
full approval, Ibn Saud had the freedom to act against the rebellious Ikhwan, and he 
crushed their movement and pacified their influence. 
King Abdulaziz generally showed great respect for the `Ulama. On many occasions, 
he asked them to provide him with fatwas and advice on the general affairs of the 
state. His respect for them was grounded in his faith and his belief that they 
represented the intact Islam. The King admitted that he used to sweat from veneration 
whenever he met Shaikh Abdullah Ibn Abdullateef' (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 741; al- 
Rasheed, 2002: 62). Ibn Saud's veneration of the `Ulama gave them considerable 
power. They could, without fear, tell Ibn Saud if they found that he was about to do 
something that went against Islamic rules, such as when they successfully persuaded 
him not to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of his accession to the Saudi throne. Ibn 
Saud followed them when he felt that they were in the right. However, he sometimes 
ignored their opinion when he felt that they did not understand the situation or were 
involved in issues which were none of their businesses, especially those related to his 
This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
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foreign affairs' (Lewis, 1933: 521; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 742-744; Vassiliev, 1998: 290; 
Wahbah, 2000: 280-282). 
King Abdulaziz was very unyielding with everyone, even the `Ulama, when the 
matter was related to his foreign affairs or some issue that would threaten the unity of 
his newly emerging state, such as their attempt to force the Shi'ah to adopt Sunni 
beliefs. 2 They sent him a long letter setting out their arguments; he revised the letter 
and told the `Ulama that they should stick to religion and leave politics to him (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 744-745). In 1927, the `Ulama of Najd protested against the new 
programme of updating the curriculum of the general education system in Saudi 
Arabia by including subjects such as foreign languages, technical drawing and 
geography. He asked them, in the course of long discussions, to show him the 
relevant Islamic proofs which would indicate that such things were forbidden. They 
finally answered his representative (Hafiz Wahbah) that they would refer their 
opinion to the Imam (King Abdulaziz), and that it would be appreciated if the Imam 
accepted and followed their opinion. They added that if the Imam disagreed, it would 
not be the first time that he had acted against their opinions. King Abdulaziz decided 
to ignore their opinion because it was not supported by accurate religious proofs 
(Vassiliev, 1998: 292; Wahbah, 1964: 49-51). 
In 1931, the `Ulama met Ibn Saud to inform him of their opinion regarding his plan to 
erect more telegraphic stations in the major cities in Najd; they had agreed to reject 
this plan. They said that his advisors had deceived him, referring especially to Philby, 
who, they said, was behind such things, and who was working to submit their country 
to the British. Decidedly, "No one has deceived me, " the King answered, adding that 
"Philby is just a merchant who worked as the commissioner in this deal ". King 
Abdulaziz also said to them: "Remember this above everything. Our country is too 
dear for us to hand it over to anyone except at the price we paid for it, our own blood. 
My dear brothers, I place you on my head as a crown (an indication of great respect), 
This was supported by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
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and I appeal to you to hold together and stay in place as my pride and ornament. For 
I fear that if I am forced to shake my head, one or more of you may fall to the ground, 
and believe me, he who falls will not be able to regain his place so easily. There are 
two matters which I will not discuss, because I am convinced of their great 
importance to me and to my country, and that they are permissible according to 
Islam. They are wireless telegraphy and motor cars" (Wahbah, 1964: 59; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 745). 
Ibn Saud dealt with the `Ulama with wisdom and patience. Indeed, he successfully 
maintained a good relationship with them and they were unswervingly loyal to his 
leadership. He followed their instructions and advice as long as they did not delay his 
plans to develop and modernise his emerging state or intervene in his foreign policy 
and the international affairs of his state. 
3.4.3 The Tribal Factor (the Ikhwan) 
In the conception of the people of Najd, the expression "Ikhwan" (brethrens) referred 
to the relationship between the tribesmen who abandoned their old style of life and 
settled in small towns to practise the real Islam, dealing with others according to their 
religious instructions and regarding this brotherhood as one that took priority over 
kinship. They took to heart the real meaning of the Koranic verse' "And hold fast, all 
together, by the Rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among 
yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah's favour on you; for ye were enemies 
and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye 
were on the brink of the Pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make 
His Signs clear to you: that ye may be guided" (Helms, 1981: 130; al-Salloom, 
1995: 320-321; al-Tuwaijri, 1997: 200; Habib, 1998: 48-49). 
1 Surat 'Al 'Imran (The Household of 'Imran), Verse, 103. Yusuf Ali's Translation: http: //quran. al- 
islam com/Targama/Dit2Targam asp? nTwe=l&nSora=3&nAya=103&nSep---l &l=arb&t=enq. 
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During the period between about 1912 and the late 1920s, the Ikhwan played an 
influential role in the wars and political events in the Arabian Peninsula. The Ikhwan 
were courageous fighters in the battlefield, full of religious zeal, and they devoted 
their life to spreading their belief and expanding their state. They were always ready 
to fight and implement their Imam's orders. King Abdulaziz admitted that, while he 
met all the Ikhwan's needs when they came to him in peace time, when war came they 
did not ask him for anything, but supported him with their own supplies and weapons. 
The Ikhwan were the major political and military instrument which helped the King 
to fortify and expand his authority over most of the Arabian Peninsula. They were his 
strong and loyal soldiers in the conquest of Asir, Hail and the Northern Provinces, al- 
Hijaz and Jaizan. They were also his key political card, enabling him to consolidate 
his sovereignty during his negotiations with the neighbouring powers (Helms, 
1981: 225-226; Kostiner, 1985: 298-299; al-Rayhani, 1988: 264-335; McLoughlin, 
1993: 40-71). 
It can be said that until 1918, the relationship between Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan was 
very good. However, some of their leaders were beginning to feel that they should be 
more influential and important, and so they began to argue with Ibn Saud, telling him 
where to expand and whom they should attack. For example, they asked Ibn Saud to 
attack al-Hijaz instead of Hail during the Conference of Shaqra' in 1918. This 
interference in political affairs became more obvious after the Ikhwan's decisive 
victory in the battle of Turabah in 1919. Moreover, some of the Ikhwan started to 
become more fanatical in their attitude towards those who did not abandon their 
nomadic life, ' and towards the urban dwellers in al-Hasa, 2 such as the Shi'ah and 
non-Ikhwan Sunni populations. The extremist Ikhwan became aggressive towards 
anybody who did not adopt their particular beliefs or even dressed differently. In their 
conception, many things were forbidden. For instance, long moustaches were 
"Kabeerah" (big sin), wearing an 'Iqal (a black strip worn to secure a head covering) 
instead of a white turban was "Kufr" (unbelief). Thus, the fanatics among the Ikhwan 
This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; and by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
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struck terror into the hearts of those Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula whom they 
regarded as infidels since they did not follow the Ikhwan's doctrine (Wahbah, 
1964: 125-130; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 143-150; Almana, 1980: 81-82; al-Rayhani, 
1988: 265; Habib, 1998: 143-145). 
The fanaticism of some Ikhwan led the people to implore King Abdulaziz to stop the 
interference of the fanatics in their life and territories. 
' The `Ulama were also in 
dispute with the Ikhwan extremists and the half-educated teachers who lacked an 
adequate knowledge and understanding of the real Islam and poisoned the minds of 
naive people in order to propagate their terror. To solve the problem, Ibn Saud called 
for a conference in Riyadh in 1919 between the `Ulama and the Ikhwan leaders in 
order to discuss the differences between the two parties. At the end of the conference, 
a fatwa was announced and signed by most of the `Ulama of Najd. This fatwa 
included major recommendations clarifying that most of the behaviour of the 
extremist Ikhwan was wrong. For this reason, the `Ulama asked King Abdulaziz to 
send more scholars and teachers to the rebellious Ikhwan (Wahbah, 1964: 129; al- 
Rayhani, 1988: 433-434; Habib, 1998: 145-146; Vassiliev, 1998: 229-230). 
In 1920, during the dispute between Najd and Kuwait of 1920-1921, over Qariah al- 
'Ulia', al-Dawish decided to attack al-Jahra' in Kuwait without having obtained the 
permission of Ibn Saud, who thus found himself in the position of having to support 
al-Dawish in order to protect his followers of the Mutair and guard part of his state. In 
1923, al-Dawish led another attack, this time against the tribes in the south of Iraq, 
even though Ibn Saud had signed the Treaty of al-'Uqair in 1922, which settled the 
frontier line between Najd and Iraq. Through this attack, al-Dawish tried to show that 
he refused to accept this kind of restrictions regarding grazing lands. In 1922, 
thousands of lkhwan invaded Trans-Jordan and penetrated to within twelve miles of 
Amman. This force was completely eliminated by British airplanes and armoured 
cars, and Ibn Saud had punished the rest for attacking Trans-Jordan without his 
1 This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; and by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
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permission. The Ikhwan repeated their raid into Iraq in 1924 as part of the many 
frontier disputes between Iraq, al-Hijaz, Trans-Jordan and Najd, which led to the 
Conference of Kuwait in 1923-1924 (Troeller, 1976: 170-198; al-Rayhani, 1988: 270- 
330; Habib, 1998: 182-186; Vassiliev, 1998: 253-257). 
During the 1920s, the Ikhwan became a double-edged weapon in King Abdulaziz's 
hand. He could make use of them (as a military force) against his enemy, on the one 
hand, but they became a source of trouble and a real threat to his state's unity and his 
leadership, on the other. ' The Ikhwan started to embarrass him with his neighbours. 
The Ikhwan attacked neighbouring states, sometimes with the permission of Ibn 
Saud, but on many occasions without it2 (Philby, 1948: 221-222; Lewis, 1933: 520; 
Almana, 1980: 81-82). Moreover, Ibn Saud knew that all the small states around him, 
from Aden to Kuwait, in addition to Trans-Jordan and Iraq in the north, were under 
the protection of Britain either in accordance with Mandate arrangements or through 
protectorates treaties or by direct colonisation, such as the case of Aden. He also 
foresaw that the Ikhwan's lust for conquest after al-Hijaz would bring them face to 
face with the British army. He felt that he should lead the Ikhwan himself and share 
their defeat, for if he refused to lead them, they would turn their anger against him 
(Howarth, 1964: 154). 
After the conquest of al-Hijaz, due to their fanaticism, the relationship between Ibn 
Saud and the extremist Ikhwan deteriorated further. 3 The Ikhwan in al-Hijaz 
condemned customs that were un-Islamic according to their belief (Hanbalism) and 
began to put their own stamp on the life of the people of al-Hijaz. After they entered 
Makkah, the fanatic Ikhwan destroyed all the tombs, the memorial of Prophet's 
1 This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
2 This was supported by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
This was confirmed by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 
January 2004; this was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 
January 2004. 
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birthplace, the house of the Prophet's wife (Khadija), and the house of Abu Bakr. 
They also prevented the people from practising some of their beliefs and customs, 
such as al-Mawlid al-Nabawi (celebration of the Prophet's birthday). They also 
forced the people to quit tobacco smoking because of their belief that smoking was 
forbidden. In 1926, during the Hajj, the Ikhwan involved Ibn Saud in a political crisis 
with the Egyptian Government when they attacked the Egyptian pilgrimage convoy 
(al-Mahmal). They were very aggressive with the people in al-Hijaz, trying to force 
them to follow their beliefs, and acted in a similar fashion in other parts of the 
Arabian Peninsula and even in the neighbouring states, and so became hated by the 
people (al-Rayhani, 1988: 370; Habib, 1998: 196-200; Vassiliev, 1998: 269-270; 
Kostiner, 1985: 314). 
In al-Hijaz, the Ikhwan were shocked by modern technological tools. The puritanical 
Ikhwan considered them as the work of devil as they were not mentioned in the 
Koran. They stood against the wristwatch, automobiles, bicycles, wireless, telephones 
and all other modern tools, without which the development of the Kingdom would 
have been impossible. As we have noted, the Ikhwan's deep suspicious of modem 
technological inventions was supported by many of the `Ulama of Najd. But Ibn Saud 
maintained that not everything deriving from Western culture and modernity was evil 
and he was determined that no one would be permitted to stop his state's 
development. He always tried to be patient with the puritanical Ikhwan and attempted 
to change their ideas peacefully, but whenever he felt that compliance with their 
desires would weaken his authority, he would exercise that authority with an iron 
hand (Wahbah, 1964: 47-63; al-Zirikli, 1977b: 99; Almana, 1980: 83-84; al-Rasheed, 
2002: 65). 
In 1926, the leaders of the Ikhwan started to function as the political elite in Najd and 
tried to shape Ibn Saud's external policy, as they had already intervened in the state's 
internal affairs. At the same time, they were frustrated when they witnessed Ibn Saud 
appointing the Hijazis into the administration and the Consultative Council (Majlis al- 
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Shura). ' It is maintained that some of the Ikhwan rebel leaders felt that their 
privileges as tribal chieftains would be terminated as a result of increased authority of 
Ibn Saud. 2 The senior leaders of the Ikhwan, such as Faisal al-Dawish and Sultan Ibn 
Bijad, started to claim their political interests and threatened Ibn Saud. 3 They felt that 
they should be upgraded from tribal chieftains to Amirs of the newly conquered cities 
as a reward for their efforts. 4 Those leaders regarded themselves as partners in the 
new realm, rather than instruments. 5 This happened at a time when Ibn Saud 
dominated most of the Arabian Peninsula and was concerned to maintain the unity of 
his new state. 6 Ibn Saud felt that he should strengthen his authority in the influential 
possessions and cities by appointing only those whose loyalty was unquestionable (al- 
Zirikli, 1977b: 109; Helms, 1981: 251-252; Kostiner, 1985: 307-315; Habib, 1998: 194- 
197; al-Rasheed, 2002: 66). 
In 1926, the leaders of the rebellious Ikhwan, especially Faisal al-Dawish, Sultan Ibn 
Bijad and Daidan Ibn Hithlain, met together in al-Artawiyyah and held a conference. 
They criticised Ibn Saud on several accounts, among them his relationship with the 
Kuffar (unbelievers), especially Britain. Moreover, they objected to the annual arrival 
of pilgrims from some states who engaged in un-Islamic practices. Ibn Saud tried to 
explain to them that his relations with such countries were important, because of their 
millions of Muslim residents. 7 Ibn Saud was also criticised for sending his sons 
abroad: Saud to Egypt and Faisal to Britain. They also accused him of limiting the 
Jihad (Holy War) against the people in Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan. Furthermore, they 
' During my interview with His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah in Riyadh on 7-10 
January 2004, he strongly opposed this idea, arguing that their leaders were in dispute with Ibn Saud 
before the establishment of the Consultative Council. He added that they believed that they deserved to 
be more than counsellors. 
2 Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 2004. 
3 This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 2 January 2004. 
4 Ibid. 
s Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 This was stated by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 January 
2004. 
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questioned the legitimacy of Ibn Saud's taxes. They also criticised the status of the 
Shi'ah in al-Hasa who, they believed, should be converted to Sunni Islam. The 
Ikhwan asked Ibn Saud not to use infidel instruments, such as telephone, radio, 
telegraph and cars. ' They also questioned Ibn Saud's prohibition of trade with 
Kuwait, arguing that if Kuwait was infidel, Ibn Saud should wage war against it; if 
not, he should not restrict trade with it (Habib, 1998: 203-204; Vassiliev, 1998: 273; 
al-Rasheed, 2002: 65-66). 
Despite the fact that the Ikhwan, from their early alliance with Ibn Saud, accepted his 
authority as the Imam (religious leader) who was responsible for dealing with foreign 
powers and calling for Jihad (al-Rasheed, 2002: 61), the Ikhwan started to interfere in 
these two important matters. In the lights of their demands mentioned above, it is 
obvious that they were intervening in Ibn Saud's attempt to maintain unity of 
leadership and in the making of his foreign policy and international relations. 
Although, Ibn Saud had noted the early warning signs of the Ikhwan's rebellion, he 
was in great need of their support in his expansion to unify his realm. Therefore, he 
hoped that, with more patience, he could moderate their demands and diminish their 
fanaticism. However, in 1926, after their meeting in al-Artawiyyah, and with more 
raids over the frontiers, such as al-Dawish's raid on the new guard-post, built by the 
Iraqi Government in Busiyyah in 1927, they became a real threat to Ibn Saud and it 
was necessary for him to take action against their raids into the neighbouring states. If 
he did not stop them, it would have been seen either that he allowed them or had no 
control over them. When he heard of the revolts, and it seemed that the rebellion of 
the Ikhwan was getting beyond his control, he came back from al-Hijaz to Riyadh and 
called the `Ulama and the leaders of the Ikhwan together for a conference (Williams, 
1933: 214-222; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 475-478; Habib, 1998: 210-213; al-Tuwaijri, 1997: 
201-204). 
' This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
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In 1928, a great assembly was held in Riyadh in order to discuss all the matters in 
question, including the replacement of Abdulaziz by another leader, if the lkhwan as 
a whole so wished. However, the three rebel leaders did not attend the. conference, 
although it was attended by thousands of people, headed by more than eight hundred 
of the Ikhwan leaders, and including most of the Royal Family princes, most of the 
`Ulama and preachers, most of the tribal chieftains and other important townsmen and 
villagers. ' The conference lasted for several days and resulted in a number of 
important resolutions, among them one rejecting the resignation of Ibn Saud. The 
conference resolved that there was nothing in Islam to disapprove an improvement in 
communications and the introduction of scientific progress. In addition, the 
relationship with the international community should be left to the Imam as long as he 
acted in accordance with the general principles of Islam. The conference also stated 
that the rebels were outlaws (baghi) which was a very important result to Ibn Saud at 
this time and gave him the legitimacy to take action against the rebellious Ikhwan 
with the full support of the `Ulama and the majority of his loyal Ikhwan (Williams, 
1933: 223-227; Armstrong, 1934: 274-277; al-Zamil, 1972: 244-262; Habib, 1998: 213- 
222; al-Rasheed, 2002: 67-68). 
As a result of the great assembly in Riyadh 1928, each side, Ibn Saud and the 
rebellious Ikhwan, felt that each must work to weaken the other side. The rebellious 
Ikhwan felt that they should take the initiative and declared Holy War (Jihad) to 
attract more followers through their raids inside Iraq. Their action forced the British 
Government to attack them with airplanes in early 1929. In order to undermine the 
support enjoyed by the leaders of the rebellion, Ibn Saud sent more preachers to the 
people of the tribes loyal to the rebel leaders to clarify that they did not work for the 
glory of God but for their own interests, in view of the fact that they had not attended 
the great assembly and thus had no wish to discuss the contentious matters peacefully. 
This caused a great split in the major tribes then supporting the leaders of the 
rebellion. Even the tribes of `Utaibah and Mutair divided into parties: one with the 
rebels and one against them. In addition, the rebels made fatal mistakes, such as the 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 00/13-1, despatch from C. K. Huston, the American Consul in Aden, to the 
American Secretary of State, on 23 March 1929. 
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slaughtering of some merchants from al-Qaseem in 1928, which turned the majority 
of the people of Najd against them (Armstrong, 1934: 269-279; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 
485-487; Habib, 1998: 223-226). 
In 1929, Ibn Saud was ready to punish the rebels. He performed the last act that was 
he needed to eradicate the rebellion completely. He coordinated with the British 
Government and came to terms with it. The agreement was that the British would not 
support the rebels, and would hand them to Ibn Saud if they fled into Kuwait, Iraq or 
Trans-Jordan. Britain was ready to help Ibn Saud because they knew that if Ibn Saud 
lost control, all the tribes would become rebels and would conduct raids over the 
frontiers. The leaders of the rebellious Ikhwan massed several thousands of their 
followers at al-Sibalah. Ibn Saud came to them with more than twenty thousand of his 
followers: the loyal Ikhwan from among the tribesmen, the majority of the `Ulama 
and most of the townsmen and villagers. It was clear that the victory would be Ibn 
Saud's. He was not keen to attack them since that most of the rebels had been misled 
and had once been his followers. He negotiated with them and sent to them some of 
their respected `Ulama, among them Abdulaziz Abu Habeeb and Abdullah al- 
`Angari, to bring them to the right side. He persisted for several days, repeating his 
offer of peace and calling on them to leave all the quarrels for the `Ulama to solve. ' 
The rebels refused and insisted on fighting. Thus, Ibn Saud, on 30 March 1929, 
attacked them from different directions. The battle lasted for a few hours, and several 
hundreds of the rebels were killed and others were injured, among them Faisal al- 
Dawish. Ibn Bijad left the battle and surrendered to Ibn Saud later when he heard that 
Ibn Saud had forgiven al-Dawish due to his surrender and his serious injury 
(Williams, 1933: 225-227; Almana, 1980: 95-114; Helms, 1981: 256-267; al- 
`Uthaimeen, 1995: 288-299; al-Salloom, 1995: 341-346). 
The Battle of al-Sibalah was decisive in the modern history of Saudi Arabia. 
Although it was not the last trouble Ibn Saud would have with rebels, it broke the 
This was supported by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 
January 2004. 
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backbone of their movement. It enabled Ibn Saud to resume his full authority, 
especially in his foreign policy in the eyes of his neighbouring states. However, it is 
important to state here that the majority of the Ikhwan were with Ibn Saud and their 
loyalty to him as leader of the nation (Imam of `Ummah) made them support him 
even against their brothers and cousins. ' For example, Jihjah, the brother of Sultan 
Ibn Bijad, was with the majority of `Utaibah and supported Ibn Saud. 2 Similarly, the 
family of Dawish and the tribe of Mutair were divided among themselves between the 
two sides. Judging by the size of Ibn Saud's army, it is clear that most of the major 
families and tribes in Najd, such as Harb, Qahtan, Shammar and Subi', were with Ibn 
Saud, and their religious loyalty took precedence over their kinship3 (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 487; Almana, 1980: 117; `Attar, 1972: 996-1000; al-'Uthaimeen, 1995: 292- 
296; Habib, 1998: 234-300). 
After al-Sibalah, the rebels of al-'Ijman tribe had not yet been punished, so they 
continued their rebellion. The remaining rebels of al-Sibalah joined them. Faisal al- 
Dawish also joined them after he recovered. They became a real threat again when 
Muq'id al-Duhainah (with part of `Utaibah) and Farhan Ibn Mashhur (with part of al- 
Ruwalah) joined them. Ibn Saud called his followers to mass again in al-Shawki. The 
rebels heard about Ibn Saud's movements and were keen to do battle: but they were 
defeated in several sporadic skirmishes and fled to Iraq and Kuwait, asking Britain to 
give them asylum. Ibn Saud insisted, through long negotiations with Britain, that the 
British should hand them over as they had pledged. Due to this commitment and on 
the insistence of Ibn Saud, the British handed over al-Dawish, Ibn Hithlain and Ibn 
Lami to Ibn Saud in Khabari Wadha in 1930, but kept back Ibn Mashhur, who was a 
subject of Syria. Ibn Saud kept those three leaders, together with Ibn Bijad, 
imprisoned for life (al-Zirikii, 1977a: 489-507; Almana, 1980: 121-139; Helms, 
1 This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
3 This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
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1981: 259-271; Dickson, 2002: 341-342). That Britain handed over the three rebel 
leaders was a good indicator of the successful foreign policy of Ibn Saud. 
Some writers argue that Ibn Saud saw the early warning signals of the rebellion in 
mid-1920s (al-Rasheed, 2002: 65). Some hold that the crushing of the Ikhwan 
movement was inevitable. Howarth (1964: 153) states, "From the moment when this 
brotherhood was founded, a wise observer could have predicted its disastrous end". 
Nevertheless, Ibn Saud avoided real conflicts with them for many reasons. Perhaps 
the most important was that he needed them to expand his authority over the other 
regions of the Arabian Peninsula and to consolidate his sovereignty over his 
neighbours. Habib (1998: 246-249) and Vassiliev (1998: 231) have claimed that when 
Ibn Saud had accomplished his goals, the time became ripe for him to get rid of 
them. ' Moreover, some historians have argued that the real reason for not punishing 
them earlier was that Ibn Saud was prepared to exercise his well-known patience, and 
hoped that they would change given more time (Wahbah, 1964: 131; al-Tuwaijri, 
1997: 201-218). Some other writers say that Ibn Saud did not plan to get rid of them, 
but they forced him to do so by their fanatical behaviour, 2 which embarrassed him 
internally and externally. Ibn Saud intentionally destroyed them before they could 
destroy him. He was compelled to crush them in order to preserve his gains, 3 and 
develop peaceful relations with the international community (Philby, 1952: 238; 
Troeller, 1976: 128-129). 
With the end of the Ikhwan rebellion, Ibn Saud became the unchallenged master in 
his state. He became the only authority, as he had always wanted, who had the right 
to make Saudi foreign policy and who was responsible for the establishment of its 
international relations. 
' This idea was strongly opposed by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh 
on 19 January 2004. 
2 This was stated by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak during my interview with him in Riyadh on 17 January 
2004. 
3 This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
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Chapter Four: Saudi Arabia and the Affairs of the Peninsula 
4.1 General Features of King Abdulaziz's Policy towards the 
Peninsula 
Saudi Arabia has been described as the first Arabian state which was established 
independently outside European plans. Some writers, among them Benoist-Mechin 
(1965: 302) and Van der Meulen (1999: 120), have claimed that, among the Arabian 
countries, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the only state that was created and 
developed independently and without the will of Western powers. Saudi Arabia's 
foreign policy had distinctive characteristics that made it different from other Middle 
Eastern states. Indeed, with less influence from the West, Saudi Arabia acted with 
more freedom in making its foreign policy. 
With less influence from the West, it was expected that Ibn Saud would follow in the 
footsteps of his predecessors and continually extend his authority. The Saudi state 
was expected to be based on unlimited expansion, especially if Ibn Saud followed the 
tenets of the enthusiastic Ikhwan. Indeed, the reign of Ibn Saud, in its first three 
decades, showed a real tendency to expand, thus resembling the two preceding Saudi 
states. After the annexation of al-Hijaz, the western part of the Arabian Peninsula, 
into the Saudi territories in 1926, it was therefore expected that Ibn Saud would turn 
to the east and extend his rule over the Gulf Emirates (Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, 
Kuwait and Oman), especially given the old Saudi influence in most of these areas. 
India Office, UP&S/20/FO31, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to 
the British Indian Government on 4 February 1906; India Office, R/15/1/710, yearly report by Percy 
Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, dated 23 September 1906. 
105 
This view was shared by most of the official British representatives in the Middle 
East, who, for many years, had been in close contact with Ibn Saud. Among them 
was Sir Percy Cox, who was the oldest and closest of the Englishmen who knew Ibn 
Saud. In 1927, Cox was said to have stated that Ibn Saud thought that he was justified 
in principle in regaining any territory that his forefathers had possessed a century 
before, whether as a conquered territory or as a sphere of influence, which included 
Oman. He added that as long as Britain paid him a subsidy he kept his hands off al- 
Hijaz, but when Britain ceased the subsidy he extended his authority over that area. 
Cox added that he had little doubt that in the course of time Ibn Saud would seek to 
extend his authority over the interior of Oman (Goldberg, 1986: 2). 
Philby, who had worked with Ibn Saud and had known him personally for more than 
thirty years, and was one of the first to write about Ibn Saud and the affairs of the 
Arabian Peninsula, was said to have mentioned in 1927 that Ibn Saud would extend 
his authority over a greater area than it covered at that time and that the unification of 
Arabia in the wider sense of the term would increase to include even Yemen. Philby 
was also to have thought that the smaller Gulf entities would eventually cease to exist 
as independent principalities and would be absorbed into the vast Saudi state (ibid: 2). 
Moreover, David Hogarth, one of the central figures at the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 
shared this view. He stated in 1926 that "Ibn Saud would perpetually find new lands 
to conquer" (quoted in ibid: 2). Hogarth even suggested that the Saudis should 
occupy the countries of Southern Arabia - Yemen, Hadramawt and Oman (ibid: 2-3). 
According to this view, it would appear that the British policy toward Ibn Saud was 
based on suspicions regarding his ambitions to expand his authority over the British 
protectorates in the region. This raises the question whether there was a real threat 
from King Abdulaziz to his neighbours? 
King Abdulaziz believed that he had the right to bring any part of the Arabian 
Peninsula, which had been governed by his ancestors, under his authority' (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1397; al-`Uthaimeen, 1999: 292). Zahlan (1982: 69-70) notes that in 1935, King 
India Office, UP&S/18/13450, report by the India Office on the Gulf, dated 25 June 1935. 
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Abdulaziz had already expressed his attitude to this matter and explained to the 
British representatives that the people of the Gulf Shaikhdoms were his subjects, and 
that they had been the subjects of his father and grandfather before him, but he 
referred to their own wish to be under British protection. There could be no question 
in his mind, however, that the rulers of these Shaikhdoms could lay claim to anything 
but the towns; the deserts and the allegiance of the tribes roaming those deserts had 
always been under his sovereignty and that of his ancestors' (ibid: 70). 
However, even though Ibn Saud's view regarding the expansion of his state was 
different from that of his predecessors, he fully understood the horrible lesson of the 
destruction of the former Saudi states. He realised that he could not enjoy complete 
freedom of action. He believed that if his actions affected the interests of the Powers 
around him, this might cause them to react against him, in order to protect what they 
perceived as important interests (Harran, 1999: 366-367). Ibn Saud concluded that he 
must distinguish between areas where he had full freedom of action and the areas 
such as the coasts, which would bring confrontation with the international powers, 
mainly Britain. Gause III (2000: 172) believed that "Britain protected the Shaikhdoms 
from outside threats (Saudi Arabia, Ottomans, Iraq and Iran), from each other, and 
at times, from their own people". 
Ibn Saud believed that if he got involved with Britain or other strong Powers, they 
would not only hinder Saudi expansion but might destroy Saudi independence 
altogether. He felt that he should avoid any conflict with those Powers, even though 
he detested their policy. Ryan (1951: 278) believed that Ibn Saud "was in his heart 
hostile to all Western influences, including that of Great Britain, but he knew that 
British friendship was a condition of his survival. " With regard to the British, Ibn 
Saud himself said that he hated their policy, but as long he stayed alive there would 
not be war with Britain, due to his friendship with many British people, among them 
This was supported by His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004; India Office, R/15/2/158, despatch from George Cole, the Deputy 
British Political Agent in Bahrain, to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 6 July 
1935. 
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Shakespear, Cox, Philby, Clayton, and not because of the British policy (Van der 
Meulen, 1999: 71). 
After the conquest of al-Hijaz, Ibn Saud realised that he had reached the maximum 
expansion that he could achieve without getting involved in a dispute with Britain, the 
Power which surrounded him from every direction. Ibn Saud worked to consolidate 
his relations with Britain through several treaties, culminating in the Treaty of Jeddah 
in 1927. ' This treaty acknowledged the sovereignty of his state and enabled him to 
establish his relationship with the international community (Wahbah, 1960: 84-87). It 
should be noted that King Abdulaziz undertook, in both treaties, with Britain, namely 
Darin in 1915 and Jeddah in 1927, to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with 
the Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the Shaikhdoms of the Omani 
Coast, which had special relations with Britain and had agreed treaties with it. 
2 In 
fact, Britain represented all the Gulf Shaikhdoms in their foreign affairs. As such, Ibn 
Saud's relations with these states were subject to the supervision of Britain, as will be 
explained later in this chapter. 
Some writers believe that King Abdulaziz, thirty years after the conquest of Riyadh, 
had reached the pinnacle of his glory. His realm covered most of the Arabian 
Peninsula in the form of a real consolidated state, which not had been accomplished 
during any of his ancestors' reigns. This was implemented with maximum expansion, 
taking into consideration the international circumstances at that time. He was 
recognised as "master of the Arabian Peninsula" by most of the influential Powers in 
the Middle East (Pison, 1999: 292). In addition, Ibn Saud was seen as one of the most 
influential leaders and was described as a great Arabian reformer of that era, who had 
established his realm and founded a united state for his nation (Ql'aji, 1971: 275-278; 
al-'Aqqad, N. D: 34). 
1 Text in India Office, L/P&S/10/1166, copy of the Treaty of Jeddah between Ibn Saud and Sir G. 
Clayton dated 20 May 1927. 
2 L/P&S/10/387, copy of Darin Treaty between Ibn Saud and Percy Cox, the British Political Resident 
in Bushire, dated 26 December 1915; L/P&S/10/1166, copy of the Treaty of Jeddah between Ibn Saud 
and Sir G. Clayton dated 20 May 1927. 
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In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a perceptible shift took place in Ibn Saud's foreign 
policy. It was at this time that Ibn Saud felt that he should divert his concern toward 
internal affairs rather than further territorial expansion. Indeed, this was one of the 
important reasons behind his dispute with the rebellious Ikhwan, which led to his 
decision to moderate their influence in order to make his state more stable. This 
consideration was indicated by the announcement, in September 1932, of a new name 
for his state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to designate its ruler and its policies, 
which gave the state its new identity (Goldberg, 1986: 3; Van der Meulen, 1999: 144- 
145). To emphasise this further, al-Zirikli (1977a: 1321) quoted the German writer 
Breukelman's description of Ibn Saud's policy in this period as having worked to 
consolidate his internal authority, rather than expand it territorially. 
It is also worth mentioning here that during the period, from mid-1920s to mid-1930s, 
most of the important governmental institutions were created, such as Majlis al-Shura 
(Consultative Council), from which all governmental rules and laws were issued. 
Other institutions including the judicial system, police authority, finance department 
and foreign affairs department were established. Also, offices dealing with public 
health, management of ports, telegraph, telephone, radio networks and transportation 
were created. Thus, it can be seen that King Abdulaziz was the leader who opened the 
door to modernisation at every level in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (al- Zirikli, 
1977a: 576-580; Kostiner, 1993: 104-105). 
4.2 Ibn Saud's Relations with the Gulf Shaikhdoms 
4.2.1 Kuwait 
It is worth mentioning that the two royal families in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait descended from one old Arabian clan (Rabi'ah), which worked to strengthen 
the relations between the two states. In addition, there were many influential families 
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in Kuwait, among them the family of al-Sabah, which had emigrated from Najd, and 
most of these families maintained relations with the original families. Due to this, 
many matters of mutual interest and support were adopted, which, in general, created 
good relations between the two states (Dickson, 2002: 15-30; Mustafa et al., N. D: 
367; al-Rasheed, 1963: 18). The early relationship of Ibn Saud with Kuwait started 
when he was exiled, together with his family, to that country after the occupation of 
Riyadh by Ibn Rasheed. These relations were strengthened further after Ibn Saud 
retook Riyadh in 1902, due in no small part to the support he had received from 
Kuwait. ' During the establishment of their states, Ibn Saud and Ibn Sabah built their 
relations on the basis of their respective political interests. This, of course, led 
sometimes to clashes between them, especially over boundaries. However, their need 
for one another's aid against their enemies, mainly Ibn Rasheed and the Ottomans, 
encouraged them to settle such problems quickly (Wahbah, 2000: 250). 
However, the relationship between Ibn Saud and Mubarak al-Sabah eventually 
declined, for a number of reasons, which ended the close alliance between them. The 
expansion of Ibn Saud, mainly into al-Hasa and al-Qaseem, was important among 
these reasons. In addition, Mubarak felt that Ibn Saud would use al-Hasa as a seaport 
to the world instead of Kuwait, which would economically affect Kuwait, 2 and this 
was indeed true. Of course, this made Ibn Sabah feel that Ibn Saud would become a 
new threat to his state. Hence, he worked to minimise Ibn Saud's ambitions. When in 
1914 Ibn Saud signed his first treaty with Turkey in al-Subaihiyyah, Mubarak was 
unhappy about it and worked to prevent it. As a result of this, Mubarak cooperated 
with Ibn Rasheed in order to balance the powers in Najd and secure for himself an 
advantageous position between them. However, this dispute did not prevent military 
cooperation between Ibn Saud and Mubarak against the rebel tribes (al-Sa'doon, 
1983: 113-153; al-Rayhani, 1988: 152&212-216; al-Salim, N. D: 67). 
India Office, L/P&S/18/B251, report prepared by the Arab Bureau in Iraq, dated 12 January 1917; 
L/P&S/12/3737, report by Major More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, dated 13 December 1927. 
2 This was opposed by Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter during my interview with him in Riyadh on 19 January 
2004. 
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Moreover, the attitudes of the two leaders toward the First World War were different 
and this led to more disagreements between the two states. Ibn Sabah insisted that Ibn 
Saud should take the British side, through many letters included in his counsels to Ibn 
Saud' (Abu Zlam, 1984: 427). Some historians have posed an important question here 
regarding the real reason behind Ibn Sabah's insistence that Ibn Saud should declare 
war against the Turks. Al-Sa'doon (1983: 169) argued that Ibn Sabah feared the new 
strength of Ibn Saud's state, and he pressed him to take Britain's side during the war, 
and thus come under British influence. 2 This would give Britain a good opportunity to 
control him if he intended to attack Kuwait. 3 
To preserve its interests, Britain asked Ibn Sabah to convince Ibn Saud to join the 
British in their actions against Turkey. 4 Ibn Saud did not follow this advice and 
preferred to maintain a neutral position 5 (al-Ghulami, 1980: 30; Abu Zlam, 1984: 427). 
However, despite pressure from Britain on Ibn Saud to cooperate with the two 
Shaikhdoms of Kuwait and al-Muhammarah and to join them in their drive to occupy 
Basrah, Ibn Saud did not agree directly. He gave an intelligent and noncommittal 
answer, saying that he would like to collaborate with his two friends to reinforce the 
common interests of all his friends. 6 Ibn Saud's response made the British feel that 
they could make an agreement with him. However, both sides, Ibn Saud and Britain, 
felt a real need for cooperation under the pressure of the situation in World War One. 7 
1 India Office, R/15/5/25, despatch from William G. Grey, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to 
Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 21 October 1914. 
2 This was supported by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 1 January 2004. 
3 Ibid. 
4 India Office, R/15/5/25, despatch from William G. Grey, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to 
Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 21 October 1914. 
5 This was also confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 
2004. 
G India Office, R/15/5/25, despatch from William G. Grey, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to 
Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 21 October 1914. 
India Office, L/P&S/10/387, despatch from Ibn Saud to Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in 
Bushire, on 9 January 1915. 
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In November 1915, Mubarak Ibn Sabah died and was succeeded by his son Jaber. 
Jaber had a strong friendship with Ibn Saud, which smoothed the relations between 
them for more than a year, until Jaber's death in February 1917. Also, a more 
important reason for the good Saudi-Kuwaiti relation was the improvement in Saudi- 
British relations, which led to the achievement of the Darin Treaty on 26 December 
1915. However, some writers have challenged this view, arguing that the 
improvement in Saudi-Kuwaiti relations was the reason for this treaty. Al-Sa'doon 
(1983: 184) quoted Husain Khaz'al, who held that this agreement between Ibn Saud 
and Britain would not have been easily accomplished if Saudi-Kuwaiti relations had 
been as they were in the last days of Mubarak's reign. 
Salim al-Sabah succeeded his brother Jaber in 1917. The two brothers were 
completely different, especially in their relations with Ibn Saud. With Salim in power 
the tensions in Saudi-Kuwaiti relations started again and augmented gradually, 
leading in the end to military conflict. The dispute between them began as a result of 
Ibn Sabah's support for the tribal rebels of Shammar and al-'Ijman who had risen 
against Ibn Saud and his welcoming them in Kuwait. Ibn Sabah was reacting to Ibn 
Saud's attempt to bring al-'Awazim, a major tribe of Kuwait, under his dominion' 
(Philby, 1952: 63-64; Abu Hakimah, 1984: 345). The dispute reached its climax in 
September 1919, when Salim decided to build a fortress in Balbool, which the 
Kuwaitis regarded as the southernmost point of their country. This was seen by Ibn 
Saud as an invasion of his territory. Ibn Saud asked Salim to withdraw, and also 
wrote to the British Agent in Kuwait, asking him to prevent Ibn Sabah achieving his 
goal2 (al-Rayhani, 1988: 271; Abu Hakimah, 1984: 345; Dickson, 2002: 260-261). 
Moreover, in April 1920 the clan of Mutair established a new Hijrah (settlement) in 
Qariah al-'Ulya, which was considered by Ibn Sabah as a hostile action by the Saudis. 
Salim complained to the British Agent and also warned the Mutair people in Qariah 
1 India Office, R/15/513, despatch from Robert E. Hamilton, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to 
the British Indian Government on 2 April 1918. 
2 India Office, R/15/2/34, despatch from the British Political Agent in Bahrain to the British Delegate 
in Baghdad on 11 March 1919. 
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to abandon it. When the Saudis did not respond, Ibn Sabah decided to use his own 
warriors, sending a Kuwaiti force of around four hundred. This made Ibn Shuqair, the 
head of the settlers in Qariah, seek help from the Mutair leader, Faisal al-Dawish, 
who responded immediately with more than two thousand of the Ikhwan, who routed 
the Kuwaiti army at the Battle of Hamd (al-Mukhtar, 1957: 225; Abu Hakimah, 
1984: 346-347; al-Rayhani, 1988: 271-272; Dickson, 2002: 261). This was the first 
time the two states were involved in a military conflict. Therefore, it is important here 
to analyse this dispute and try to find the real reason behind this deterioration in 
Saudi-Kuwaiti relations. 
It is true that each side saw the ambition of the other to expand their territory over 
more lands as the real reason. Some writers mentioned that the Kuwaiti people 
believed that their southern boundary should be at Jabal Manifah according to the 
Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 1913' (Troeller, 1976: 170; Abu Hakimah, 
1984: 346-347; Dickson, 2002: 262). Ibn Saud did not agree with this, for he 
considered this agreement to be redundant since it was not ratified by these two 
powers, as a result of the First World War. Also, Ibn Saud believed that these two 
powers were not allowed to set the boundaries between the Gulf States after he 
expelled the Turks from al-Hasa. Moreover, Ibn Saud insisted that the Turks did not 
have any influence over the internal lands and their people. 2 He relied in his belief on 
article six of the Anglo-Saudi treaty of Darin in 1915, which provided that Ibn Saud 
would refrain from all aggression on, or interference with, the territories of Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman Coast, or tribes and Chiefs, who were under the protection 
of the British Government, and the limits of whose territories shall be hereafter 
determined3 (al-Sa'doon, 1983: 214-216; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 250-251). 
India Office, LIP&S/10/B381, copy of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement dated 29 July 10913. 
2 India Office, R/15/2/158, despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 6 July 1935. 
3 India Office, L/P&S/10/387, copy of the Darin Treaty between Ibn Saud and Percy Cox, the British 
Political Resident in Bushire, dated 26 December 1915. 
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As a result of the difference between the views of the two sides, long negotiations 
started between Ibn Saud and Ibn Sabah to end this clash, and both of them agreed 
that Britain would be the arbitrator. During these negotiations they did not arrive at a 
compromise, which led to the battle of al-Jahra in October 1920, when al-Dawish 
attacked it, with more than four thousands of his followers. Ibn Sabah was defeated in 
this battle, which caused him to ask Britain to protect him militarily. Britain sent its 
ships and airplanes and directly threatened the Ikhwan, which forced them to leave 
Kuwait (al-Mukhtar, 1957: 225; al-Sa'doon, 1983: 223-269; Abu Hakimah, 1984: 346- 
347; al-Rayhani, 1988: 272-276; Dickson, 2002: 263-266). 
In the wake of al-Jahra, Britain worked with the two sides to resolve their 
disagreement over the boundary issue. During the negotiations, Salim al-Sabah died, 
in February 1921, and was succeeded by his nephew, Ahmad al-Jaber, who was a 
personal friend of Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud now declared that there was no need for further 
negotiations to specify the boundaries between the two states. ' This attitude has led 
some writers to argue that Ibn Saud's dispute with Salim al-Sabah was driven by 
personal hatred between them 2 (Philby, 1928: 378-382; al-Khatrash, 1974: 117; al- 
Sa'doon, 1983: 273; Dickson, 2002: 266-267). It can be said that this hatred between 
Ibn Saud and Salim al-Sabah mainly resulted from their ambitions for more political 
achievements. In November 1922, in order to solve the problems over the boundaries 
between Najd and its northern neighbours, a meeting took place at al-'Uqair, and was 
chaired by Cox with Ibn Saud representing Najd and its Dependencies, Sabih Bey 
representing the Iraqi Government and Major James C. More, the Political Agent in 
Kuwait, representing the Kuwaiti Government. The meeting ended with the Treaty of 
al-'Uqair, signed on 2 December 1922, which drew the borders between the three 
countries, ending the struggle between them regarding the loyalty of tribes in the 
1 India Office, IJP&S/12/3737, report by Major More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, dated 13 
December 1927. 
2 This was confirmed by His Highness Prince Abdulraliman Ibn Abdullah during my interview with 
him in Riyadh on 7-10 January 2004. 
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border areas and resolved the problems of the shepherds in these areas, (Troeller, 
1976: 179; Dickson, 2002: 282-290). 
Despite the conclusion of the Treaty of al-'Uqair between Najd and Kuwait, the 
difficulties between them were not over. They had problems of another kind, such as 
tribal raids over boundaries, and trade and oil issues. Ibn Saud planned to invigorate 
his new ports on the Gulf coast, such as al-Jubail, al-'Uqair and al-Qataif, due to his 
increasing need for more income to consolidate his authority and build his state. He 
imposed more taxes on imported goods, most of which came from Kuwait. The 
Kuwaiti merchants and the people of Najd were not accustomed to such taxes, due to 
the boundary system being new in their area. When Ibn Saud set up posts for the 
purpose of tax collection, the people started smuggling, and so Ibn Saud asked the 
Kuwaiti Government to cooperate with him by implementing one of three options: 
firstly, to agree that Ibn Saud could send some of his employees to Kuwait to collect 
the taxes for him; secondly, that Ibn Sabah pay Ibn Saud from his cabinet an amount 
equal to the payable taxes; or thirdly, that Ibn Sabah should appoint Kuwaiti 
employees to collect the taxes and pay them to Ibn Saud. Ibn Sabah refused all these 
options, considering them contradictory to the full sovereignty of Kuwait. As a result, 
Ibn Saud imposed economic sanctions and prohibited trade with Kuwait2 (al-'Aqqad, 
1974: 244-245; al-Salim, N. D: 114-115). 
The Saudi-Kuwaiti economic dispute lasted for around twenty years and went 
through many long negotiations. In 1932, Prince Faisal visited Kuwait and discussed 
these issues without achieving any real advance. In 1935, with the direct intervention 
of the British to help solve this dispute, another conference was held in Kuwait to 
discuss several Kuwaiti proposals which had been rejected by King Abdulaziz. In 
1938, direct negotiations took place between Saudi Arabia and the British 
Government (as the representative of the Kuwaiti Government in its foreign affairs). 
Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp 5-9; India Office, R/15/5/100, 
despatch from Major More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to Ibn Saud on 2 December 1922. 
2 India Office, R/15/5/53, despatch from Stuart G. Knox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to 
the British Foreign Office on 20 June 1923. 
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Three new proposals for three different agreements were discussed. After long 
negotiations all three were signed in Jeddah on 20 April 1942. These agreements 
concerned friendship and good neighbourly relations, the extradition of criminals and 
a trade agreement' (Wahbah, 2000: 87-88; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 240-241; al-'Aqqad, 
1974: 245). 
Some historians consider the improvement in Saudi-Kuwaiti relations, which led to 
such agreements, to be due to King Abdulaziz's attitude to the Kuwaiti political crisis 
in the late 1930s. In late 1938, Iraq began an aggressive propaganda campaign, 
claiming that Kuwait was a part of the Basrah province. This was supported by some 
of the Arab nationalists in Kuwait, such as Abdullah al-Saqr, who led a revolt in 
March 1939 to overthrow the Kuwaiti Government and make the country part of Iraq. 
Ibn Saud's attitude was very supportive of Shaikh Ahmad al-Sabah' (al-Khamees, 
1972: 41-43). The Saudi-Kuwaiti relations improved further and they exchanged 
official visits in 1947. During these visits, they negotiated a mutual security and 
defence treaty which was signed on 28 July 1947 (al-Shurbasi, 1953: 25-35; al- 
Husaini, 1975: 31-32; al-Salim, N. D: 117). 
Before the end of King Abdulaziz's reign, several agreements were achieved between 
Saudi Arabia and the Emirate of Kuwait. Also, most of the disputes between them 
were resolved by compromise, including the administration of the neutral zone and 
the privilege of digging for oil in this area. This achievement stabilized Saudi- 
Kuwaiti relations and led to further improvement (al-Shuhail, 1987: 164). However, it 
is important to emphasise that the good relationship between Ibn Saud and Britain, as 
the Power which had the right to represent Kuwait in foreign affairs, was significant 
in attaining these results. 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp275-293. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 March 1939; India 
Office, UP&S/12/3758, report by Gerald de Gaury, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to the British 
Foreign Office dated 3 April 1939; India Office, R/15/5/127, despatch from Sir Reader Bullard, the 
British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 6 March 1939. 
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4.2.2 Bahrain 
From Ibn Saud's point of view, Bahrain was very similar to Kuwait, in terms of royal 
families and of residents. Ibn Saud acknowledged that the royal families in Bahrain 
and Kuwait were distantly related to him since they all descended from the same 
tribe. Accordingly, from the early days, he showed great respect for them (al-Shuhail, 
1987: 165; Zahlan, 1982: 71). Moreover, there was a large community in Bahrain 
which originally came from Najd and maintained strong relationships with their 
people there. In general, the relationship of the Bahraini Royal Family and its people 
with the Saudis had been characterized by friendliness since the eighteenth century 
(al-Shuhail, 1987: 165; Wahbah, 2000: 102-104). 
Ibn Saud's early political contact with Bahrain was during the First World War. This 
was when Ibn Saud appointed al-Qusaibi as a commercial agent in Bahrain to take 
care of the large Najdi community there. ' In 1919, Shaikh 'Isa of Bahrain imposed 
more taxes on the merchandise which went to Ibn Saud's ports. This caused a decline 
in the relationship between them. 2 Moreover, in May 1923, a sectarian dispute 
between the Najdi and Iranian people in Bahrain took place, which led to the 
intervention of the British and their insistence that Ibn Saud withdraw his 
commissioner from Bahrain due to his sympathetic attitude toward the Najdi people. 
Britain asked Ibn Saud not to send another commissioner without its prior agreement. 
This dispute led to the replacement of Shaikh 'Isa by his son Hamad, 3 and also forced 
many Najdi people in Bahrain to leave for the eastern province of Saudi Arabia 
(Qasim, 1973: 225-232; Madanat, 1970: 26). 
1 India Office, L/P&S/10/827, yearly report by Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, 
dated May 1913. 
2 India Office, R/15/2/204, despatch from Dickson, the British Political Agent in Bahrain, to the British 
Resident in Bushire on 6 December 1919. 
3 India Office, R/15/1/334, despatch from Stuart G. Knox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to 
Ibn Saud on 15 June 1923. 
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Ibn Saud did not agree with the British stance towards his representative and his 
people; he also insisted on the return of his commissioner, and agreed with Britain 
that al-Qusaibi should limit himself to commercial matters. Britain also agreed later 
that the Najdi people who had left Bahrain as a result of the 1923 dispute should 
return in 1927 (ibid). A relevant question arises here: Why did not Ibn Saud expand 
his authority to include Bahrain? These problems would have given him a good 
reason to intervene more directly in Bahrain's affairs. Of course the answer lies in Ibn 
Saud's recognition of his commitments regarding his treaties with Britain: Darin in 
1915 and Jeddah in 1927. He knew that such an action would bring him into 
confrontation with British power. 
The year 1927 witnessed a resumption of the good relationship between Ibn Saud and 
the Shaikh of Bahrain, as a result of Ibn Saud's undertaking in the Treaty of Jeddah to 
refrain from all aggression against, or interference in, the affairs of the Gulf states, 
including Bahrain as a Protectorate of Britain (Qasim, 1973: 233-234). In addition, Ibn 
Saud was very supportive of Bahrain against the long-standing Iranian claims to 
sovereignty over the Shaikhdom when Iran disagreed with the terms of the Treaty of 
Jeddah, for this Treaty implicitly acknowledged the independence of Bahrain. ' Iran 
saw the Treaty as undermining its ambitions in Bahrain. In addition, during 1927- 
1935, Iran protested to the League of Nations, claiming sovereignty over Bahrain, a 
claim which was subsequently rejected. In 1948-1949, Iran escalated its campaign 
and claimed sovereignty over Bahrain, which was not acknowledged by Ibn Saud and 
Britain (Faroughy, 1951: 97-102; Subhi, 1962: 162-165; Qasim, 1973: 227-237; al- 
Bahama, 1968: 167-195). 
In February 1930, Ibn Saud visited Bahrain for two days, and this visit reflected the 
strength of the Saudi-Bahraini relationship at that time. This visit took place despite 
the disagreement of the British Agents in Bahrain and Bushire. When Ibn Saud 
decided to make this visit, he sent two telegrams, one to Shaikh 'Isa and the other to 
1 India Office, R/15/2/138, despatch from Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Hufhaniz Khan, the Deputy Persian Plenipotentiary Minister in London, on 18 January 1928. 
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the British Consulate, informing them of his intention. The British Agent, Colonel 
Biscoe, replied that Shaikh 'Isa was ill and not in al-Manamah to receive Ibn Saud. 
The message proved to be not true, since the sons of Shaikh 'Isa came the following 
morning to Ibn Saud and told him that their father was waiting to receive him. At 
their insistence, Ibn Saud agreed to come ashore, but told them that he did not wish to 
see the British Consul. Ibn Saud and Shaikh 'Isa were overjoyed by the visit, to the 
chagrin of the British Consul, who had tried to prevent Ibn Saud entering al- 
Manamah for fear that this would stir up further nationalist movements and 
demonstrations in Bahrain. Britain attempted later to justify its behaviour and 
apologised for the action of its Agent in Bahrain (Almana, 1980: 140-141; Wahbah, 
1960: 93-94). 
On 16 November 1935, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain signed a tariff agreement, ' and in 
April 1939, Shaikh Hamad visited King Abdulaziz in Ras Tannorah in Saudi Arabia 
and suggested a return visit. King Abdulaziz accepted his invitation and visited 
Bahrain for the second time on 2 May 1939. Ibn Saud stayed several days and 
enjoyed a warm welcome from the Government and people of Bahrain. During this 
visit, the people of Bahrain expressed their strong affection for King Abdulaziz 
through a great variety of activities. This visit was considered a clear indicator of the 
strong relationship between the two countries2 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 688; Belgrave, 
1960: 109-111). The attitude of the British Agent toward this visit was different in 
comparison with the previous one. Britain welcomed Ibn Saud, due perhaps to the 
early signs of the Second Wold War and Britain's need to maintain good relations 
3 with Ibn Saud, as an influential leader in the Middle East. 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp: 215-219; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/19005, despatch from Albert S. Calvert, the British Ambassador in Jeddah, to Prince Faisal, the 
Saudi Foreign Minister, on 16 November 1935. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/23188, despatch from the British political Resident in Bushire to 
London on 7 April 1939; India Office, L/P&S/10/3767, report by Hugh Weightman, the British 
Political Agent in Bahrain, dated 21 May 1939. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/23188, despatch from the British political Resident in Bushire to 
London on 7 April 1939; India Office, R/15/2/140, despatch from Hugh Weightman, the British 
Political Agent in Bahrain, to Shaikh Hamad Ibn Khalaifah of Bahrain on 23 April 1939. 
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In general, the Saudi-Bahraini relationship improved day by day and remained strong. 
In comparison with the Saudi relations with the other Gulf states, such as that 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, this was much more cordial, which led some 
scholars to wonder about the reasons for difference. Some writers believed that Ibn 
Saud had no ambitions in Bahrain, since it was a small island with limited land and 
population in which he had little interest (Zahlan, 1982: 71). 
' Moreover, there were no 
real disputes over boundaries, since there were no land borders between them, which 
produced an environment conducive to good relations. However, both sides held 
several meetings and conducted long negotiations to discuss issues regarding the 
territorial waters and the small islands between them. These issues did not affect the 
Saudi-Bahraini relations and they were resolved after King Abdulaziz's death through 
the Sea Agreement of 1958 under King Saud. 2 
4.2.3 Qatar 
The Saudi-Qatari relationship was considered to be somewhat different in nature from 
those between Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring states. Qatar is not totally 
surrounded by the Gulf waters as Bahrain is, or by the sands of the Empty Quarter as 
Oman and the Oman Coast Shaikhdoms are. Also, Qatar is not like Kuwait, which 
was protected by the deserts of al-Dibdibah and the neutral zone resulting from the 
Treaty of al-'Uqair signed in 1922 with Britain. In addition, Qatar is next to al-Hasa, 
and so had been easily influenced by the policy and beliefs of the Saudis for many 
decades. This early contact led to the Qatari adoption of Ibn Abdulwahhab's teachings 
and the creed of Ibn Hanbal during the eighteenth century (al-'Aqqad, 1974: 155-156; 
al-Rayhani, 1988113-114: 15). 
1 This was supported by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz during my interview with 
him in Jcddah on 31 December 2003. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat wa al-Ittifaqiyyat, Part Two, 1936-1973. Pp 129- 
134; the Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu 
Dhabi wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al- 
'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah, Vol. 2,1955. Pp: 128-129. 
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This of course, created a strong sympathy between the royal families of both states. A 
clear indicator of this was the migration of Imam Abdulrahman with his family, 
including his son Abdulaziz, to Qatar in 1890, directly after they were expelled from 
Riyadh (al-Dabbagh, 1961: 186: al-Muzayyan, 1997: 29). Moreover, the two royal 
families supported one another such as when Ibn Saud helped Shaikh Jasim Ibn Thani 
to restore his authority in 1905, against his brother Ahmad and rebellious tribes; 
' this 
was in recognition of Jasim's earlier support of Ibn Saud against Ibn Rasheed (al- 
Mansur, 1975: 200-205; Abu Zlam, 1984: 349-352). 
In 1913, Ibn Saud took al-Hasa, which was seen by Ibn Thani as an indicator of the 
Saudi threat, as it would put an end to his own ambitions to bring al-Hasa under his 
authority. Ibn Thani therefore sent several letters to Ibn Saud telling him that he 
objected to the occupation of al-Hasa and also warning him not to invade Qatar. 
However, Shaikh Jasim died on 17 July 1913 and was succeeded by his son Abdullah, 
which led to improvements in Saudi-Qatari relations (Ali, 1957: 136-137; al-Mansur 
et al., 1977: 16). Shaikh Jasim had found himself surrounded by three powers, the 
Ottomans, Britain and Ibn Saud, which could have harmed his sovereignty. In these 
circumstances, and to avoid the anger of the Turks, he was obliged to protest formally 
to Ibn Saud opposing the occupation of al-Hasa. In addition, Ibn Thani allowed the 
Turks to deploy their forces in Qatar during their attempts to retake al-Hasa from Ibn 
Saud. At the same time, however, he sent his son Khalifah with his cousin to Ibn 
Saud to placate him, thus avoiding hostility. Moreover, Ibn Thani was more worried 
about the British ambitions in Qatar, due to the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, in 
accordance with which the Ottoman Government renounced all rights over Qatar. 
2 
1 Public Record Office, FO 248/844, report from Arthur P. Trevor, Deputy British Political Resident in 
Bushire, dated 15 October 1905; India Office, L/P&S/20/FO31, despatch from Percy Cox, the British 
Political Resident in Bushire, to the British Indian Government on 4 February 1906. 
2 L/P&S/10/827, report by Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, in May 1913; India 
Office, L/P&S/10/386, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to the 
British Indian Government on 22 June 1913; India Office, R/15/2/30, despatch from Arthur P. Trevor, 
the British Political Agent in Bahrain, to Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 3 July 
1913. 
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However, this Anglo-Turkish Agreement was the cause of most of the disputes in the 
region, due to the fact that Britain and the Gulf states, as its Protectorates, adhered to 
this Agreement with regard to boundary issues, while Ibn Saud did not recognise it at 
all. ' Ibn Saud's opposition to the Agreement led Shaikh Abdullah of Qatar to become 
suspicious of Ibn Saud's ambitions. Despite Ibn Saud's treaty with Britain in 1927, 
which provided for the protection of Qatar as well as other states, and as a result of 
his apprehensions, Abdullah Ibn Thani entered into a secret agreement with Ibn Saud. 
In 1930, Shaikh Abdullah confessed to the British Political Agent in Bahrain that he 
had been paying Ibn Saud a secret annual subsidy of 100,000 rupees over the years to 
maintain his position2 (Zahlan, 1979: 82). 
The competition over oil between the oil companies in the region, which were mainly 
British and American, was a major factor in the disputes over boundaries between the 
Gulf states, although the Gulf rulers were also involved in these issues. These oil 
companies, seeking to enhance their interests, wanted to work over specific areas in 
order to avoid obstructions due to boundary disputes which would cost them much3 
(Anderson, 1969: 28-31; al-'Aqqad, 1973: 168). In these circumstances, the dispute 
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia became manifest in 1935, when Qatar was about to 
sign an agreement for preliminary oil concessions with the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (Mursi, 1981: 85; Zahlan, 1982: 69). Ibn Saud warned the Shaikh not to 
conclude such an agreement until the boundaries between their states were settled4 
(Zahlan, 1982: 69). Moreover, the Shaikh of Qatar admitted to the deputy of the 
British Political Agent in Bahrain in July 1935 that he did not dare to claim any land 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 381-382. 
2 This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 
2003; Public Record Office, FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 
1935. 
3 http: //web. nys. nayy. niil/-relooney/3040 1601. htm. 
4 India Office, R/15/2/158, despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 6 July 1935. 
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south of Salwa or Khur al-'Udaid, during the life time of King Abdulaziz, because the 
tribes of those areas were very loyal to Ibn Saud. 
The arguments over the Qatari-Saudi border lasted for many years between the 
Governments of Saudi Arabia and Britain (which represented Qatar in terms of 
foreign affairs). The reason for these protracted arguments was the insistence by both 
sides on the right of dominion over small areas that showed strong signs of containing 
substantial oil reserves. This led Britain, as Qatar's representative, to insist on control 
over these areas, mainly those of Khur al-'Udaid and Jabal Nakhsh2 (Kelly, 
1964: 199). The British motives became crystal clear during a meeting, which was 
held in al-Dammam in Saudi Arabia in 1952, one year before the death of King 
Abdulaziz. During this meeting, each side, Saudi Arabia and Britain, adhered to their 
old attitudes (Lenczowski, 1960: 145). Despite the British stance, the Shaikh of Qatar, 
who was attending the conference, announced that he considered King Abdulaziz as 
his "father" and he would accept the King's decision regarding the boundaries 
between their states. 3 This was not accepted by Britain, however, and the situation 
remained tense until the two states signed an agreement on 24 October 1965,4 settling 
the boundary issue (Qasim, 1974: 166). 
' India Office, R/15/1/604, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in 
Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 22 January 1935; India Office, R/15/1/605, 
despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, to Percy G. Loch, the 
British Political Resident in Bushire, on 15 August 1935. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 384-382; India Office, R/15/1/607, despatch from Reader Bullard in 
Jeddah to Anthony Eden on 29 December 1936; India Office, R/15/2/160, despatch from Percy Cox, 
the British Political Resident in Bushire, to Sir Louis Dane, the Secretary of the British Indian 
Government on 16 September 1906. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 413. 
4 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat wa al-Ittifaqiyyat, Part Two, 1936-1973. Pp: 
465-469. 
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Despite the unhelpful British stance, during the long arguments over the boundaries 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, King Abdulaziz remained very committed to his 
treaties with Britain, mainly Darin 1915, al-'Uqair 1922 and Jeddah 1927, in which he 
undertook not to practise any aggression against Qatar or the other Gulf states. On 
many occasions, he reiterated that those areas and the tribes roaming the deserts of 
such areas, had been ruled by his ancestors, but despite this he would not intervene in 
the affairs of the cities, due to his respect for his treaties with Britain and his desire to 
maintain his friendly relations with Britain and with those shaikhdoms' (Zahlan, 
1982: 69-70). 
4.2.4 The Shaikhdoms of the Lower Gulf and the Sultanate of Oman 
Those Shaikhdoms, which are now called the United Arab Emirates, consist of seven 
emirates. The Shaikhdoms are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, al-Sharjah, Ras al-Khaymah, al- 
Fujayrah, Um al-Quwain and 'Ajman. The Shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi is the most 
important of these seven, with regard to size and resources, followed by Dubai (Abu 
al-Hajjaj, 1978: 238-239). The people of this area, which extends from the southern 
coast of the Arabian Gulf in the north, to the interior part of Oman in the south, are 
divided into two main groups. The first comprises the al-Hanawi people including 
Bani Yass, who in general were against the influence of Al Saud from the early years 
(al-'Abid, 1976: 144). The other important group is that of the al-Ghafari people, who 
mainly consist of al-Qawasim and al-Nu'aim, who adopted the teachings of Ibn 
Abdulwahhab from the very beginning. Al-Qawasim were devoutly attached to these 
beliefs, which led to their sympathy for Al Saud, and as a result they created a good 
relationship with them, which they have maintained until the present era2 (Mursi, 
1978: 86). 
1 India Office, R/15/2/158, despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 6 July 1935. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Iqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 49-95; India Office, L/P&S/20/FO31, despatch from Percy Cox, the 
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In 1905, when Ibn Saud went to support Shaikh Jasim of Qatar, he sent several letters 
to the Shaikhs of the Omani Coast telling them that he wanted to visit them. Their 
reaction was negative, especially that of Shaikh Zayid Ibn Khalaifah, the Shaikh of 
Abu Dhabi, who wrote to the British Agent and also visited the Sultan of Oman, 
asking their advice and telling them of his fears of the expansion of Ibn Saud's 
influence into his territory. Shaikh Zayid asked Britain to take suitable measures to 
prevent Ibn Saud from making these visits. ' Britain asked Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait 
to advise Ibn Saud not to visit the Shaikhdoms of the Omani Coast and to warn him 
that if he did so, it would be seen as an action hostile toward Britain. 2 As a result, Ibn 
Saud told Ibn Sabah that he did not intend to expand his authority into those 
territories and did not have any hostile intention towards them3 (Sinan, 1969: 89-90; 
al-Mansur; 1975: 202). It is worth asking here if Ibn Saud had any prior intention to 
expand his authority into these areas. Indeed, from 1905-1913, Ibn Saud was engaged 
in his internal affairs in Najd with his traditional enemy, Ibn Rasheed and his allies 
the Turks. Also, Ibn Saud needed to establish friendly relations with the British and 
he asked them to recognise him several times. Thus, it would have been unlikely for 
Ibn Saud to have acted against Britain's wishes. 
The relations of Ibn Saud with those Shaikhdoms and Oman remained as described 
for many years. With expanded relations with Britain, Ibn Saud was persuaded not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of those areas, in accordance with his treaties with 
British Political Resident in Bushire, to the British Indian Government on 4 February 1906; India 
Office, R/15/1/556, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to the Omani 
Coast Shaikhdoms on 22 April 1906; India Office, R/15/1/710, yearly report by Percy Cox, the British 
Political Resident in Bushire, dated 23 September 1906. 
Public Record Office, FO 248/844, report by Arthur P. Trevor, Deputy British Political Resident in 
Bushire, dated 15 October 1905; LJP&S/20/FO31, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political 
Resident in Bushire, to the British Indian Government on 4 February 1906. 
2 L/P&S/20/FO31, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to the British 
Indian Government on 4 February 1906; India Office, R/15/5/24, despatch from Stuart G. Knox, the 
British Political Agent in Kuwait, to Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 7 March 
1906. 
3 R/15/2/160, despatch from Percy Cox, the British Political Resident in Bushire, to Sir Louis Dane, the 
Secretary of the British Indian Government on 16 September 1906. 
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Britain at Darin in 1915 and Jeddah in 1927. The Treaty of Jeddah was a remarkable 
step by Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud stated clearly that he would not undertake any aggression 
against British Protectorates, among them were these Shaikhdoms of the Omani 
Coast. Due to Ibn Saud's commitment to this Treaty, the disputes with those 
Shaikhdoms and Oman were confined to the issue of boundaries; which escalated 
only as a result of the competition over oil in the region and the oil companies' need 
to specify their concession lines. In fact, the Saudi claims in the disputed areas relied 
on several factors, among them was the old loyalty of the tribes of these areas, the old 
dominion of the Saudis over these territories and the great efforts of the Saudi 
Government, which brought security and peace to the people of those areas (Kelly, 
1980: 72; Vassiliev, 1998: 165). Britain, as the representative of the Sultanate of 
Oman and the Omani Shaikhdoms, strictly refused any compromise based on the 
historical background or the tribal loyalties of the area towards Ibn Saud (Mann, 
1964: 34). 
On 29 May 1933, King Abdulaziz gave the oil concession in the eastern part of Saudi 
Arabia to an American company (the Standard Oil Company of California), which 
angered the British Government. Consequently, the British Government revived the 
boundary issue, relying on the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, which had always 
been opposed by Ibn Saud' (Sinan, 1969: 196-197; Qal'aji, 1965: 587-588; Mustafa et 
al., N. D. 109-110). In 1937-1939, the Sultan of Oman, Sa'ed Ibn Taimur, and the 
Shaikhs of the Omani Coast gave the oil concession in their territories to a British 
2 company (Petroleum Concession Limited). This was the time when these oil 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tal trim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 335; Public Record Office, FO 406/72, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, 
the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 27 
June 1934. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 337-338; Public Record Office, FO 371/20843, yearly report by Sir 
Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign 
Secretary, dated 28 February 1937; Public Record Office, FO 371/21908, yearly report by Sir Reader 
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companies insisted, along with their governments, on defining the borders, ' in order 
to work over specific areas, and to avoid any military clashes which would delay their 
work and cost them much (Anderson, 1969: 28-31; al-'Aqqad, 1973: 168). 
In fact, a main reason for the non-resolution of the border problems was that the 
British oil companies were interested in the area and they strongly competed with the 
American companies. The influence of Britain over Oman and the Shaikhdoms 
delayed the resolution of the disputes. As a result, the dispute over the boundaries 
remained a stumbling block in Saudi-Emirates and Saudi-Omani relations. The 
insistence of each of Saudi Arabia and Britain (representing the foreign affairs the 
Oman and Omani Coast Shaikhdoms) led to many inconclusive conferences being 
held to specify the boundaries between them. However, the outbreak of World War 
Two in 1939 induced both sides to shelve the boundary problems temporarily (Sa'ed, 
N. D.: 136; Qal'aji, 1965: 588). 
In time, relations between the Sultan of Oman and the Shaikhs of the Omani Coast 
with King Abdulaziz developed for the better, as the Shaikhs had admiration for Ibn 
Saud. This improvement was concurrent with Ibn Saud's growing cordiality towards 
them. This brought the relations between them to a level where any problem could 
have been solved, had they been free to act without consulting Britain in the area. 
This was made clear through several letters which were sent to King Abdulaziz and to 
the British Agents in the region by these Shaikhs, among them the Shaikh of Abu 
Dhabi, who stated his great loyalty to King Abdulaziz, due to his belief in the 
unification of the Arabs. Also, he stated that he did not claim any lands or tribes 
under Ibn Saud's sovereignty and he would accept Ibn Saud's territorial claims, which 
Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 
26 March 1937; India Office, L/P&S/12/2073, report from Alan Trott in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the 
British Foreign Secretary, dated 1 October 1937. 
' Public Record Office, FO 371/20843, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 28 February 1937. 
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were located east of the blue line mentioned in the memorandum of the 
Saudi 
delegate, Fuad Hamzah. 
In 1949, more discoveries of oil in the disputed areas provoked renewed arguments 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia, which in turn led to several meetings: in London 
in August 1951, then in al-Dammam in January 1952 and later in Riyadh, in February 
1952. All these conferences failed to solve the problems in question. Moreover, in 
September 1952, the Saudi Government sent Turki al-'Utaishan to be Governor of al- 
Buraimi, the main residential area in these territories. The British Government 
protested against this action and asked the Saudi Arabian Government to withdraw al- 
'Utaishan. King Abdulaziz refused to do so, which led to the military occupation of 
al-Buraimi by Britain. This was the first military dispute between Ibn Saud and 
Britain, which created the crisis of al-Buraimi between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
(acting on behalf of those Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of Oman). This dispute 
remained unresolved for many years and continued even after the death of Ibn Saud 
in November 19532 (Sa'ed, N. D.: 442-454; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1393-1399). 
The Saudi Government believed that it had dealt with full honesty and fairness with 
the leaders and the people of the disputed area, which had declared their loyalty to the 
Royal Family of Saudi Arabia over a period of about 150 years. 3 Moreover, the Saudi 
Government was convinced that the British Government's policy was the sole cause 
1 India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah on 2 February 1948; R/15/1/604, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 22 January 1935; R/15/1/605, 
despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, to Percy G. Loch, the 
British Political Resident in Bushire, on 15 August 1935. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Iqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 396-427. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 359-362. 
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of these disputes over those areas, and without that policy, there would have been no 
problems with regard to the boundaries. ' 
4.3 Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
Early official contact between Yemen and Saudi Arabia dated from the siege of 
Jeddah by Ibn Saud in 1925. Imam Yahya Ibn Hameeduddeen, the Imam of Yemen, 
wrote to Ibn Saud and King Ali, asking them to cease fighting and accept him as an 
arbitrator between them. 2 Ibn Saud replied him that he called on all Muslims to hold a 
conference to discuss the issue of al-Hijaz, adding that he hoped the Yemeni delegate 
would participate in this conference (al-Rayhani, 1988: 418). 
While Ibn Saud was busy with the conquest of al-Hijaz, the rivalry within the Idreesi 
family started after the death of Mohammed al-Idreesi. This led to a power vacuum in 
Jaizan, which had been committed to a neighbourhood treaty with Ibn Saud since 
1920, when Ibn Saud occupied Asir. This situation emboldened the Imam of Yemen 
to occupy al-Hudaidah and attack Jaizan. The Yemeni armies penetrated the Idreesi 
Emirate and continued to the city of Maydi. During the advance of the Yemeni 
troops, al-Hasan al-Idreesi took control of Jaizan and asked for support from the 
Italians and British, but they declined. This coincided with Ibn Saud becoming the 
King of al-Hijaz and al-Idreesi saw that the only way to stop the advance of Yemenis 
into his land was to ask for the protection of Ibn Saud. In order to save what was left, 
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Iqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 413-414; R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to 
the British Embassy in Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/10810, report by Stanley Rupert Jordan, Deputy British Consul in 
Jeddah, to Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 29 October 1925. 
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he signed the Treaty of Makkah with Ibn Saud on 21 October 1926, 
' which gave Ibn 
Saud the right to execute foreign affairs and stop any aggression against this region, 
leaving for al-Idreesi the control of internal affairs (Sa'ed, 1964: 190-192; al- Zirikli, 
1977a: 535-536; Vassiliev, 1998: 283; Wenner, 1967: 143-144; Wahbah, 2000: 43-44). 
The Treaty designated Ibn Saud as protector of the Emirate of al-Idreesi. As a result 
Imam Yahya, with his ambitions in Jaizan, started new relations with Saudi Arabia 
and a long period of dispute ensued, which culminated in the Saudi-Yemeni war. 
In June 1927, a Saudi delegation arrived in San'a to discuss the various boundary 
issues with Imam Yahya, who insisted that all of Asir was part of Yemen. This was 
seen by the Saudis as an extreme demand, which was refused. In December 1927, Ibn 
Saud sent another delegation to San'a with the aim of finding a solution to the 
boundary problems between the two states, but unfortunately the long discussion 
ended without any progress. In early 1928, a Yemeni delegation arrived in Makkah to 
negotiate the Saudi-Yemeni dispute but returned empty-handed to Yemen, due to the 
insistence of both sides on their demands. The main result of the three conferences 
was their implicit satisfaction with the current situation (Sa'ed, 1959: 79-81; Salim, 
1963: 331-332). As a result and also due to the correspondence, which had a peaceful 
tone, between King Abdulaziz and Imam Yahya, the Saudi-Yemeni military conflict 
was delayed for several years. During this period each side worked towards a further 
consolidation of its control over the area. 
Ibn Saud was in full control of Jaizan, when on 27 October 1930 al-Idreesi resigned, 
which gave Ibn Saud absolute power in the region (Wenner, 1967: 144; al- Zirikli, 
1977: 535-536; Vassiliev, 1998: 283). The new situation in Jaizan made Ibn Saud feel 
more responsible towards the region and also gave him full freedom to deal with the 
Imam of Yemen. However, at the same time, the Imam of Yemen established secret 
contacts with the Idreesis. Imam Yahya thought if he supported the Idreesis in a 
revolt, this would help him assert his authority over Najran, the coastal strip of Jaizan 
' American Archives, 890 F. 014, despatch by Henry P. Fletcher at the American Embassy in Rome to 
the American Secretary of State, on 25 February 1927. 
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and the southern region of Asir. Consequently, he proceeded to occupy the mountain 
of al-'Aru in southern Asir, which led to the first military conflict between Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia in 1931 (Philby, 1955: 322; Vassiliev, 1998: 283). As a result, immediate 
negotiations started and the Imam of Yemen stated that he wanted Ibn Saud to be the 
arbitrator for this problem and that he would be satisfied with Ibn Saud's decision. ' 
Ibn Saud decided to let the Imam have al-'Aru and the Agreement of al-'Aru was 
signed in December 1931. In this agreement, both sides agreed on cordial bilateral 
relations and mutual coordination (Philby, 1952: 184; Sa'ed, 1959: 201; Salim, 1963: 
344-346; al-Ghulami, 1980: 79). 
Despite the signing of the Treaty of al-'Aru, more serious clashes took place in 
1932-1933 over the disputed areas when Yemeni troops occupied Najran. Ibn 
Saud's reaction was swift: he sent Khalid Ibn Luway to head a troop of Saudi 
tribesmen, who drove the Yemenis out of Najran and formally annexed the land 
in the name of Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud sent a delegation to San'a to discuss all the 
boundary issues, with the hope that Imam Yahya would accept this graceful step. 
In response, Imam Yahya reasserted his claim to southern Asir with new military 
operations. Ibn Saud therefore strengthened his army in the area and issued an 
ultimatum to Imam Yahya. He proposed that the Imam of Yemen should 
withdraw from the occupied territories, restore the former borders and extradite 
the rebels of the Idreesis3 (Philby, 1955: 322; Vassiliev, 1998: 285; al-Ghulami, 
1980: 86). 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 413; the Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Kitab al-'Akhdar: al-'Alaqat al- 
Su'udiyyah al-Yamaniyyah, 1934, Makkah: Matba'at Umm al-Qura, Pp: 16-17. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1. Pp 101-102. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/17925, daily report on the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, covering the period 
from 3 January to 5 May 1934, sent by the British Embassy in Jeddah to London; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir 
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 1935. 
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In late February and early March 1934, a new meeting between the two monarchs 
was held in the city of Abha in Saudi Arabia. King Abdulaziz moderated his attitude 
and proposed to make Najran a neutral zone between the two states. However, Imam 
Yahya avoided giving a definite response. As a result, King Abdulaziz insisted on the 
three demands mentioned above and designated 5 April 1934 as a deadline; if the 
terms were not accepted, war would ensue. ' The deadline for the ultimatum expired 
and so on 5 April, Ibn Saud ordered two separate Saudi armies, headed by his sons 
Prince Saud and Prince Faisal, to attack Yemen2 (Philby, 1952; 185; Wenner, 1967: 
145; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 603; Vassiliev, 1998: 285). 
Crown Prince Saud was to attack the mountain strongholds of north Yemen from 
Najran, while Prince Faisal was to work his way south down the Tihamah. Crown 
Prince Saud set out from Najran to attack the north-east of Yemen. He met strong 
resistance in the mountains where Yemeni tribesmen were able to impede the 
progress of the Saudi troops, who were unfamiliar with the difficulties that 
mountain passes pose for an army on the march. Meanwhile, Prince Faisal set out 
from Jaizan and drove his way south. An enemy force, based at the town of 
Haradh, blocked his path but, in the ensuing battle, the Saudi troops were 
victorious and Prince Faisal was able to progress to the western coast of the 
Yemen, until he occupied al-Hudaidah3 (Philby, 1955: 322-323; al-Zirikli, 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Kitab al-'Akhdar: al-'Alaqat al-Su'udiyyah al-Yamaniyyah, 1934, 
Makkah: Matba'at'Umm al-Qura, Pp: 81-85; Public Record Office, FO 371/17925, daily report on the 
Saudi-Yemeni conflict, covering the period from 3 January to 5 May 1934, sent by the British Embassy 
in Jeddah to London; Public Record Office, FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the 
British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 
May 1935. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/17925, daily report on the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, covering the period 
from 3 January to 5 May 1934, sent by the British Embassy in Jeddah to London; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir 
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 1935. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/17925, daily report on the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, covering the period 
from 3 January to 5 May 1934, sent by the British Embassy in Jeddah to London; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir 
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 1935. 
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1977a: 603; Vassiliev, 1998: 285-286; al-'Uthaimeen, 1995: 281-285). The fall of 
al-Hudaidah was followed by an extremely confused situation, which led to some 
efforts by the Arabs, such as an Arab delegation consisting of Hajj Amin al- 
Husaini, Shakeeb Arsalan, Hashim al-Atasi and Mohammad Allubah which 
arrived to Saudi Arabia and asked Ibn Saud to stop the war (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 604; 
al-'Uthaimeen, 1995: 286). 
Furthermore, the warships of Britain, France, and Italy advanced toward al- 
Hudaidah to urge moderation. Also, the Italians, who were inclined to support the 
Imam, landed troops there (Vassiliev, 1998: 286). Ibn Saud understood that these 
European Powers would not allow him to annex the whole of Yemen. I Also, with 
Prince Faisal's occupation of al-Hudaidah, the Imam of Yemen had been 
persuaded to send a letter to Ibn Saud informing him that he agreed to Ibn Saud's 
three terms of peace. 2 Thus, the King accepted and offered terms for peace, 
ordering a cessation of hostilities and inviting Imam Yahya to discuss the 
demarcation of a new frontier between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
On 15 May 1934, a formal armistice was arranged between the Saudi and Yemeni 
forces to allow Imam Yahya to fulfil the terms of peace which Ibn Saud had 
stipulated. On 20 May 1934, the Treaty of al-Taif was signed by Prince Khalid, 
representing Saudi Arabia and the representative of Yemen, Abdullah al-Wazeer. 3 
The treaty provided for the establishment of a peaceful friendship between the 
two states and for mutual recognition of independence and sovereignty. The 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/17935, report from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 2 June 1934; Public Record 
Office, FO 371/17926, despatch from Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador in Rome, to Sir John 
Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 May 1934; Public Record Office, FO 371/19019, yearly 
report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the 
British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 1935. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/17935, report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 2 June 1934. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'atal-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp: 152-198; India Office, R/15/2/638, 
despatch including the text of the Saudi-Yemeni Treaty of 1934, from the British Embassy in Jeddah to 
London, dated 4 May 1934. 
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Saudi forces were to be withdrawn from the occupied territories and the Imam 
had to abandon all claims to Asir, Najran and Jaizan (Philby, 1952: 186-188; al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 603-61 1; Abu Darn, 1984: 532-534; al-Ghulami, 1980: 87-88; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 286). 
The Treaty of al-Taif, in contrast to al-'Aru Agreement, was successfully fulfilled and 
peaceful relations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia were established. The King's 
insistence on settling all the boundary issues and on defining the position of the two 
countries over the disputed territories in an authenticated treaty was the main reason 
for the improvement of the Saudi-Yemeni relationship. That an improvement had 
occurred was made clear by the Imam Yahya's response the assassination attempt on 
Ibn Saud during the Hajj of 1935, which could be considered as the first real test for 
the Treaty of al-Taif. Following the end of the war with Yemen, Ibn Saud performed 
the Hajj and while circumambulating the Ka'abah in the centre of the Sacred Mosque 
in Makkah on 15 March 1935, he was attacked by three Yemenis. 1 He was saved by 
the prompt and courageous action of his son, Prince Saud, who inserted himself 
between his father and the Yemeni assailants, receiving a knife wound to his 
shoulder. The royal guards opened fire and the assailants were shot dead (Philby, 
1952: 188; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 619-621; Vassiliev, 1998: 286). Imam Yahya, concerned 
that he might be implicated in the plot, immediately sent a message to Ibn Saud 
deploring the assassination attempt and declaring his joy and relief that Ibn Saud had 
survived it. Moreover, the King himself announced that he believed that the Imam 
was innocent. 2 Consequently, the relationship between the two dynasties steadily 
improved and cooperation began between the two states. 
India Office, L/P&S/12/2082, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in 
Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 15 March 1935; American Archives, 890 F. 001 Ibn Saud/14, 
despatch from Ray Atherton, the American Ambassador in London, to the American Secretary of State, 
on 21 March 1935. 
2 India Office, L/P&S/12/2082, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in 
Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 15 March 1935. 
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Saudi-Yemeni relations improved further when Imam Yahya decided to join the 
Saudi-Iraqi Charter for Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, which was established on 2 
April 1936 between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. ' Thus on 26 August 1937, Yemen became 
the third member of the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Charter of Arab Brotherhood and 
Alliance, which stated that any Arab state had the right to join theme (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1199-1200; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 289). However, Yemeni-Saudi relations 
experienced further problems during the incidents of 1948, which culminated in the 
assassination of Imam Yahya. Ibn al-Wazeer, the leaded of the revolt, sent a 
delegation to Ibn Saud requesting Ibn Saud's recognition or goodwill, but Ibn Saud 
supported Crown Prince Saif al-Islam Ahmad against the usurpers with a view to 
restoring his throne. Ibn Saud's attitude towards the usurpers became clear when he 
described them as murderers, while addressing their delegation in a public assembly, 
and ordered them to leave his country (Philby, 1952: 190-192; Sa'ed, 1959: 136-144; 
al-Zirikli, I977a: 1301-1312). This illustrated how Saudi-Yemeni relations after the 
Treaty of al-Taif remained strong and continued to be stable. Moreover, Ibn Saud's 
attitude towards the Imam of Yemen during the 1948 revolt was a good indicator of 
his strong influence and also of his commitment to his treaties with Yemen, even with 
regard to the internal affairs of Yemen, which could influence the stability of Saudi 
Arabia. 
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Muahadat, 1922-1951. Pp: 220-224; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/20056, despatch by Sir Archibald C. Kerr, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, to Anthony 
Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 8 April 1936. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1. Pp: 241-244; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/20838, copy of the Saud-Iraqi-Yemeni Treaty of 1937, dated on 15 August 1937. 
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Chapter Five: King Abdulaziz and the Arab World 
5.1 The Palestinian Problem 
5.1.1 The King's Action on the Palestinian-Arab Front 
The Balfour Declaration, issued on 2 November 1917, committed Britain to 
support the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine 
(Williams, 1933: 122; Howarth, 1964: 107). Weizmann (1936: 671-672) 
acknowledged that when Palestine emerged from the Great War it had a Jewish 
population of only fifty thousand, adding that Palestine was a small country 
where land was not plentiful and where the Arabs population was certainly not 
ready to receive them with open arms. Of all the problems that King Abdulaziz 
dealt with, the Palestine issue was, unquestionably, the most disturbing. Howarth 
(1964: 223) stated that King Abdulaziz had always been adamant about the Arab 
rights to Palestine, and had always been liable to become enraged when Palestine 
was discussed. As leading Arab head of state of his time, he refused, from 1915 
onwards, the several appeals made by British Governments to accept their plans 
to give the Zionists a national home in Palestine (Qal'aji, 1971: 19; al-Musallam, 
1985: 117; al-Shuhail, 1987: 181). 
Ibn Saud was deeply moved by the plight of the Palestinians and alarmed by the 
increased immigration of Jews into Palestine, which had increased from 1928 and 
which was a primary cause of subsequent Arab revolts. King Abdulaziz was a 
figurehead for the aspirations of most Palestinian leaders and revolutionaries. 
They came or wrote to him seeking his support from the early years of the 
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Palestinian struggle, ' among them the famous leader, Hajj Amin al-Husaini. The 
Palestinians considered King Abdulaziz to be the most popular and famous Arab 
leader, and he had the capability to provide them with political and financial 
support. 2 King Abdulaziz was one of the first Arab leaders to resist the British 
implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Al-'Ash'al (1986: 135) stated that King 
Abdulaziz, due to Britain's insistence on putting the Balfour Declaration into 
practice, according to the Mandate policy, refused the frequent British invitations 
to join the League of Nations. He believed that if he became a member of the 
League of Nations, he would have been obliged to accept its policies. 
On the Palestinian issue, King Abdulaziz's policy was based on two important 
pillars. The first was coordination and co-operation with Arab leaders and 
intellectuals in order to unite the Arab resistance against Zionist strategies. 3 The 
second pillar was his diplomatic and peaceful attempts to gain the support of 
influential powers, mainly Britain and the United States of America, in the Arab 
struggle, or at least to secure their neutrality. He endeavoured to convince Britain 
and the U. S. of the importance of Arab rights and tried with patience to change 
their position (Barry, 1981: 16). 
With regard to coordination and cooperation among the Arabs, Saudi Arabia 
participated in most of the conferences which were held to discuss the problem of 
Palestine. Saudi Arabia always co-operated with all the Arab countries which 
were sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians (Howarth, 1964: 223; al- 
Ghulami, 1980: 146; Harran, 1987: 14). Moreover, Howarth (1964: 223) argued 
that the only wish which all the Arabs shared was to throw the Jews out of 
Palestine as soon as the British Mandate ended. Indeed, Arabs and Muslims were 
American Archives, 890 F. 001 Ibn Saud/19, despatch from Mr. Brant at the American Consulate in 
Jerusalem, to the American Secretary of State, on 15 November 1936. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 001 Ibn Saud/19, despatch from Mr. Brant at the American Consulate in 
Jerusalem, to the American Secretary of State, on 15 November 1936. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/23274, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 12 February 1939. 
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discontented with granting the Jews a home in Palestine and enthusiastic to fight 
for Palestinian rights. Most of the Arab people saw that the restoration of 
Palestine by peaceful means was unlikely but, despite this, the Arab leaders did 
not prepare their people either politically or militarily for their decisive battle (al- 
Mareq, 1978: 347-351; 'Ali, 1980: 102). 
King Abdulaziz believed from the early years in peaceful and diplomatic 
solutions to the Palestinian problem. He called for negotiations with Britain, the 
power responsible for the creation of this problem (Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 
1999: 100). He acknowledged that he was criticised by his people, the Arabs and 
the Muslims, for his diplomatic policy. However, he defended his strategy. He 
emphasised his belief in the credibility of Britain and the United States and their 
promises to solve this problem with the full cooperation of the Arabs (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1071-1076 and 1254-1257; Harran, 1999: 383). 
Also, King Abdulaziz justified his policy by conceding that using military force 
against Britain would not enable the Arabs to liberate Palestine (al-Zirikli. 1977a: 
1100; Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 100). Furthermore, he believed that 
Britain would not leave the Jews to their fate if the Arabs tried to solve the 
problem militarily (Howarth, 1964: 224; al-Zirikli. 1977a: 1193 and 1256; al- 
Mareq, 1978: 385-386). For further justification, Zu'aitir (1980: 256) indicated 
that, in order to rationalize his policy, King Abdulaziz told the Arab High 
Committee' that before thinking of resisting Britain, the Arabs should create a 
strong linkage with another strong foreign power. To do otherwise would make 
resistance an unsafe adventure. 
Many Arabs criticized their leaders, among them King Abdulaziz, for their 
attitude toward the Palestine issue and for adopting the apparently unsuccessful 
policy of peaceful diplomacy. Indeed, King Abdulaziz himself, during his 
1 The Arab High Committee was formed in 1936, and consisted of the leaders of the Palestinian 
parties. It was headed by the famous Palestinian leader, Hajj Mohammad Amin al-Husaini. 
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meeting with the British Commissioner in Jeddah, Sir Reader Bullard, in 1938, 
acknowledged that under the pressure of public opinion, which resulted from the 
British policy in Palestine, he was unable to guarantee maintaining his friendly 
relations with Britain. ' Furthermore, he acknowledged in several letters that the 
British policy in Palestine had made him the target of Arab and Muslim criticism 
for his peaceful policy with respect to Britain. He claimed that this had put him in 
a critical position. His friendship with Britain and his duty as a Muslim and Arab 
leader became increasingly incompatible (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1079-1091 and 1255; 
'Attar, 1973: 137-140). 
According to Harran (1999: 403-405) and Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah 
(1999: 236-290) it seemed that, during the second conference in London in 1946, 
King Abdulaziz believed that Britain would continue its support towards the 
Jews. He also believed that the UN was expected to vote on partitioning Palestine 
due to the great influence exerted on it by Britain and the United States. On 29 
November 1947, the UN General Assembly declared its Resolution to partition 
Palestine into two states between the Arab and Jews. As a matter of fact, Britain 
abstained from voting on this Resolution. The Resolution was strongly rejected 
by King Abdulaziz and all the other Arab leaders. Britain announced the end of 
its Mandate in Palestine on 15 May 1948, one day after the declaration by the 
Zionists of the establishment of Israel. This paved the way for the first war 
between the Arab countries and the Jews, as King Abdulaziz had predicted. 
King Abdulaziz had repeatedly declared that if Britain and the United States 
insisted on partitioning Palestine, this would ignite a war in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, he acknowledged on various occasions that it would honour him to 
die as a martyr for Palestine and stated that he would rather prefer to die and be 
deprived of his offspring and fortune than establish a homeland for the Zionists in 
Palestine. He argued that the establishment of the Jewish homeland in Palestine 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/23274, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 12 February 1939. 
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would be against the interests of the Arabs and would threaten their entity, not 
only in Palestine, but in all Arab states (Monroe, 1973: 37; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1100; 
Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 99-100). The deterioration of the Palestine 
situation in 1947-1948 forced King Abdulaziz to change his political language 
and convinced him of the need for military action. 
However, his perspective on the war was different from that of other Arab 
leaders. Most Arab leaders thought that they should use the Arab regular armies 
against the Jews after they had declared the establishment of their state of Israel 
on 14 May 1948, at the end of the British Mandate (Wahbah, 1960: 169-170; al- 
Mareq, 1978: 350; al-Saud, 1990: 65). There were protracted negotiations in the 
Arab League. King Abdulaziz's perception was that the Arab regular armies were 
not ready and not sufficiently trained for a real battle against an enemy with about 
60,000-70,000 well trained and armed troops (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1291; 'Ali, 1980: 
253). In addition, it was expected that foreign powers would intervene to protect 
the Jews if the Arab states attacked them. Also, he believed that the Palestinians 
themselves were capable of liberating their land from the Zionists and that this 
would deprive the foreign powers of the opportunity to intervene in Palestine 
(Howarth, 1964: 224; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1291; al-Saud, 1990: 65). 
King Abdulaziz suggested that the Palestinians should announce their 
independent state, and that the Arab and Muslim countries should acknowledge 
this and support the Palestinians with volunteers and financial backing (Wahbah, 
1960: 170; al-Mareq, 1978: 354; al-Saud, 1990: 65). This point of view was 
shared by some Egyptian parliamentary members. However, the Palestinians 
leader, Hajj Mohammad Amin al-Husaini, preferred that the fighting be restricted 
to the Palestinians, with the support of well-trained Arab military elements, in 
order to keep the Palestinian issue an internal affair. This, it was hoped, would 
prevent the foreign powers from intervening in support of the Zionists (al-Mareq, 
1978: 376; al-Badri, 1987: 55-56; Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 333-335). 
However, the attitude of King Abdulaziz was criticized by some of the Arab 
leaders and politicians, as they believed that he did not want King Abdullah of 
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Jordan to profit from this situation due to the old quarrel and competition between 
the two Royal Families. Al-Mareq (1978: 378-380) explained that this was the 
view of the Arab League as represented by its General Secretary, Abdulrahman 
'Azzam. 
However, King Abdulaziz called on the Arab League to present a united front and 
he agreed to send his troops to Palestine to participate in the first Arab-Israeli 
War of 1948. Another important reason which forced him and the other leaders, 
who shared his view, to take this position, was the massacres which were carried 
out by the Jewish armed elements against civilian Arabs, such as the Deir Yassin 
Massacre on 9 April 1948.1 This massacre took place under the leadership of 
Begin, who late became an Israeli Prime Minister (Begin, 1951: 162). At that 
time, Begin was the leader of the radical Jewish organisation (Irgun). The Deir 
Yassin Massacre was seen, even by some Israeli historians, as a shameful episode 
in Jewish history (Kimche, 1953: 228). Hence, Arab leaders decided, through the 
Arab League, to intervene militarily in Palestine under pressure to preserve the 
remaining Arab lands and to secure the life of their people in Palestine. 
The sequence of events of the War confirmed that King Abdulaziz's opinion was 
correct, for it demonstrated the Zionists' military superiority. A truce was 
arranged on 2 June 1948 ('Ali, 1980: 271-274; Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 
1999: 341-348). Al-Shathli (2003) has pointed out that the British air force fought 
against the Arabs and shot down five Egyptian aircraft while they were attacking 
the Zionists. He also claimed that the Zionists, as a result of the 1948 war, 
occupied a greater part of Palestine than they had been given by the UN decree. 2 
Philby (1955: 348) quoted President Nasser of Egypt, who said "We ourselves are 
responsible for the loss of Palestine, and our leaders were the principal agents in 
losing it. We did nothing but make speeches and hold meetings. We used to say 
that we would throw the Jews into the sea, but we didn't do it". Moreover, al- 
1 httg: //www. deiryassin. or2/indexl. html. 
2 In Shahid 'Ala al-'Asr Programme, on al-Jazeerah TV Channel. 
141 
Mareq (1978: 351-393), as one of the Saudi Arab soldiers who experienced the 
bitterness of the 1948 catastrophe, argued that the leaders of the neighbouring 
Arab countries used the Palestinian issue for their personal interests. In any way, 
Arab military intervention, through regular Arab armies led to disaster (Van der 
Meulen, 1999: 123). 
Thus, it can be said that the British and United States policy in Palestine 
contributed to the catastrophe. Unsuccessfully, they attempted to reconcile the 
legitimate interests of the indigenous Palestinians with Zionist aspirations to 
establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The British-American insistence on adopting 
these two commitments, which had never been reconcilable, was a major factor 
that contributed to the escalation of violence and conflict in the Holy Land. This 
will become clear in the following analysis of the second pillar of King 
Abdulaziz's policy: his attempt to restore Palestine through diplomatic channels 
and through his friendship with Britain and the United States of America. 
5.1.2 Dealing with Britain as the Mandatory Power in Palestine 
The peace settlement after the First World War had left Britain the dominant 
power in the Middle East. In fact, the region was regarded by all other powers as 
a British sphere of influence (Bryson, 1977: 115; Vassiliev, 1998: 324). Moreover, 
Palestine was governed under a British Mandate in accordance with the League 
of Nations instructions. According to the Balfour Declaration, Britain was 
committed to establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, but 
it is said to have neglected its commitments, as a Mandate Power, to the Arabs, 
particularly the Arabs of Palestine, although the Arabs who supported the Arab 
revolt of 1916 were supporting the British position in the First World War 
(Williams, 1933: 122; Ghory, 1936: 686-692; Howarth, 1964: 107). 
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King Abdulaziz's position was one of absolute opposition to the British 
commitment to the Jews (al-Mukhtar, 1957: 247; Howarth, 1964: 107; Qal'aji, 
1971: 19; al-Shuhail, 1987: 181). Al-Zirikli (1977a: 1073) stated that his rejection 
of British plans and refusal to agree that there was a special situation regarding 
the British Mandate in Palestine was a main reason behind the failure of Wadi al- 
'Aqeeq negotiations in 1926,1 which preceded the Treaty of Jeddah. His view on 
this matter was well-known to Sir Gilbert Clayton when he came to Saudi Arabia 
to negotiate the Treaty of Jeddah with Ibn Saud in 1927. Clayton strongly 
recommended avoiding any discussion of British commitments to the Zionists 
with Ibn Saud, due to Britain's previous knowledge of Ibn Saud's outright 
rejection of ceding Palestine or any Islamic or Arab territory to the Zionists 
(Qal'aji, 1971: 19; al-Musallam, 1985: 117; al-Saud, 2001: 115; al-Ghulami, 
1980: 145). Winston Churchill (1959: 971) described King Abdulaziz as the most 
intransigent and obstinate of all the Arab allies over the Palestinian issue. 
In 1936, the Palestinians embarked on a revolt in the form of a general strike. 
This was a result of the augmentation of Jewish emigration into Palestine during 
the 1920s, and also in opposition to the perceived Zionist plans to impose a 
Jewish state on their land. The Arab Higher Committee urged all Palestinians to 
refuse to pay taxes to the British Mandate Government as part of the protest. The 
strike lasted around six months and caused great hardship to the most vulnerable 
members of the Palestinian community. During the strike, Ibn Saud maintained 
contact with the British and consulted closely with Arab leaders in Iraq, Trans- 
Jordan and Yemen. In the end, responding to British appeals for help, Ibn Saud 
played a crucial role in persuading the Arab High Committee to end the strike in 
October 1936, with the promise of the British Government to send a Royal 
Commission to study the situation (Wahbah, 1960: 155; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1073- 
1076; Hallah, 1987: 13-14; Abu'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 56-69). 
1 This was supported by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004. 
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The Royal Commission, known as the Peel Commission, concluded its work in 
August 1937, with the declaration that Palestine be partitioned between the Arabs and 
the Zionists. This proposal was strongly rejected by the Arabs with King Abdulaziz 
taking the lead. Moreover, as a result of this proposal, he told the British 
Commissioner in Jeddah, Sir Reader Bullard, that no honest Arab would agree to the 
partitioning of Palestine, and if there were an Arab leader in any Arab country who 
did agree, one could be sure that the majority of the people of that country would 
oppose him. Also, King Abdulaziz warned the British against any action which would 
provoke the Arabs (Philby, 1955: 336; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1077; al-Musallam, 1985: 119- 
122). 
It might be said that King Abdulaziz's support for the Palestinians was limited to 
protest against the British plans and giving financial aid. Yet, his concern over the 
Palestine issue went far beyond that. He used his influence in Islamic and Arab 
circles, in addition to his good relations with Britain, to offer a suitable solution. 
During 1937, there was extensive correspondence with the British Government, 
including a memorandum submitted in September 1937, which featured a proposal of 
several points which he hoped the British Government would adopt. The most 
important point in this proposal was his suggestion that the British should declare a 
Palestinian constitutional government shared by the inhabitants of Palestine according 
to their percentage in that year under the condition of respecting this percentage by a 
limitation of the Jewish immigration (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1079-1088; al-Musallam, 
1985: 117-121; Hallah, 1987: 14-15). 
With regard to the Palestinian issue, it could be said that good Saudi-British 
relations started to reap results. Furthermore, the British Government was 
gradually discovering that there were forces at work in Palestine over which it 
had no control. On 9 November 1938,1 the British Government despatched an 
envoy to invite Ibn Saud to attend a conference in London to discuss the issue of 
1 http: //www. one-state. org/historical/documents/mcdonald. htm. 
144 
Palestine. ' The British Colonial Secretary, Malcolm McDonald, 2 told the House 
of Commons that the British Government was in communication with the 
Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and Yemen in order to 
arrange a conference on Palestine. 3 Syria and Lebanon, within the French sphere 
of influence, were not to be invited, due to the British desire not to provoke 
France (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1113-1116; Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 217- 
222). 
In February 1939, Prince Faisal Ibn Abdulaziz led the Saudi Arabian delegation 
to the London Conference on Palestine, which was held from 7 February to 17 
March. He brought with him a letter addressed to the British Prime Minister, 
Neville Chamberlain, from his father, Ibn Saud. The letter recalled the support 
which Ibn Saud had lent to British interests in the past and invited the British to 
state their policy on Palestine clearly. However, the conference failed to resolve 
any of the issues raised by the Palestinian situation for many reasons, among 
them the British exclusion of the Mufti of Jerusalem and the real leaders of the 
Palestinians from the conference, in addition to the escalation of violent incidents 
in Palestine4 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1117-1120; 'Ali, 1980: 21-54; al-Hallah, 
1987: 15). Furthermore, the attention of the British Government was quickly 
diverted to another hazardous matter. By September 1939, Germany had invaded 
Poland and Britain with France had declared war on Germany. The Second World 
War had begun. 
In February 1945, shortly after his meeting with President Roosevelt, Ibn Saud met 
the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in Egypt. Deplorably, Churchill declared 
that he was the original architect of the British policy to create a Jewish homeland in 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/23274, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 12 February 1939. 
2 http: //ianus. lib. cam. ac. uk/db/node. xsp? id=FAD%2FGBR"/o2F0115%2FRCMS%2041: recurse=1. 
3 http: //www. one-state. org/historical/documents/mcdonald. htm. 
Public Record Office, FO 371/23274, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 12 February 1939. 
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Palestine. Moreover, Churchill attempted to use the positive relations that had existed 
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Britain over many years to influence Ibn 
Saud's view on the issue of Palestine. He suggested that Ibn Saud should use his 
authority and influence to persuade the Arab world to accept the Zionist plans. Not 
surprisingly, Ibn Saud found Churchill's views entirely unacceptable and he tried to illustrate 
the real threat of supporting unlimited Zionist ambitions, which would harm Arab interests 
and the entire Middle East region, which, consequently, would be disastrous for British-Arab 
relations' (Wahbah; 1960: 159). 
Holden and Johns (1981: 134) argued that with World War Two nearly over, the 
conflict implicit in the original Balfour Declaration between the concept of a Jewish 
homeland and the rights of the existing Arab inhabitants of Palestine was approaching 
a climax. The Arabs, including King Abdulaziz, started to lose their patience, 
especially when in view of Britain's perceived support for the Zionists, as mentioned 
above. 2 This might be an important reason why King Abdulaziz worked to attract the 
Americans to the Middle East through commercial relations. As we have noted, he 
believed that the Arabs required another strong ally, as he told the Arab Higher 
Committee. Therefore,. it was the British policy toward the Arabs which forced them 
to look for another source of support. 
5.1.3 Ibn Saud's Attitude Towards the Zionist Activity 
King Abdulaziz's attitude towards the Zionists resulted from his early perception of 
their plans in the Arab lands. He stated this on several occasions. Ibn Saud told 
Dickson, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, in 1937 that he was sure that the Zionists' 
aspirations were to seize not only Palestine, but all the land down to al-Madinah, and to spread 
their control in the east as far as the Gulf coast (Dickson, 2002: 412). As a result of the 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
2 Ibid. 
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King's opposition, the Zionists tried to reach agreement with him on several occasions. For 
example, Chaim Weizmann made a proposal that was communicated to Ibn Saud through 
Philby in 1940. Taking advantage of In Saud's financial needs, the Zionist leaders offered 
him £20 million if he would change his attitude to the Palestine Question and settle all the 
Palestinian Arabs in his country (Philby, 1952: 213-214; Wahbah, 1960: 178-179). 
Given Ibn Saud's resolute stance, the Zionists continued their attempts through the 
Americans; Harold Hoskins, the delegate of President Roosevelt, met Ibn Saud in 
July 1943 and discussed the Palestinian issue with him. During this meeting Hoskins 
asked the King if he could meet Weizmann to discuss the Palestinian problem. The 
King refused to meet him due to his earlier attempt, through Philby, to bribe him. He 
described their attempt as a vile and criminal act ('Attar, 1972: 1266-1270; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1138-1143; Abu'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 115-117). 
In politics nothing stays the same, yet the attitude of Ibn Saud against Zionism 
remained unchangeable to his death. ' It is clearly important to discover the reason. In 
March 1943, Ibn Saud gave an interview to an American journalist called Noel E. 
Bush on the issue of Palestine. During this interview, he justified the reasons for his attitude 
and asked Bush to inform the American people. He stated that he could not see that the 
Jews had any justification for their claims in Palestine on the grounds that for centuries 
before the mission of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him), Palestine had 
been a Jewish land. The Romans had conquered the Jews, killing and scattering them so 
that no trace of their rule remained. The Arabs had conquered Palestine over 13 
centuries ago, liberating it from the Romans, and since that time it had remained 
Muslim. The Jews therefore had no right to the country, because all the countries in 
the world had been conquered by people who had made undisputed homes in such 
lands. If we were to follow the Jewish theory, many of the settled people of the world 
would have to leave their homes. Secondly, he was not afraid either of the Jews or of 
their having a state or authority in Arab countries or anywhere else because of what 
God told us through the tongue of His Prophet in his Holy Book. 2 He saw that the 
Jews' insistence on a homeland in Palestine could not be maintained for the reason 
' Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan. In 'Idha'at Programme, on al-'Arabiyyah TV Channel on 9 June 2004. 
2 'Umm al- ura Newspaper, Issue No. 1080,16 November 1945. 
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that it was unjust to the Arabs and the Muslims, and also because it only created 
friction between the Muslims and their friends, the Allies. If the Jews needed a place in 
which to live there were countries in Europe, America, and elsewhere that were larger, 
more fertile, and more convenient to their interests (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1131-1132). 
King Abdulaziz officially presented his policy to the Zionists when he sent his Crown 
Prince, Saud, to meet President Truman in 1947. King Abdulaziz provided his son 
with general guidance, including his policy toward the Zionists and a justification for 
his attitude. He said "We, the Arabs, are Muslims first of all. The Jews have been the 
enemies of our religion since the birth of Islam. At the same time, Islam does not 
share the principle of racism. We are not racists; we do not oppose the Jews just 
because they are Jews. However, we oppose the tyrannical policy preached by some 
Zionist Jews. The reasons for our opposition to that policy are numerous. Zionism is 
based on a tyrannical principle. Zionism claims hypocritically that it is based on the 
liberation of oppressed Jews. How can one get rid of oppression by oppressing others, or 
eliminate injustice by committing a greater injustice? Zionism contradicts the Arab countries' 
current political interests. It threatens them from the military and strategic viewpoint" (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 776-777; Vassiliev, 1998: 342-343). 
King Abdulaziz believed that opposing Zionism constituted real justice. He tried to 
explain that there was no use in confronting the Allies and the Muslims with a 
problem from which neither would profit. As for ancient Jewish history, the Jews had 
behaved in a deliberate way in order to provoke trouble and disturbances. Now they 
were harming the natives of Palestine, causing poverty and desolation which would be 
the source of persistent problems in Palestine and in the entire Middle East. 
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5.2 King Abdulaziz and the Question of Colonialism in Arab 
Countries 
5.2.1 Relationship with Arab Political Leaders 
Hakeem (1976: 165) has argued that after conquering al-Hijaz and consolidating his 
authority over most of the Arabian Peninsula in one sovereign state, King Abdulaziz 
achieved the first unification of Arabia, which became the model for the Arabs and 
the object of their hopes. ' This was due to the general circumstances in the Arab 
world, which were not suitable for any kind of Arab integration. During the King's 
reign, most of the Arab countries were controlled directly or indirectly by foreign 
powers, mainly by Britain and France as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement2 of 
1916, and according to the policy of the Mandate. The foreign policies and 
international relations of most of the Arab states at that time were therefore governed 
by those foreign powers; consequently, in order to establish his relationships with 
other Arab countries, King Abdulaziz was compelled to deal with the colonial powers 
which controlled those countries (al-Mukhtar, 1957: 184-191; al-Shuhail, 1987: 170- 
173; al- Mareq, 1978,272; Harran, 1999: 373). 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, King Abdulaziz became one of the most influential 
Arab leaders. There were several reasons for his authority and prestige during those 
years, among them the recognition of his sovereignty by the powerful states through 
his treaties with them such as the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927 with Britain and the 
Treaty of al-Jazeerah with France, 3 signed on 10 November 1931. Another important 
reason was his victory at the battle of al-Sibalah, which consolidated the internal 
American Archives, 890 F. 001 Ibn Saud/19, despatch from Mr. Brant at the American Consulate in 
Jerusalem, to the American Secretary of State, on 15 November 1936. 
2http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes. htm; http: //www. lib. byu. edu/- rdh/wwi/1916/sykesp 
icot. html. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1. Pp: 114-127. 
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stability of his state and the unity of his leadership. He was also victorious in the 
Saudi-Yemeni war of 1934, which led to the Treaty of al-Taif in the same year. 
Indeed, this Treaty and the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Charter for Arab Brotherhood and 
Alliance, which was established on 1937, ' constituted a great step forward in 
consolidating inter-Arabs solidarity. The King said that these two treaties laid a 
strong foundation for mutual support among the Arabs. Also, he expressed the wish 
that Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Syria would join in this Alliance (al-Musallam, 
N. D: 21; al-Mukhtar, 1957: 520-522; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 659). Certainly, King 
Abdulaziz was among the pioneering Arab leaders who called for Arab unity from his 
earliest years as a monarch. 
Moreover, the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Charter for Arab Brotherhood and Alliance was a 
result of the determination of King Abdulaziz and King Faisal of Iraq to achieve the 
consolidation of the Arab nation. They met together in 1930 to discuss many of the 
issues confronting the Arab world and agreed on solutions to most of the problems 
besetting relations between their two countries. In April 1931, in Makkah, Prince 
Faisal and Nouri al-Sa'ed signed an arbitration protocol, a treaty of friendship and 
good neighbourly relations and an agreement on the extradition of criminals' 
(Wahbah, 1960: 119: al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 265-266). Indeed, this policy of friendly 
relations agreed between King Abdulaziz and King Faisal, and continued by Faisal's 
son King Ghazi in 1933, was the main step leading to the Saudi-Iraqi Charter for 
Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, which resulted directly from the collaboration 
between King Abdulaziz and King Ghazi. This Charter, signed on 2 April 1936, 
provided for Saudi-Iraqi co-operation in many areas including cultural, diplomatic, 
security and military issues. 3 This achievement could therefore be considered the first 
step on the path leading to Arab solidarity. 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 241-244; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/20056, despatch by Sir Archibald C. Kerr, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, to Anthony 
Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 8 April 1936. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1, pp: 68-77. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1, pp: 220-224. 
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An important result of this Charter occurred almost immediately; only one month 
after it was signed, Saudi-Egyptian relations improved markedly after a long period 
of disagreement. It is true that this improvement came immediately after the death of 
King Fuad, who was hostile toward Ibn Saud for a long time, after the latter's 
conquest of al-Hijaz, but the general environment was conducive to this development. 
The two Governments signed a Treaty of Friendship on 7 May 1936. ' According to 
this Treaty, the two states upgraded their diplomatic representation to legation level 
after a long period of Egyptian insistence on keeping it to only agency level (al- 
Musallam, N. D: 21; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 126). 
It is worth noting here that the Saudi-Egyptian dispute had several causes. Among 
these was the al-Mahmal issue during the Hajj of 1926; it took some time for the two 
sides to settle this problem. Also, there was a personal disagreement between King 
Abdulaziz and King Fuad, which of course, led to the dispute between the two states. 
This dispute between the two Kings was centred on their different views concerning 
the Caliphate. 2 King Fuad aspired to be Caliph for the entire Islamic World and to this 
end he called for an Islamic conference, which was held in Cairo in May 1926. Ibn 
Saud did not send his representative and the conference refused to appoint King Fuad 
as Caliph due to his strong relations with the British (Wahbah, 1960: 130-146; al- 
Tahiri, 1991: 405). 
The Treaty of 1936, however, ushered in a period of close Saudi-Egyptian relations 
and consolidated the joint policy of King Abdulaziz and Fuad's successor King 
Farooq. They exchanged official visits; King Farooq visited Saudi Arabia on 25 
January 1945, and King Abdulaziz visited Egypt the following month. Also, King 
Abdulaziz visited Egypt for the second time on 6 January 1946 for twelve days. 
During those visits and as a result of the Kings' good relationship, the two 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1, pp. 225-233; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/20061, despatch by Sir Miles Lampson, the British High Commissioner and Ambassador in 
Cairo, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 12 May 1936. 
2 American Archives, 890F. 404/9, despatch from Mr. Childs, the American Consul in Cairo, to the 
American Secretary of State, on 14 April 1936. 
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Governments adopted similar policies on several Arab issues during this period' (al- 
Zirikli, 1977b: 269-305; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 27). They worked together for the 
creation of the Arab League according to their shared vision of the need for the 
unification of the Arab World, 2 and to bring about the independence of Syria and 
Lebanon as sovereign states, free from the influence of the Hashemite House. 3 Some 
scholars have argued that the Governments in Riyadh and Cairo supported the 
majority of the people in Syria and Lebanon, as a result of collaboration against the 
strategies of the Baghdad-Amman Axis (al-Tahiri, 1991: 405-406; Harran, 1999: 414- 
417). 
There was a project for regional integration in Bilad al-Shaam, known as the Greater 
Syria, and also a plan for the integration of Iraq and Bilad al-Shaain, the region 
known as the Fertile Crescent, conceived by Nouri al-Sa'ed, the former Iraqi Prime 
Minister. This project was rejected by the Syrian nationalists. At the same time, King 
Abdulaziz saw that these projects and suggestions were likely to benefit the 
Hashemite House in Iraq and Jordan. He was also fearful that those kinds of narrow 
integrationist plans would only benefit individuals and personal interests rather than 
the Arab people as a whole, and that the plans, if realised, might constitute a real 
threat to his unified territories and the sovereignty of his country. 4 This increased 
King Abdulaziz's doubts concerning these proposals for regional integration (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1200-1207; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 190-193; Harran, 1999: 433-437). 
King Abdulaziz wished, through his Arab policy, to achieve all kinds of political, 
economic and cultural cooperation with the Arabs. 5 When the notion of Arab unity, 
or, more specifically of the Arab League, became clear, he included his 
recommendations in a message and sent it on 3 January 1945 to the General Arab 
' Public Record Office, FO 371/45542, copy of"Le Journal d' Egypt" dated I February 1945. 
2 This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/45237, despatch from Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador in Cairo, 
to the British Foreign Office on 23 March 1945. 
° This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 2 January 2004. 
5 Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
152 
Conference, which was organized in Alexandria in Egypt. He was concerned to 
establish an Arab organization to promote coordination and cooperation between its 
members, based on mutual respect and full acknowledgment of the sovereignty of all 
its member states. This view was shared and supported by the Egyptian Government, 
which worked to dispel Saudi reservations and persuaded the Saudi Government to 
sign the Charter of the Arab League' on 22 March 1945 ('Assah, 1971: 128-131; al- 
Zirikli, 1977: 1207-1209; al-Humoodi, 1998: 528-529; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 193- 
197; Harran, 1999: 437-441). 
Relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained warm until 1952, when the army 
took power in Egypt. The reason for this cooling of relations might have been the 
eagerness of the new Egyptian rulers to export their revolution to the other Arab 
countries. However, King Abdulaziz reacted to this upheaval with patience and 
calmness, believing that time would teach the young officers that relations between 
the two countries were a serious matter transcending personal differences and that 
they were based on mutual interests and inseparable religious and cultural bonds 
reflecting people-to-people rather than ruler-to-ruler ties (al-Tahiri, 1991: 406). 
During the Second World War, France promised to give Syria and Lebanon their 
independence, but it changed its policy and became more aggressive towards the 
Arabs, such as when the French Delegate-General, Jean Helleu, declared martial law, 
cancelled the Lebanese constitution and arrested the President together with most of 
the ministers and Members of Parliament in November 1943.2 King Abdulaziz 
protested against this action to the Governments of the USA, 3 Britain and France 
lhtto: //wNvw. vale. edu/lawweb/avalon/mideastlarablea . 
htm; http: /hvww. mugatcl. com/openshare/indexf. 
html; Public Record Office, FO 731/45237, despatch from Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador in 
Cairo, to the British Foreign Office on 23 March 1945. 
2httu: //home. iprimus. com. au/fidamelliem/ssnp/The%20battle%20for%20independence%20 in%20Leba 
non. htm; http: //www. stmaron. org/marhstl2. html. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/35162, report on the negotiations between Anthony Eden and Prince 
Faisal in London, dated 18 November 1943; Public Record Office, FO 371/40256, article on Prince 
Mansur's visit to Gaza in the "Palestine Post" 21 November 1943. 
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itself. Nevertheless, the savage French policy in Syria and Lebanon increased in 
intensity and became more brutal, exemplified by the bombing of some Syrian cities 
due to the augmentation of the Syrian rejection of the French Mandate. This led the 
King to increase his protests against the French actions to Britain and the United 
States of America, which finally prompted British military intervention with the 
support of America' (Harran, 1999: 412-414). 
The attitude of King Abdulaziz toward Syria and Lebanon was very supportive from 
the beginning. He worked to keep them from being swallowed by the Hashemite 
throne, but his main aim at this time was to help them achieve their independence 
from France and secure for their people the right to self-determination (al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 805-806; al-Tahiri, 1991: 410-411; al-Salloom, 1995: 297). His position on this 
matter was indicated by his alleged response when in 1939 France was said to have 
offered to appoint one of Ibn Saud's sons, apparently Prince Faisal, as King of Syria; 
he agreed only on condition that it would help to liberate Syria and that Syria would 
be given at least as much freedom as Iraq 2 (Wahbah, 1960: 49; Sa'ed, 1964: 299). 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thus worked through its relations with France, Britain 
and the United States for the freedom of Syria and Lebanon. 3 This was one of the 
important issues which King Abdulaziz discussed with President Roosevelt during 
their meeting on 14 February 1945 at Bitter Lakes (al-'Uqbi, 1984: 162; al-Zirikli, 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
2 This was stated by Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak, during my interview with him in Riyadh, on 17 
January 2004; Also, this was confirmed by Lateefah al-Salloom, in an interview with her in Riyadh on 
11 January 2004; Public Record Office, FO 371/23276, despatch from Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 15 April 1939; Public 
Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939; Public Record 
Office, FO 406/77, cipher telegram by Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, to Sir Reader Bullard, the 
British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, on 6 October 1939. 
s Public Record Office, FO 371/45616, cipher telegram from Rupert Stanley Jordan, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 9 February 1945. 
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1977a: 1178). After this meeting, the King met al-Quwwatli, the first President of 
independent Syria, the day before his meeting with Winston Churchill, the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, on 17 February 1945, in al-Fayyum in Egypt' (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1184). Also, during the UN's first conference held in 1945 in San 
Francisco, the King, through his representative Prince Faisal, demanded the 
independence of Syria and Lebanon. 2 This demand was a factor influencing the 
participant members to adopt the right to self-determination and independence for all 
the establishing members, and this led to the drafting of Article 78 of the UN Charter, 
which stated that "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have 
become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on 
respect for the principle of sovereign equality". 3 On 7 April 1946, the French forces 
evacuated Lebanon and Syria, and both became independent states (al-Tahiri, 
1991: 410; Harran, 1999: 414). 
The relations of King Abdulaziz with Syria and Lebanon continued through a new 
policy designed to maintain their sovereignties as republics against some nationalist 
movements and military coups which would have served the Hashemite house and 
British policy through unification with Iraq or Jordan. It was clear that in this period 
Syria became an arena for two contradictory policies. Ibn Saud's policy was opposed 
by those of the British and the Hashemite House, and it was put into practice by 
supporting the movement of Husni al-Za'eem in March 1949. This movement was 
eradicated by Sami al-Hinnawi's coup in August 1949. Al-Hinnawi's plan was to 
rekindle the hope of integration between Iraq and Bilad al-Shaam to form a unified 
Fertile Crescent, which led to a new confrontation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Both 
these states welcomed the coup of Adeeb al-Shishakli in December 1950 and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia implemented a new policy towards Syria by giving 
financial support amounting to six million dollars through the Trade Agreement of 
Public Record Office, FO 371/45542, despatch from Rupert Stanley Jordan, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office, on 10 February 1945. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
3 http: //www. vale. edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart. htm#art78. 
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1950' (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 284-287; Harran, 1999: 414-418). Indeed, this policy 
helped the new regime to survive until another coup took place in 1954, after the 
death of the King. 
It can be noticed that the Hashemite-Saudi relationship was the main concern of King 
Abdulaziz's Arab Policy. Relations with King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, however, 
were somewhat different from those with his brother King Faisal. It is true that in 
November 1925, Ibn Saud had signed the Treaty of Haddah with Trans-Jordan, but 
the disputes between them continued due to the hatred of King Abdullah for Ibn Saud 
(Lewis, 1933: 521-532; Wahbah, 1960: 129-130; al- Mareq, 1978,296). From 1930 to 
1932 the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan escalated, due to many 
cross-border tribal raids conducted by both sides, which led them finally to ask 
Britain to arbitrate between them. In addition, the attitude of King Abdullah toward 
King Abdulaziz became clearer when the former supported Ibn Rifadah during his 
revolt against Ibn Saud in 1932 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1367; al-Sabbagh, 1999: 162-163). 
However, as a result of the peaceful relations between Ibn Saud and the Hashemite 
throne in Iraq, relations with the other Hashemite house in Jordan improved after a 
long period of political disputes between King Abdulaziz and King Abdullah of 
Jordan. The two royal families adopted a new policy which culminated in the signing 
of an arbitration protocol and a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations 
on 27 July 1933,2 thus the protracted enmity between the two states ended in peace 
(Wahbah, 1960: 129; al-Sabbagh, 1999: 105-169). On 29 June 1948, King Abdullah 
visited King Abdulaziz in Riyadh. Both heads of state expressed their satisfaction 
with this visit, indicating to some observers that a new era of mutual trust, 
cooperation and coordination between the two states had begun. This was indeed the 
case, especially since this period saw the emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They 
both declared their strong support for the Arab League with regard to the Palestinian 
issue and various Arab affairs. Also, after that visit the two states exchanged 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 331-337. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 131-148. 
_ u"a-ta1 
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diplomatic representation. Moreover, King Talal, who succeeded his father King 
Abdullah after his assassination in July 1951, continued his good relations with Ibn 
Saud and visited Saudi Arabia in November 1951 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1367-1374). It 
seems probably that the two states felt the need for increased cooperation and mutual 
support due to the new threat to the Arabs in Palestine. 
5.2.2 Ibn Saud, the Arab National Liberation Movements and Colonial Powers 
Wahbah (1960: 171) called King Abdulaziz the father of the leaders of the struggle for 
Arab liberation and described Riyadh as their object of hope. Moreover, al-Mareq 
(1978: 272-286) noted that the leaders of the Arab political and military liberation 
movements turned to King Abdulaziz to support them in their resistance and indeed 
to save their lives when they were driven from their countries by the pressure of the 
colonial powers and found themselves refugees in Saudi Arabia. This was when most 
of the Arab countries were under foreign occupation, such as the French Mandates in 
Syria and Lebanon, and the French occupation of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the 
British Mandate in Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine, and the Italian occupation of 
Libya. Al-Mareq named many of the leaders and political revolutionaries from all 
over the Arab World who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and found support from King 
Abdulaziz. 
It is, however, important to investigate the reasons behind King Abdulaziz's attitude 
toward these leaders, since this was at a time when such an attitude would have 
brought about confrontation with powerful states such as France, Britain and Italy. 
Also, Saudi Arabia at that time faced the pressure of a shortage of economic 
resources, which forced King Abdulaziz to ask for a loan from Britain, France and the 
United States of America' (Williams, 1933: 250; Holden and Johns, 1981: 114-118). 
1 Public Record Office, 371/45523, despatch from Rupert Stanley Jordan, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 February 1945; American 
Archives, 890 F. 51/12, despatch from Mr. Fox, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to the American 
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However, his attitude and policy toward current Arab issues were shaped by many 
factors, among them was his strong feeling of responsibility as a Muslim and Arab 
leader (Wahbah, 1960: 171; al- Shuhail, 1987: 181). Piscatori (1983a: 33) argued that 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia acknowledged on various occasions that the first 
principle of its foreign policy was Islamic solidarity, and the second was Arab unity. 
Some writers have pointed out that Ibn Saud perceived his success to have derived 
from his faith in Islam and his determination to maintain and build on the Arab 
traditions of the region. It was a unique combination of faith and respect for traditions 
(Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 156-159). Ibn Turki (2003: 13) stated that "The governing 
regime in Saudi Arabia was based on Arabic traditions, and the political system in 
the Kingdom was not imported from Russia or America or any other state in the 
world". He also added that "The Saudi Political regime emerged from the reality of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its traditions and heritage. It is a truly local regime 
which could engage in development without losing its essential merits". 
It can be said, then, that one of the basic reasons behind the King's attitude toward the 
Arabs was his strong belief in the value of Islamic and good Arab traditions and his 
sense of responsibility as a role model for the Arabs. Al-Saud (1990: 88) stated that 
King Abdulaziz described himself to be an Arab man believing in Arab traditions and 
complying with them even before being a King, which required that he had to be a 
moral symbol for the Arab people. This helps to explain why he acted on many 
occasions in accordance with his Islamic belief and Arab traditions, although he knew 
that he would pay for his stance politically. This tradition entailed the protection of 
refugees, even non-Arabs and non-Muslims (Philby, 1955: 337). For example, he 
refused to hand over Rasheed al-Kailani to the British and Iraqi Governments when 
Secretary of State, on 1 August 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 51/13, despatch from Mr. Fox, the 
American Vice Consul in Aden, to the American Secretary of State, on 28 August 1933; American 
Archives, 890F. 51/14, despatch from Mr. Salter, in the American Consulate in Aden, to the American 
Secretary of State, on 14 November 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 0011/12, despatch from W. N. 
Walmsley Jr, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to the American Secretary of State, on 3 August 
1932. 
158 
he fled to Saudi Arabia in October 1945 after the suppression of his revolt against the 
British Mandate in Iraq in 1941, which led the British and Iraqis to issue a capital 
sentence against him' (Rida, 1950: 38-39; Philby, 1955: 337; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1213- 
1220; al-Saud, 1990: 87-90). 
Moreover, King Abdulaziz insistently refused to deliver one of the revolutionaries 
against the French Mandate to the French Government for execution. This refugee 
was Fawzi al-Qawugji, who later became the Chief of the Saudi Army (al-Mareq, 
1978: 274-286). Surprisingly, he forced the French to accept Rashad Fir'un, who had 
been one of the revolutionaries struggling against their rule, as the Saudi Ambassador 
in Paris. When the French Government insisted that another be appointed instead of 
Rashad, Ibn Saud answered that they must accept Rashad or the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia would not send any ambassador ( ibid: 48-52). It is worth noting here that 
most of his advisors and ambassadors were revolutionaries against the foreign 
occupying powers in their home states; most of them turned to King Abdulaziz for 
support, and he welcomed them and treated them as Saudis. 
Moreover, due to his respect for Arab customs, King Abdulaziz was willing to excuse 
those who acted in accordance with Arab traditions. For example, he quit asking the 
Iraqi Government to hand over 'Uqab Ibn 'Ijil, from the tribe of Shammar, who was 
one of his followers who had rebelled against him and sought asylum with his cousin, 
'Aqeel al-Yawar in Iraq. When al-Yawar asked Ibn Saud whether he would extradite 
Ibn 'Ijil, if he was in his position, this question was enough to persuade Ibn Saud to 
forget the issue and respect al-Yawar's attitude (al-Mareq, 1978: 13-22; al-Saud, 
1990: 84-87). 
However, King Abdulaziz's support for the Arabs was not limited to those who 
resorted to him for aid. Indeed, he had assisted all the Arab leaders who asked for his 
support while they were struggling for the independence of their countries all over the 
Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
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Arab world. This was confirmed by the opinion of Sharif Faisal, later King Faisal of 
Iraq, although ha was a rival of King Abdulaziz. When France occupied Syria and 
Lebanon under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Sharif Faisal led the Syrian resistance, 
but he was defeated in 1920. It has been alleged that he said to some of his followers 
"I will go to London to try to achieve Syrian independence; if I fail in my mission the 
only way for all of us is Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud is the only one who is able to unify the 
Arab countries and consolidate their independence" (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 736; Abu 
Zlam, 1984: 553). 
Moreover, Al-Mareq (1978: 278) cited al-Qawuqji, a fighter for Syrian independence, 
who said "King Abdulaziz's support was not restricted to the Syrian revolutionaries, 
but he supported all Arab fighters who fought for their freedom in Palestine, Iraq, al- 
Maghrib al-'Arabi and all the Arab countries". Al-Qawuqji also named some of those 
resistance fighters who obtained assistance from King Abdulaziz, such as Sultan 
Basha al-'Atrash, Prince 'Adil Arsalan, Nabeeh Bik al-'Adhmih, Mohammad 'Ali al- 
Shawwaf and 'Adil Bik al-'Adhmih. Furthermore, al-Salloom (1995: 290-291) has 
noted that Ibn Saud contacted the Arab movements in the Arab Maghrib through 
some of his counsellors, including Basheer al-Sa'dawi and Khalid al-Ghargani, who 
both secured Ibn Saud's assistance toward the independence of Libya from the Italian 
occupation. With regard to the Algerian struggle, Algerian leaders such as Basheer al- 
'Ibrahimi, Abdul Hameed Ibn Badees, al-Tayyib al-'Uqbi and Ma'ali al-Haj contacted 
Ibn Saud very early and obtained his sympathy and support for the cause of the 
liberation of Algeria from French colonialism. 
Also, the leaders of the Tunisian liberation movement contacted King Abdulaziz 
seeking his support for their guerrilla war against the French occupation. Al-Mareq 
(1978: 309-310) and al-Saud (1990: 139-141) remarked that Mohammad al-Masmudi 
revealed that he and Habib Bourgiba both met King Abdulaziz to explain their need 
for his assistance regarding the independence of Tunisia. When the King asked them 
what he could do for them, unfalteringly Bourgiba said that they were determined to 
fight their enemy and had come to ask for his support. Immediately, Ibn Saud 
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responded to their requests and provided them with money which they used for 
buying armaments to fight the French. 
It can be seen that one of the main reasons behind the King's policy toward the Arab 
liberation movements was his attitude toward colonialism in general. He did not 
accept the policies of the Mandate and occupation, and rejected all the agreements 
which emerged as a result of them from the beginning. Moreover, some historians 
have argued that Ibn Saud refused to join the League of Nations as result of its 
adoption of the Mandate policy, ' which led to the placing of most of the world's 
countries, among them most of the Arab states, under the control of the European 
Powers such as Britain, France, Spain and Italy2 (Al-Qaba', 1980: 36; al-Salloom, 
1995: 293). However, al-Sumari et al., (1999: 179-186) pointed out that the King, 
acting with uncharacteristic indecision, tried to join the League of Nations under the 
threat of the Italian activity in the southern part of the Red Sea. 3 But he finally 
decided not to join due to his old opinion regarding the policy of Mandate and also as 
a result of the repeated failures of the League of Nations to protect small countries, 
which became clear after Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936-1937. The British 
Commissioner in Jeddah, Sir Reader Bullard, stated that King Abdulaziz's desire to 
join the League of Nations ceased completely in 1937 (ibid: 186). 
However, King Abdulaziz's attitude toward the colonial powers, mainly Britain, 
France and Italy and their interests in the Middle East which might threaten his 
political independence, and his hatred of the Mandate policy, seem to have been the 
main reason underpinning his desire to develop wide international relations with 
those international powers which had no colonial interests in the Arab World. The 
early 1930s witnessed various Saudi diplomatic initiatives toward the United States of 
This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah, on 31 December 
2003. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/20843, yearly report by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 28 February 1937. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 406/77, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 29 January 1939. 
161 
America, the Soviet Union and Germany. These were put into effect through several 
official visits conducted by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal and also through 
commercial agreements and the granting of oil concessions (Piscatori, 1983: 34-36; 
Harran, 1999: 371). 
This new policy of King Abdulaziz succeeded in bringing in new competitors, which 
ended the monopolistic position of previous powers in the region, such as Britain and 
France. Moreover, the King's new foreign policy, in addition to maintaining his good 
relations with old friends, created a political balance and greater stability in the area. 
This helped him to secure the sovereignty of his state, which in turn allowed him to 
support the colonised Arab states in their struggle for independence. The King's 
foreign policy successfully enabled him to play a remarkable role in all matters of 
importance to the Arab World. In general, it can be said that by the end of his reign, 
King Abdulaziz had developed intimate relations with Egypt, the neighbouring states 
in the Gulf, the Yemenis in the south, the Hashemite thrones in the north, Syria and 
Lebanon, and with Arab liberation movements in North Africa. He sought a 
countervailing force in the Arab world which would bring about independence and 
unification. Also, he built strong relations with the international powers which 
exercised their political, economic or even military influence over the Arab World 
and used these relations for the benefit of all the Arabs. 
5.3 King Abdulaziz's Approach to Inter-Arab Relations: a 
Conclusion 
The Arab states' political, economical and territorial interests inevitably gave rise to 
competitions between them. However, the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry was remarkable 
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and centuries old; ' it started in the early years of the establishment of the first Saudi 
State (Niblock, 1982: 12; Vassiliev, 1998: 100-104). In the modem era, when Sharif 
Husain proclaimed himself the King of the Arabs and Caliph of Muslims, his action 
was rejected by Ibn Saud (Vassiliev, 1998: 261; Alangari, 1998: 128-141; Howarth, 
1964: 141). King Abdulaziz described the Hashemites as his political opponents. In 
his guidance to his son Prince Saud during his official visit to United States in 1947, 
he acknowledged that there were some political disputes with Britain due to its 
unfriendly policy of supporting the Hashemites and other political opponents against 
him (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 775). 
On several occasions the relationships between Saudi Arabia and some other Arab 
states deteriorated, such as that between King Abdulaziz and Salim al-Sabah, due to 
the personal hatred between them, which led to several military clashes. Kuwaiti- 
Saudi relations recovered after Salim's death because his successor Ahmad al-Jabir al- 
Sabah enjoyed a close friendship with Ibn Saud. Saudi-Egyptian relations were 
acrimonious during King Fuad's reign because he resented King Abdulaziz's conquest 
of al-Hijaz, and also because Ibn Saud refused to acknowledge him as Caliph. When 
Amin al-Rayhani asked King Abdulaziz about Arab unification, he frankly admitted 
"We know ourselves and we cannot accept the leadership of others" (Armstrong, 
1934: 231; al-Shuhail, 1987: 180). 
However, the personal hostility shown towards Ibn Saud by some of his neighbours, 
such as the Hashemites and King Fuad, became particularly clear when they both 
supported Ibn Rifadah's movement in northern Saudi Arabia, in 1932. This took place 
concurrently with Imam Yahia's support for the Idreesi in the south, which threatened 
Ibn Saud's sovereignty. This forced Ibn Saud to adopt a policy that might be 
described as pre-emptive self-defence, as when he supported Syria and Lebanon in 
their struggle to be independent states. Of course, his concern to secure the stability 
and sovereignty of his state was a major reason for his policy against the Hashemite 
'New York Post. Friday, 30 April 1948, "Ibn Saud's Star Wanes"; 
htti): //www. varchive. oriz/obs/480430. ht m. 
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ambitions of the Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent. Also, his belief in the Syrians' 
right to self-determination was an essential reason for his policy. This was 
demonstrated when he expressed his reaction to the French Government concerning 
the appointment of one of his sons as a monarch in Syria. 
It should be remembered here that King Abdulaziz's authority was threatened by 
several boundary disputes, such as his dispute with Kuwait in the early 1920s, the 
Saudi-Yemeni War in 1934 and the al-Buraimi dispute, which was with Britain. Some 
might ask if those could have been avoided. Unfortunately, in the absence of any 
Arab organisation, capable of mediating between them, such clashes were inevitable. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that King Abdulaziz was eager to establish the Arab 
League in 1945, which would be based on full respect for the sovereignty of its 
members, mutual support and co-operation. He strongly opposed intervention in the 
internal affairs of other Arab states and remained very committed to this policy. He 
stated that: "If any Arab state gave itself the right to intervene in the internal affairs 
of another Arab state during any emergence of any problem in that state, then many 
tribulations would follow" (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 806). 
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Chapter Six: King Abdulaziz and Islamic Affairs 
6.1 King Abdulaziz's Vision of the Islamic Identity of Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, the pattern of religious and political orientation has been in place 
since the alliance between Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab and Mohammad Ibn Saud 
in 1744. Over two hundred years of mutual support have wedded the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to Islam. This has been reinforced by the application of Islamic law and 
the promoting of the welfare of the Islamic state. Despite the extent and degree of the 
changes that characterise the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Islamic values 
have remained intact and have been central to Saudi political affairs. The 
symbiosis between political power and leadership, represented by the House of 
Saud, and the religion of Islam, represented by the 'Ulama, continues to this day 
in Saudi Arabia, providing a motivational nexus which has led to the 
consolidation of the legitimacy of the Saudi regime (al-Rayhani, 1988: 40-43; 
Kechichian, 1986: 53-57; Piscatori, 1983: 56-57; Dekmejian, 1994: 627). 
Some scholars argue that King Abdulaziz, while attempting to consolidate his 
authority when building the third Saudi state, found a conceptual framework 
which would be crucial for the establishment of his rule. He would be granted 
legitimacy as long as he championed the cause of the religious specialists, becom- 
ing the guardian of ritualistic Islam. His legitimacy sprang from the recognition 
and enforcement of Islamic law, a law above his authority and independent of his 
will. As long as he allowed himself to be governed by this law, the way it was 
interpreted by the 'Ulama of Islam, he would be able to rule. Such concepts of 
authority and power were crucial for promoting ambitious leadership (al-Rasheed, 
2002: 51). 
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The Islamic identity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is clearly recognisable in its 
policies regarding external affairs, as well as in the internal setting. King 
Abdulaziz himself announced that Islamic Law (Shari'ah) was the constitution 
of his state' (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 277). In point of fact, the importance of 
following the commands of Islam is something which most Saudis believe in. 
All their rules, attitudes and policies, including Saudi foreign policy, should 
emerge from an Islamic framework and be in accordance with Islamic 
instructions2 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 353-354; al-Muzayyan, 1997: 9; Van der 
Meulen, 1999: 143). Therefore, it can be said that the political affairs of the 
Saudis were and are based on the teachings of Islam. Kechichian (1986: 63) 
stated that from Turki Ibn Abdullah in 1843, who warned his governors that 
they should always remember that it was Islam which united the Arabian 
Peninsula and that they should adhere to its instructions, to the modern 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which embarked on an unprecedentedly rapid 
process of modernization, it is safe to state that Islam continues to affect politics 
in a similar fashion. 
In fact, this perspective is not exclusive to the Saudis, but is shared by most Muslims. 
Indeed, the political life of Muslims has been strongly influenced by Islam because 
most issues of significance such as personal faith, theological doctrine, cultural 
attitudes, and patterns of everyday behaviour inevitably shape Muslims' political 
values, since these matters are equally important parts of the Islamic faith as understood 
by its devotees. As a consequence, Islam underlies the politics of all Muslims, certainly 
including the Saudis, whether their political view are explicitly based on theological 
beliefs and ethical values, as in most cases, or, sometimes, on cultural and societal roles, 
or a combination of both (Humphreys, 1979: 2; Kechichian, 1986: 63). 
With regard to the Islamic identity of Saudi Arabian foreign policy, the monarchs of 
Saudi Arabia acknowledged, on various occasions, that the first principle of Saudi 
1 Al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, October, 1987, pp. 47. 
2 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 142,2 September 1927. 
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foreign policy was to support various Islamic issues and Islamic solidarity, and then 
Arab unity, as a second principle (Piscatori, 1983: 33). Nakhleh (1975: 51) stated that 
the defence of Islam was one of the important factors, on which Saudi foreign policy 
has been based. Furthermore, Piscatori (1983: 33) cited Sir John Wilton, as saying that 
Islam has been a longstanding feature of Saudi foreign policy. In fact, the Islamic 
identity of Saudi Arabia was adopted from the earliest years of King Abdulaziz's 
monarchy, and there can be no doubt that King Abdulaziz, as a person, was a very 
religious man (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 178-179). 
King Abdulaziz was a sincere adherent of the original Islamic guidance, as from an 
early age he understood it to be based on the pure instruction of Prophet Mohammad 
(Peace Be Upon Him). Most of the people of Najd, including the Al Saud family, 
followed the creed of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, which was renewed and propounded by 
Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab (Armstrong, 1934: 20-21; al-Mukhtar, 1957: 14; 
Holden and Johns, 1981: 21-22; Van der Meulen, 1999: 16). Consequently, King 
Abdulaziz was well known for the piety, faithfulness and strongly ethical behaviour, 
which sprang from his faith, and that marked his dealings with his state affairs 
(Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 178-179; Almana, 1980: 229-231; al-Muzayyan, 1997: 14; al- 
Rasheed, 2002: 62). 
King Abdulaziz's intense belief in Islam was emphasized by the British Political 
Agent in Kuwait, Captain William Shakespear, who was known as one of the first 
Westerners who came to know Ibn Saud and admired him. Shakespear perceptively 
grasped, as early as 1915, that Ibn Saud was animated by a deep veneration and an 
absolute respect for Islam, and was motivated by a single-minded desire to do his best 
for his people by obtaining stable peace and security for them (Piscatori, 1983: 33). 
Due to his strong belief, King Abdulaziz dedicated himself and his state to the 
preservation and propagation of pure Islam, as propounded by the great reformers, 
Mohammad Ion Saud and Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab (Holden and Johns, 1981: 
21-22; Van der Meulen, 1999: 143-144). 
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Some writers about King Abdulaziz went further, pointing out that Ibn Saud, 
strengthened by his trust in God, was inspired by a driving belief that he had been 
entrusted by God with a mission to unite his people into one nation, lead them back to 
the greatness of their Muslim ancestors and make the Word of God Supreme 
(Armstrong, 1934: 291-292; Van der Meulen, 1999: 15-16). Likewise, Benoist- 
Mechin (1965: 179) noted that Ibn Saud left the British Agent, Sir Percy Cox, in no 
doubt that he was a Muslim first and an Arab second, but he would always consider 
himself the servant of God. ' King Abdulaziz said, on several occasions that, "I am a 
preacher, calling people to the religion of Islam and for its propagation among the 
nations"2 (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 183; Harran, 1999: 447). 
Several historians have argued that King Abdulaziz undertook his long mission and 
re-established the dominion of his dynasty, impelled by his strong devotion to Islam 
and his desire to reunite the Arabian Peninsula in order to reform, renew and spread 
the Islamic doctrines according to Ibn Abdulwahhab's teachings; this was one of his 
key objectives (Armstrong, 1934: 291-292; Abu Zlam, 1984: 233; al-Shuhail, 1987: 
18; al-Salloom, 1995: 13; Van der Meulen, 1999: 15-16). Goldberg (1986: 185) cited 
Hamilton, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, who remarked "Ibn Saud was 
motivated by dreams of restoration of the ephemeral Wahhabi Empire. " 
However, other historians did not agree with this concept. Lewis (1933: 518), Helms 
(1981: 172), and Piscatori (1983b: 58-59) insisted that King Abdulaziz's main target 
was the re-establishment of his ancestors' dominion. They claimed that King 
Abdulaziz found that the best way to restore his family's power was to convince his 
followers that his main motivation was to establish an Islamic state. Therefore, he 
strengthened his links to a vision of a pure version of Islamic guidance by renewing 
Ibn Abdulwahhab's teachings and encouraging his people to adopt them. Piscatori 
(1983b: 59) claimed, "It is obvious that he and his successors have used Islam to 
legitimate their positions and policies, and indeed, their very right to govern as a 
'Umm al Aura Newspaper, Issue No. 434,16 April 1935. 
2 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 434,16 April 1935. 
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royal family. " According to this view, Ibn Saud used the religious beliefs of his 
followers to help him forge a weapon with which to realise his political ambitions 
(ibid: 58). 
This view was shared by other writers. Helms (1981: 172) seems to take the view that 
Ibn Saud was merely using Islam to further his own political ambitions: "Under 
Abdulaziz's instructions the Wahhabi movement continued to be encouraged and used 
as a political tool". Lewis (1933: 518) insisted that the guiding motive of King 
Abdulaziz's brilliant campaign was not to spread the light of Ibn Abdulwahhab's 
teachings, but to regain the land of his forefathers and the fact that his conquests 
led to the founding of the current Wahhabi Empire was but incidental. Lewis 
(ibid) also said it could be argued with force that the subsequent policy of Ibn 
Saud afforded strong corroboration of the contention that his motives were 
political rather than religious. Goldberg (1986: 185) quoted Keyes, who argued that 
"Ibn Saud was driven by a sense of patriotism, which with him is entirely dynastic". 
Shakespear, the British Agent in Kuwait wrote in 1915 that Ibn Saud was enthused, 
first, by intense patriotism for his country and then by a profound veneration for his 
religion (Piscatori, 1983: 33; Goldberg, 1986: 185). 
With regard to this debate, it can be said that, as a result of the old and continuing 
coalition between the religious-ideological (Ibn Abdulwahhab's teachings) and the 
political leadership (Al Saud dynasty), there was no real conflict between establishing 
the Saudi state, in order to reform and expand what was understood to be pure Islam, 
and adopting and practising what was considered as original Islam, and re- 
establishing the Saudi state. Thus, King Abdulaziz served his religion, his people and 
his state. Benoist-Mechin (1965: 179-180) argued that the religious and political 
actions of King Abdulaziz were combined together to the degree that the King 
himself could not distinguish between them. ' He added that the expansion of Ibn 
Saud's authority and the propagation of his religion were one thing and each of them 
1 Lateefah al-Salloom, in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004, endorsed this idea. 
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supported the other. ' This was the source of King Abdulaziz's actual power (ibid: 
180). 
It is evident that, the Islamic image of King Abdulaziz and his state was indisputable. 
Therefore, in his foreign policy, especially with non-Muslim countries, King 
Abdulaziz always acted according to his Islamic beliefs and also because he wished 
to satisfy the devout and conservative'Ulama and Ikhwan. As a Muslim, he felt it was 
his duty not to break his treaties and promises. Thus he insisted on staying neutral 
during the First World War, in order to keep the balance between his two treaties with 
the Turks and the British. Despite the Treaty of Darin in 1915, which stated that he 
agreed to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any 
foreign nation or power, he was never influenced in his policies by any motive so 
nebulous as loyalty to Britain; his loyalty was to himself, his creed and his people 
(Howarth, 1964: 199; Van der Meulen, 1999: 123). 
King Abdulaziz attempted to strengthen and consolidate his Islamic identity, 
especially after he conquered the Two Holy Cities of Makkah and al-Madinah, by 
convening the Muslim World Conference, which was held in Makkah in 1926, and 
announcing that he would guarantee the neutrality and inviolability of the Holy Places 
in al-Hijaz. He also stated that he would not accept the presence of any foreign 
powers on his territories. By doing so, King Abdulaziz attempted to secure 
international Islamic approval of his full control of al-Hijaz. Moreover, he took 
advantage of his new position to maintain his Islamic stance and eliminate the 
restrictions of the Darin Treaty. He also sought, as far as he could, to dictate the terms 
of the new Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 1927, which, unlike the old treaty, 
acknowledged the complete and absolute independence of King Abdulaziz's 
dominions, and thus made clear that he was not the subordinate of an "infidel" power 
in the eyes of his own conservative followers, or in the eyes of Muslims around the 
world (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 177-191; Piscatori, 1986: 70-71). 
1 Lateefah al-Salloom, in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 January 2004, endorsed this idea. 
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As a result of Ibn Saud's successful foreign policy, in addition to his strong 
commitment to the principles of Islam, the scholars of Najd (al-'Ulama) confirmed, 
during the great assembly in 1928 in Riyadh, which discussed Ibn Saud's dispute with 
rebellious Ikhwan, that they had never observed Ibn Saud display any weakness or 
indifference in his support for Islam. They also swore by God that they had never 
seen him commit any deed contrary to the rules of Islam, and this consolidated his 
legitimacy among his followers and most of the world's Muslims. This trust enabled 
him to act with more freedom and helped him to overcome many problems in both 
the internal and external arenas (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 483; al-Zamil, 1972: 255). 
Some writers have claimed that there was a shift in the foreign policy of the modem 
Saudi state as a result of the conquest of al-Hijaz. They alleged that, in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, a change, if not a reversal, took place in King Abdulaziz's attitude 
towards Ibn Abdulwahhab's teachings, when it became apparent that the King was no 
longer expanding territorially, one of the factors that caused the dispute with the 
Ikhwan. This new perception was reflected in the gradual disappearance of the term 
"Wahhabi" and its replacement by "Saudi" to designate the state, its ruler and its 
policies, and was confirmed by the new name of the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", 
introduced in 19321 (Goldberg, 1986: 3 and 185-186; Van der Meulen, 1999: 144- 
145). 
However, Goldberg (1986: 188) among others, admitted that the modem Saudi state 
remained, in both theory and practice, officially dedicated to the preservation of a 
"pure" Islam as propounded by Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab. But the propaga- 
tion of Ibn Abdulwahhab's instruction was another matter. Not only was Saudi 
Arabia no longer dedicated, in practice, to the propagation of the Wahhabi 
doctrine but even the theory was restrained in the twentieth century (ibid). To some 
extent, this was the case. King Abdulaziz's attitude towards Ibn Abdulwahhab's 
teachings was clear from the outset. When he received the 'Ulama of al-Hijaz in 
1 This was completely rejected by Lateefah al-Salloom in an interview with her in Riyadh on 11 
January 2004. 
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1924, he declared that he would abide by the judgments of Ibn Abdulwahhab and 
others as long as they were demonstrably in accordance with the Koran and the 
guidance of the Prophet's Sunnah' (al-Zamil, 1972: 152; al-Zirikli, 1977b: 216; al- 
Rayhani, 1988: 374-375; al-Azmeh, 1993: 153-154). 
Van der Meulen (1999: 15) strongly argued that although King Abdulaziz had 
accomplished many reforms for his people in Arabia, his new foreign policy missed 
the opportunity to accomplish more in the Islamic arena. Through this policy, the 
King secured his newly-emerging state, but missed the chance to present a Saudi- 
Islamic solution to the problems besetting Muslims in the region (ibid: 145). In 
addition, Van der Meulen (1999: 19) claimed that King Abdulaziz restricted his 
mission to reforming the Arabian Peninsula only; he was not ambitious to reform 
outside its borders or to be a reformer for the entire Islamic world, which influenced 
King Abdulaziz's future more than once. In fact, attaining the objective of reforming 
the Islamic World, however, was beyond the ability of King Abdulaziz and his 
followers in the modern era. 2 
A Wahhabi state along the lines of the first two Saudi states could not have 
survived for long in modern times. King Abdulaziz's new policy was prompted 
by the trauma of the difficult lesson of the destruction of the former Saudi states. He 
understood that he could not enjoy complete freedom of action. The change that Ibn 
Saud undertook was a transformation in foreign policy. With uncontrolled 
expansion as its foundation, and without cohesive force, such a state was bound 
to be checked and even crushed. Ibn Saud had the insight to grasp this reality 
and thus secure the survival of the state. He believed that if his actions affected the 
interests of the powers around him, this might cause them to react against him and 
protect what they perceived as important interests (Goldberg, 1986: 171 and 188; 
Harran, 1999: 366-367). 
1 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 142,2 September 1927, and, Issue No. 1132,8 November 
1946; Al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, October, 1987, pp. 48. 
2 This view, which advocated by the present author, was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my 
interview with him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003. 
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King Abdulaziz's policy led to his state being secured, which enabled him to establish 
a strong position for himself in the international arena. From this strong position, with 
his firm commitment to Islam, King Abdulaziz was able to serve Muslim affairs 
better. It was clear that the King's policy towards Islamic affairs was based on his 
strong belief in the influence of Islam in the life of all Muslims. Thus, from the early 
years of the conquest of al-Hijaz, he dedicated himself and his state to this new 
mission. In addition, he declared that the pilgrimage would continue unhindered, 
promising free access to the Holy Places to all Muslims of all schools and 
creeds, and vowing to guarantee the security of the Holy Places and the 
pilgrimage. Thus, Ibn Saud endeavoured to find an international Islamic 
dimension for his state and his control of the Holy Places of Islam, as well as to 
prove that freedom and security were prevailing in those sacred places (Benoist- 
Mechin, 1965: 177-191; Goldberg, 1986: 181; Harb, 1991: 83). 
Furthermore, he was concerned with all Islamic affairs, and in particular the 
Palestinian issue, as was discussed in the previous chapter. His Islamic policy 
was based on the importance of strengthening the Muslims' belief and 
confidence in their God. Al-Ghulami (1980: 319) and Sharaf and Sha'ban 
(1983: 277) noted that King Abdulaziz said that if the Muslims could only use 
their power effectively, their enemies would not be able to use a power like it. 
This power is the Muslims' faith and trust in God. ' Also, the King believed that 
power lay in the influence of the unification of Islamic efforts and cooperation 
between all the Muslim states, associations and organizations. '` He was 
convinced that no power could threaten the Muslims if they cooperated and 
supported each other3 (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 277). 
King Abdulaziz acknowledged that he, his family and his people were "Soldiers 
among the soldiers of God"; working for the welfare of all Muslims all over the 
Al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, October, 1987, pp. 47. 
2 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 838,9 January 1941, Issue No. 1132,8 November 1946, and, 
Issue No. 1281,14 October 1949. 
3 Al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, October, 1987, pp. 47. 
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world' (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 277). Moreover, al-Zirikli (1977b: 250) noted 
that the King declared that all he called for was that Muslims should speak in 
one voice and act in harmony: then they would be able to accomplish their 
duties towards their God and their countries. He added that he was supplicating 
God to awaken the Muslims and facilitate their cooperation and support for each 
other. King Abdulaziz stated that, "The most valuable thing to him was the unification 
of the Word of the Muslims" (al-Subait et al., 1990: 465). Furthermore, King 
Abdulaziz said that he would be ready to sacrifice himself and his family for the 
objective of Muslims' unity (al-Zirikli, 1977b: 216; Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 183). 
He strongly believed that the Muslims, owing to their differing views, were more 
harmful to themselves than the foreign powers could ever be, and therefore he 
assumed that if they could only unite, they would stop harming themselves2 (Sharaf 
and Sha'ban, 1983: 392; Bullah, 1984: 7-8). 
The Islamic attitude of King Abdulaziz was based on his strong sense of 
responsibility toward all Muslims around the world. He did not restrict his concern to 
the Islamic states or the countries in which the Muslim communities formed the 
majority, but heeded the call of Islamic minorities everywhere. He stated that he 
believed that he should respect the rights of the foreign states with which he dealt. He 
felt that he should maintain his commitments to the treaties with them and guarantee 
the security of their citizens in his state. Consequently, he also had rights which 
should be acknowledged by the international community. He was the protector of the 
Sacred Places, opening them for the pilgrims and securing their visitors from over the 
world, and so among these rights, he believed, was that each state should assist its 
Muslim citizens to visit the Holy Places. Moreover, he confirmed that there was a 
right which was more important to him; this right was that he had, in these distant 
' This was also confirmed by His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz on the Saudi 
TV channel, during his meeting with the members of the Muslim World League on 21 September 
2004; http: //www. alwataii. com. sa/daily/2004-09-22/first page/first page06. htm; Al-Faisal Magazine, 
Issue No. 128, October, 1987, pp. 47. 
2 'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 229,16 May 1929. 
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countries, Muslim brothers, who should be treated satisfactorily and whose rights 
should be maintained' (Sharaf and Sha'ban, 1983: 187). 
6.2 Islam and King Abdulaziz's Worldview 
It is logical that each state should, in its foreign policy, work to maintain and 
reinforce its interests through its international relations. However, in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, when there was a disparity between Islam and its interests, Islam would be 
given the priority. King Abdulaziz stated that he would reject every thing in the life of 
this world that was not in accordance with Islam2 (al-Duraib, 1985: 41). Saudi policy 
towards the Soviet bloc was an example of this attitude. The Soviet Union was the 
first country to officially recognise Ibn Saud as the new King of al-Hijaz and Sultan 
of Najd and Its Dependencies, which it did in February 1926 (al-Rayhani, 1988: 429; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 265; al-Tahiri, 1999: 482). Moreover, during the Islamic Conference 
in 1926, the Chairman of the Central Spiritual Directorate of the Soviet Muslims, 
Mufti Rizauddin Sahreddinov, recognised King Abdulaziz as the Custodian of the 
Holy Places (Vassiliev, 1998: 266). 
The Saudi-Soviet relationship improved for many reasons; among them was the 
aspiration of the Saudi Government not only to secure its position in the Islamic 
world but also to establish further international relations with the powerful states 
regardless of their religion or ideological persuasion, obtain recognition of its 
status and broaden the range of its foreign relations. To this end, King 
Abdulaziz established diplomatic relations even with the Communist and 
atheist Soviet Union (Goldberg, 1986: 181). It should be noted, however, that the 
'Umm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 27,29 January 1926; al-Faisal Magazine, Issue No. 128, 
October, 1987, pp. 47. 
2iUmm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 142,2 September 1927, Issue No. 295,1 August 1930, and Issue 
No. 389,27 May 1932. 
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USSR was the first to take the initiative when it sent a letter to Ibn Saud offering its 
recognition of him as King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies in 
February 1926 (Vassiliev, 1998: 265). 
Another important reason for developing Saudi-Soviet relations was the British policy 
in the Middle East, especially in Palestine, and the policy of the other colonial powers 
in the region. King Abdulaziz's attitude towards the colonial powers and their 
interests in the Middle East, which might threaten his political independence, seems 
to have been the main reason underlying his desire to develop wide-ranging 
international relations with these powers including the USSR. This was put into effect 
with official visits conducted by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal, to various 
foreign countries including the Soviet Union in 1932 (Piscatori, 1983: 36; Harran, 
1999: 371-372). 
Additionally, the Soviet Union was eager to expand its influence in the Middle East 
for commercial purposes, and to realise its old dream of reaching the warm waters of 
the South (Philby, 1955: 334; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276). The USSR tried hard to 
secure commercial agreements with the Middle Eastern countries. They tried to 
conclude a commercial treaty with Ibn Saud but he was not enthusiastic. As a result, 
relations between them gradually declined until 1938, when the Soviet Government 
withdrew its diplomatic legation from Jeddah (Philby, 1955: 334; Piscatori, 1983: 
36; al-Tahiri, 1999: 479-483). However, it is important that this study analyse the 
historical background of these relations in order to discover why they were 
discontinued for more than fifty years until they resumed in 1990, and to find out 
whether or not the Islamic attitude of the Saudi state, which was a main pillar of its 
foreign policy, played an important part. 
Al-Tahiri (1991: 390) believed that Communism was an ideology which worked 
against Islamic solidarity, as the adherents of Islam would put an end to Communism 
since it was explicitly atheist. In addition, the Communist countries feared the 
influence of Islamic solidarity over the millions of Muslims who were in subjection 
during the Communist era. The Kremlin's attitude to Islam became clear in the late 
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1930s, through the Soviet treatment of the Muslim minority in the USSR and also the 
propagation of Communist beliefs in the region (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276-277; al- 
Tahiri, 1991: 480-484; Harran, 1999: 371). Communism thus aroused the strong 
antipathy of King Abdulaziz. The King made his attitude toward the atheists clear on 
many occasions and reiterated his hatred of atheist ideology. ' Philby (1955: 335-336) 
pointed out that Ibn Saud made no secrets of his distaste for any dealings with a state 
which publicly professed its hostility to all religions and pursued a policy of 
persecution and repression. 
In fact, the policy of the Saudi Government against Communism was similar to its 
policy towards Zionism. This was due to King Abdulaziz's belief that there was a 
strong link between Communism and Zionism. As a result, the Saudi policy towards 
both Communism, represented by the Soviet Union, and Zionism, represented by 
Israel, remained firmly unchangeable due to their enmity to Islam. This was clearly 
and officially stated by King Abdulaziz when he sent Crown Prince Saud to the U. S. 
in 1947. King Abdulaziz provided his son with general guidance, including his policy 
towards Communism and Zionism. He said that "The USSR was considered an 
'indirect threat' to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but we believe that it is a very 
dangerous threat for three reasons; because of the Communist ideology itself, we 
also believe in the firm relation between Communism and Zionism, and because of 
the Orthodox Church's Russian propaganda. We oppose Zionism and Communism 
and hold that the Orthodox Church should not be permitted to become a tool of 
Russian propaganda in the Arab countries" (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 776; Vassiliev, 1998: 
342). 
Nevertheless, some writers have given different explanations for the severing of the 
Saudi-Soviet relations. Piscatori (1983: 36-37) claimed that the Soviets had declared 
that withdrawing their legations from Saudi Arabia was meant to show their displeasure at 
the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Treaty in 1938, but it was more probably due first 
to the fact that the legation had very little work to do in Jeddah and secondly, to the 
1 'Umm al-Aura Newspaper, Issue No. 389,27 May 1932. 
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Soviet policy at that time of reducing its representation abroad, which had already led 
to the closure of consulates in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. At any rate, the 
decision to withdraw the Soviet legation from Jeddah was taken by the Soviets and had 
nothing to do with Saudi antipathy to Communism (Ibid). On the other hand, some 
writers argued that Saudi-Soviet relations were terminated because of the atheist 
ideology of the Soviets and their eagerness to export their ideology throughout the 
world, in addition to economic and commercial difficulties (Harran, 1999: 371-372). 
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union tried to resume its diplomatic relations 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi Government did not desire to do so, 
due to the Soviet Communist ideology (al-Tahiri, 1991: 479). In the mid-1940s, the 
American influence in the Middle East grew and the U. S. worked to find allies to 
counteract the Communist influence in the region. Thus the USSR considered this a 
real threat, and it was the main reason behind the Soviet attempts to expand their 
influence in the area by looking for allies among the Arab countries (Benoist-Mechin, 
1965: 275-277; al-Tahiri, 1991: 485). Any kind of alliance with any of the foreign 
powers was strongly rejected by most of Arab countries (al-Tahiri, 1991: 485). 
Indeed, some of Arab countries, headed by Saudi Arabia, did not see any difference 
between the threat of the Soviet Union and the Israeli threat, as they had got to know 
of the USSR's ambitions in the region (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276-277; Piscatori, 
1983: 38). Of course, this resulted from the Soviet propaganda against the 
conservative Arab regimes and its support of Communist and radical movements in 
the Arab countries. 
Actually, the Soviet Union was presented with a good opportunity as a result of the 
Saudi-British dispute over al-Buraimi in the early 1950s. The USSR tried to take 
advantage of this dispute in order to restart Soviet-Saudi relations through its offer of 
full support to the Saudis, in addition to furnishing them with the weapons they 
needed; the Saudi Government, however, did not accept (al-Tahiri, 1991: 485). The 
policy of Saudi Arabia towards the USSR did not change until the Soviets abandoned 
the Communist ideology in 1990. Nakhleh (1975: 51) maintained that the staunch 
opposition to Communism was one of the most important factors influencing Saudi 
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foreign policy. The Saudi Government justified its policy of not establishing 
international relations with the Communist bloc countries by stating that Saudi Arabia 
would be ready to reciprocate diplomatic representation with them if they 
acknowledged the existence of God (al-Tahiri, 1991: 480). Al-Tahiri (ibid) insisted 
that this was the main reason for the rejection by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 
normal international relations with the Soviet Union and the entire Communist bloc. 
6.3 King Abdulaziz's Foreign Policy toward the Islamic States 
During the King's reign, most of the Islamic countries were controlled directly or 
indirectly by foreign powers, mainly Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union and 
Holland. The foreign policies and international relations of most of the Islamic states 
at that time were therefore governed by those foreign powers. Consequently, in order 
to establish his relationships with other Islamic societies and states, King Abdulaziz 
was compelled to deal with the colonial powers which controlled those countries (al- 
Shuhail, 1987: 175-176; al-Saud, 1990: 64; Harran, 1999: 443). However, there were 
some independent non-Arab Muslim states, such as Turkey, Iran (Persia), 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia. Some of them, such as Pakistan and Indonesia, 
gained their independence in the latter years of King Abdulaziz's reign (Harran, 1999: 
453). 
In general, most of the Islamic states acknowledged the spiritual and cultural unity of 
the faith, while maintaining the reality of territorial divisions. Thus, their relations 
were based on the principles of respect for sovereignty, the independence and 
territorial integrity of each member state, and the abstention from the threat of use of 
force against the territorial integrity, national unity or political independence of any 
member state. ' In general, all the Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, insisted that 
each refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the others and respect the 
I http: //www. muaatel eom/opgmhare/indexf html. 
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inviolability of common frontiers. They all commonly shared the emotive factor of 
Islamic sympathy and solidarity between their peoples (Piscatori, 1986: 73; Harran, 
1999: 449-450) 
Turkey was an independent Muslim state, and its official relations with Saudi Arabia 
started when Ibn Saud entered al-Hijaz and united it under his authority, and the 
Hijazi people called him their King. The Republic of Turkey was one of the first 
countries to recognise Ibn Saud as the King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and Its 
Dependencies in early 1926 (Philby, 1930: 325; al-Rayhani, 1988: 427: 429; Kostiner, 
1993: 68-70). From that time, the representative of Republic of Turkey was resident 
in Jeddah; his work mainly consisted of supervising and taking care of the Turkish 
pilgrims' affairs. On 3 August 1929, the Government of the Kingdom of al-Hijaz and 
Najd and Its Dependencies, represented by Fuad Hamzah, signed a Friendship 
Agreement with Government of the Republic of Turkey, represented by Abdulghani 
Sinny. In this agreement, both countries recognised the full sovereignty of each other 
and agreed to establish their political relations according to international law, (al- 
Salloom, 1995: 244-245; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 127). 
Turkish-Saudi relations were at their lowest ebb during the time of Mustafa Kamal 
(Ataturk) due to the attitude of the Turkish Government towards Islam. The decline of 
Saudi-Turkish relations was a good illustration of King Abdulaziz's Islamic policy. 
The Turkish Government, under Ataturk, was known for its unyielding attitude 
towards the religion of Islam (Philby, 1930: 297). At the same time, Ibn Saud was 
well known for his hatred of dealing with any government which publicly professed 
its hostility to any religion at all, and in his view the secular Turkish Government 
should be regarded as a persecutor of Muslims (Philby, 1955: 335-336). However, 
after the death of Ataturk in 1938, Saudi-Turkish relations started to improve to the 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 54-58; Public Record Office, FO 
371/15292, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Arthur 
Henderson, the British Foreign Secretary, on 30 December 1930. 
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point of a normal friendly Islamic relationship, as was the case with the other Islamic 
states. 
Saudi-Iranian relations started in a different way. When the Ikhwan entered Makkah 
and al-Madinah in 1924-1925, the fanatics among them demolished all the tombs and 
the historical places which had been regarded as shrines. These actions produced a 
thrill of indignation all over the Islamic world, including Iran. The Iranian 
Government dispatched a delegate for the purpose of ascertaining what had actually 
taken place and the probable intentions of Ibn Saud. Consequently, the Iranian 
Government withheld its recognition of Ibn Saud, and discouraged Iranians from 
undertaking the pilgrimage, until 1929 (Philby, 1955: 316-317). 
In 1927, the dispute with Iran was exacerbated as a result of King Abdulaziz's 
undertaking in the Treaty of Jeddah to refrain from all aggression against, or 
interference in the affairs of the Gulf States, including Bahrain as a protectorate of 
Britain. The attitude of Ibn Saud was very supportive toward Bahrain against Iranian 
claims and Iran disagreed with the Treaty of Jeddah, for this treaty implicitly 
recognised the independence of Bahrain) Iran saw this would put a stop to its 
ambitions in Bahrain and protested to the League of Nations during 1927-1934, 
claiming sovereignty over Bahrain, which was subsequently rejected. In 1948-1949, 
Iran escalated its campaign and claimed sovereignty over Bahrain, which was not 
accepted by Ibn Saud and this hindered Saudi-Iranian relations for a long time 
(Qasim, 1973: 227-237; al-Baharna, 1968: 167-195). 
Nevertheless, in 1929, Habibullah Huwaida, the Iranian Consul in Syria, visited al- 
Hijaz, on an official mission on behalf of his Government to settle all the problems 
between the two Governments and negotiate a treaty. Also, in the same year, King 
Abdulaziz sent an official delegate to Tehran, which led to Irani's formal recognition 
of the Ibn Saud Government, and Huwaida was nominated to take charge of the 
1 India Office, R/15/2/138, despatch from Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Hufhaniz Khan, the Deputy Persian Plenipotentiary Minister in London, on 18 January 1928. 
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Iranian Legation at Jeddah to mark the resumption of diplomatic relations. 
Consequently, an Agreement of Friendship was signed in August of that year by 
Abdullah al-Fadhil and Mohammad al-Rawwaf, representing the Saudi Government 
and Mahdi Qali, representing Iran' (al-Salloom, 1995: 245; Harran, 1999: 456-457). 
Afghanistan was also an independent Islamic state, but at first Saudi-Afghani 
relations remained very basic and were restricted to pilgrims' affairs. Then, in 1929 
the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan asked Ibn Saud to recognise King Nadir Shah 
(al-Sumari et al., 1999: 162). In 1932, the Government of Saudi Arabia and the 
Kingdom of Afghanistan exchanged mutual recognition and signed an Agreement of 
Friendship. This was concluded in Jeddah by the Saudi representative, Yusuf 
Yasseen, and the representative of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Khan. 
The agreement was similar to those with Turkey and Iran. However, this agreement 
was not ratified by the two Monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan until 17 
March 19342 (Harran, 1999: 457). 
Ibn Saud's relationship with the Indian Muslims started very early, as they had shown 
concern with al-Hijaz issues since 1924. Also, King Abdulaziz was very sympathetic 
towards their demand for an independent state free from British colonialism and also 
from the influence of the Hindus. In 1947, when the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
achieved its independence, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first states to 
recognise it. Also, King Abdulaziz was very supportive of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan regarding the issue of Kashmir, which was discussed in the United Nations 
in 1948 (Harran, 1999: 458-459). On 25 November 1951, the Saudi Foreign Minister, 
Prince Faisal, and Hajj Abdulsattar Sitt, the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, signed an Islamic Friendship Agreement3 
(ibid: 459). 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 44-47. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951, pp: 149-151; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/19019, yearly report by Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir 
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 18 May 1935. 
3 iUmm al-Oura Newspaper, Issue No. 1406,17 April 1953. 
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Indonesia was another Islamic state which had official relations with Saudi Arabia 
during King Abdulaziz's reign. As soon as the Indonesian nationalists announced 
their independent republic after the evacuation of the Japanese armies at the end of 
World War Two, Ibn Saud recognised their independence. The Indonesians initiated a 
new phase of resistance against Holland, which did not accept the independence of its 
former colony. After several years of military and political struggles, the Security 
Council recommended that Holland declare the independence of Indonesia, which 
took place in December 1949 (Kushman, 1958: 182-183). King Abdulaziz's policy 
towards the Indonesians during their struggle for freedom was one of complete 
support. ' Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first states to 
recognise the independent state of Indonesia and the two states exchanged diplomatic 
representatives immediately (al-Sumari et al., 1999: 178; Harran, 1999: 460-461). 
' 'Umm al-Oura Newsppper, Issue No. 1119,10 October 1946. 
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Chapter Seven: King Abdulaziz's Relations with Britain 
Several major issues were involved in Saudi-British relations from the Treaty of 
Jeddah in 1927 until King Abdulaziz's death in 1953. We shall discuss these issues 
below and examine their impact on the relations between both sides. 
7.1 The Ikhwan Rebellion 
On 20 May 1927, a decisive step for Ibn Saud's policy of international relations was 
taken when the Treaty of Jeddah was signed with Britain. ' This gave Ibn Saud 
confirmation of the content of the previous treaties, Haddah and Bahrah in 1925, but, 
above all, explicitly recognised his new status as an absolute, independent and 
sovereign monarch over his new state and also cancelled the impact of the Treaty of 
Darin of 1915, which implied the protection of Britain over him (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 
298; Mcloughlin, 1993: 87; al-Saud, 2001: 113-125). Indeed, the Treaty of Jeddah 
arranged and improved relations between the two countries and eliminated all reasons 
for previous disputes. It is not too much to say that the Treaty of Jeddah has, ever 
since that day, provided a firm foundation for friendship between the two nations, 
which has grown from strength to strength to the great advantage of both (Philby, 
1948: 262). 
This progress of Saudi-British relations, which led to the Treaty of Jeddah, was soon 
tested by a particularly severe crisis, which was to last for two years. The crisis was 
ignited by the British policy which encouraged the establishing of castles and forts as 
'Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 33-43; UP&S/10/1166, copy of the 
Treaty of Jeddah between Ibn Saud and Sir G. Clayton, dated 20 May 1927. 
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new guard-posts across the Iraqi-Saudi border. This policy led to clashes between the 
Ikhwan and Iraqi desert patrols which were later commanded by Major I. B. Glubb 
and were supported by the British armoured cars and aeroplanes that pursued the 
Ikhwan to Najd. Ibn Saud protested to the British Government against these attacks. 
The attacks exacerbated the Ikhwan's opposition to Ibn Saud, who ordered the two 
major leaders of the Ikhwan, Faisal al-Dawish and Sultan Ibn Bijad, to withdraw from 
the border zone and leave the matter for him to settle by diplomacy. They refused and 
opposed his agreements with Britain and its allies in Iraq and Trans-Jordan. They 
insisted on continuing their Jihad against the infidels, on the one hand, and to render 
the agreements null and void, on the other, by attacking the borders of Iraq and Trans- 
Jordan (Williams, 1933: 214-220; Philby, 1948: 263-264). 
Being aware of the terms of the Treaty of Jeddah, lbn Saud saw that he must act as a 
strong authority representing a state which respected and recognised its 
responsibilities in the international arena. However, his statesmanlike attitude was 
rejected by the rebellious Ikhwan, who disobeyed him. The Battle of al-Sibalah came 
about mainly because the Ikhwan were determined to act in accordance with their 
beliefs, and also due to the absolute refusal of Ibn Saud to permit his authority to be 
challenged on any account whatever (Philby, 1948: 264). Also, it can be said that, in 
accordance with the second article of the Treaty of Jeddah, in addition to the other 
Saudi-British treaties, especially those of Bahrah and Haddah, the British authorities 
co-operated with King Abdulaziz, to some extent, in the suppression of this 
movement. The British authorities in the Gulf nevertheless gave the rebels the right of 
asylum, which in Ibn Saud's view they ought not to have done. Ibn Saud insisted, 
through long negotiations with Britain, that the rebellious leaders should be handed 
over to him. Due to their commitments in those treaties, the British handed over al- 
Dawish, Nayif Ibn Hithlain and In Lami to Ibn Saud in Khabari Wadha in 1930, 
after he had promised to spare their lives. These results were good indicators of the 
success of the Treaty of Jeddah (Dickson, 2002: 336-345; Almana, 1980: 134-139; 
Helms, 1981: 259-271). 
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It is worth mentioning here that one important result of the Treaty of Jeddah was the 
agreement of the British Government to sell King Abdulaziz the weapons he needed 
for the protection of his state and also to allow him to import them from any other 
state. ' In spite of this fact, and also the fact that King Abdulaziz acted militarily 
against the rebellious Ikhwan and maintained his treaty commitment by not 
threatening the British protectorates, when he was forced to request weapons to 
suppress the revolt, his request was referred to a conference held in India in 1929. 
The conference, after a long delay, agreed to sell him weapons and ammunition at a 
cost of £20,958. This became a subject of slander in the London press, which stated 
that Ibn Saud was in debt to Britain for this amount, and the British Treasury 
Administration was concerned because no guarantees of settlement had been 
produced. Ibn Saud quickly paid the total amount to avoid open defamation (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 298-299). 
7.2 Saudi Diplomatic Crisis with the British Ambassador 
Saudi-British relations remained good and Britain upgraded its diplomatic 
representation in Jeddah from consulate to embassy level and appointed Sir Andrew 
Ryan Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1930 (Philby, 1952: 
123; Wahbah, 1960: 95; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 101). However, Wahbah noted that the 
British Ambassador did not promote good relations as he was supposed to do and 
made several mistakes that could have affected Saudi-British relations. In 1932, he 
was the cause of a serious crisis between Saudi Arabia and Britain. This resulted from 
a clash of attitudes with regard to the slavery issue: Ryan insisted on giving asylum to 
one of the King's slaves without consultation with the Saudi Government _Therefore, 
the Saudi Government sent a memorandum on 5 February 1932 to the British Foreign 
Office, accusing the British Ambassador of putting obstacles in the way of good 
relations between the two countries. The memorandum enumerated his mistakes and 
1 Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp38. 
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explained that the King would ignore them for the sake of his friendly relations with 
the British Government, but that he would not tolerate any more. At the end of the 
memorandum, the Saudi Government requested a quick and definite answer so that 
the dispute would not widen and the two Governments would not find themselves 
enmeshed in unnecessary problems (Wahbah, 1960: 95-98). 
The memorandum caused a stir within the British Government, and Ryan was called 
to London to discuss its details. The British Government replied on 21 March 1932, 
stating that Ryan had 30 years' experience in governmental jobs and had won the 
respect of various foreign secretaries, and that he had been chosen for the post of 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Jeddah because he was the most suitable person to 
strengthen relations between the two countries. The British Government supported its 
representative in Jeddah and denied what had been said about him in careful 
diplomatic language. At the end of its memorandum, the British Government asked 
the Saudi Government to withdraw its memorandum and insisted that, if Sir Andrew 
Ryan did not resume his duties in Jeddah, his government would not appoint another 
minister to replace him (ibid: 99-101). 
The Saudi Government yielded to the British insistence and indicated that the purpose 
of its memorandum was to strengthen good relations with Britain and remove 
anything that could have an effect on the friendship with the British Government. The 
Saudi reply added that there was no personal enmity with Ryan and the Saudi 
Government had no objection to his returning to Jeddah. At the same time, the Saudi 
Government insisted that three matters should be maintained: Saudi honour, Saudi 
independence and the promotion of a friendly relationship with the British 
Government. The crisis was over, but it had had a negative effect on the Saudi 
Government (ibid: 99-101). 
However, it is worth asking why the British Government threatened to sever relations 
with Saudi Arabia and also why the Saudi Government yielded to its threat. In fact, 
both Governments knew that Britain was the authority and power which had 
influence over most of the borders around Saudi Arabia. Moreover, King Abdulaziz 
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knew that Britain had the capability and the means to create unlimited problems for 
him and his newly-emerging state. Ibn Saud was very cautious in his dealing with his 
Hashemite antagonists to the north. The crisis had happened at a time of internal 
instability due to the Ikhwan rebellion and Ibn Rifadah's activities. Unfortunately, it 
also occurred during a Saudi financial crisis. ' Therefore, King Abdulaziz bent to the 
storm. The King's wisdom and patience had averted a real deterioration in Saudi- 
British relations, which could have occurred as a result of the arrogant attitude of the 
British Ambassador at that time (Wahbah, 1960: 101-105). 
7.3 Oil Concessions and the Saudi Financial Crisis 
In 1923, Ibn Saud gave an oil concession in the al-Hasa district to an English oil 
group calling itself the Eastern and General Syndicate, for £2000 a year. This group 
was represented at that time by Major Holmes. 2 The company carried out several 
attempts at exploration, but was at last compelled to withdraw due to financial 
problems. The concession was finally cancelled in 1928, due to the company's failure 
to pay the rent to Ibn Saud. Thus, the district remained unexploited (Howarth 
1964: 183; Longrigg, 1968: 100; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 692-694; Almana, 1980: 217-218; 
Holden and Johns, 1981: 111-112). However, the most important factor in the 
deterioration of relations between King Abdulaziz and Britain was the oil concession 
which was given to the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) in Jeddah on 
29 May 1933 (Twitchell, 1953: 151; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 696-697; Holden and Johns, 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/45523, despatch from Rupert Stanley Jordan, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 February 
1945; American Archives, 890 F. 51/12, despatch from Mr. Fox, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to 
the American Secretary of State, on 1 August 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 51/13, despatch from 
Mr. Fox, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to the American Secretary of State, on 28 August 1933; 
American Archives, 890 F. 51/14, despatch from Mr. Salter at the American Consulate in Aden, to the 
American Secretary of State, on 14 November 1933. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 6363/13, despatch from George C. Cobb, the American Vice-Consul in 
Jerusalem, to the American Secretary of State, on 10 July 1923. 
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1981: 118; Longrigg, 1968: 107-108). Al-Rasheed (2002: 100) argued that the granting 
of the Saudi oil concession to an American company marked the beginning of the 
decline of British influence in Saudi Arabia, which entered its final phase after the 
Second World War. 
In fact, the universal economic crisis of the early 1930s put further pressure on Saudi 
Arabia. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was experiencing a shortage of economic 
resources as a result of internal rebellions, ' which forced the country to ask for a loan 
from its friends, mainly Britain (Williams, 1933: 250; Wahbah, 1960: 104; Sluglett 
et al., 1982: 46-47). This financial crisis obliged King Abdulaziz to think deeply 
about looking for real help to exploit the hidden riches of his land, which he could not 
achieve by his own means. For this reason, in 1931, the King admitted to Philby that 
if anyone were to offer him a million pounds, he would be welcome to all the 
concessions in Ibn Saud's country (Philby, 1948: 291; Howarth, 1964: 180; 
Mcloughlin, 1993: 103). 
It is worth mentioning here that Ibn Saud was in desperate need of funds to develop 
and build a regular army after the suppression of the internal rebellions, such as those 
of Ibn Rifadah and the Ikhwan. 3 These clashes revealed the urgent need to strengthen 
the army and to adopt modern methods of development in all state institutions. Of 
course, this new policy would increase his expenses. Therefore, King Abdulaziz sent 
his Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal, on a special visit to London, with Karl Twitchell's 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/20063, report by A. C. Oppenheim, the Deputy British Consul in 
Jeddah, sent by Albert S. Calvert to Anthony Eden on 26 June 1936. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/45523, despatch from Rupert Stanley Jordan, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 February 
1945; American Archives, 890 F. 51/12, despatch from Mr. Fox, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to 
the American Secretary of State, on 1 August 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 51/13, despatch from 
Mr. Fox, the American Vice Consul in Aden, to the American Secretary of State, on 28 August 1933; 
American Archives, 890 F. 51/14, despatch from Mr. Salter at the American Consulate in Aden to the 
American Secretary of State, on 14 November 1933. 
3 India Office, L/P&S/12/3856, despatch from Gerald S. de Gaury, the British Political Agent in 
Kuwait, to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 10 January 1936. 
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report, ' which indicated the possibility of oil reserves in the al-Hasa region, in the 
hope of persuading the British oil companies to purchase the oil concession in al- 
Hasa. The British reaction was that they were uninterested in Saudi oil. 2 In fact, Ibn 
Saud was keen to grant the concession to an English company because he had 
previously dealt with Britain. 3 He did not grant the concession to an American 
company until he despaired of the British companies, which it seemed, had lost 
interest in getting concessions in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, he shifted his hopes to the 
Americans (Wahbah, 1960: 104; Almana, 1980: 221; Holden and Johns, 1981: 114). 
However, when they realised how productive the Saudi oilfields were likely to be, 
and also due to their apprehensions regarding the new American competition in the 
region, the British tended to believe that Ibn Saud chose the American company (the 
Standard Oil Company of California) because it had offered him more, but in fact the 
offers were equal in respect of estimation of proceeds per ton. But the American offer 
outweighed the British one in other ways. Ibn Saud explained his position in terms of 
pure economic interest. The Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) had won 
out because it had agreed to grant Ibn Saud loans which he was in desperate need of. 
SOCAL undertook to pay an immediate loan of £30,000 in gold, with another 
£20,000 in eighteen months, plus a first annual rental of another £5,000 in gold and a 
subsequent rental of the same amount to be paid in agreed foreign currencies. In 
addition, the American company agreed to pay its revenues with a currency that could 
be changed into gold, while the British company (the Iraq Petroleum Company) 
rejected the idea of a preliminary loan altogether, and would only offer to pay in 
Indian Rupees, a practice common in the Gulf area at that time (Howarth 1964: 185; 
Almara, 1980: 223-226; Holden and Johns, 1981: 117-118; Longrigg, 1968: 107-108). 
1 Karl Twitchell was an American geologist who became the first person to undertake a systematic 
geological survey of Saudi Arabia. 
2 His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz, citing King Faisal and King Fahd, mentioned that 
the British knew that the Saudi territories were rich in oil, but they wanted to delay the production of 
Saudi oil until later, because they controlled Iraqi and Iranian oil. This was during my interview with 
him in Jeddah on 31 December 2003 and 1 January 2004. 
3 India Office, L/P&S/12/3856, despatch from Gerald S. de Gaury, the British Political Agent in 
Kuwait, to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 10 January 1936. 
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The important step taken by the King of preferring the American company to a 
British one has been a subject of much discussion. Some researchers have tended to 
believe that SOCAL won the concession as a result of a change in Ibn Saud's policy 
towards his old friend, Britain. They argued that the King preferred the American oil 
companies, which were going to take care of investment operations in his country, 
because he believed, with good reason, that the American companies were not only 
stronger than the British but also less subject to governmental influence. Therefore, 
American companies could contribute to the development of the Saudi economy more 
effectively than British companies. It has also been claimed that the King, knowing 
that the United States of America was very far away from the Middle East and had no 
imperial heritage, believed it had no political ambitions in the region, as the European 
powers did (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 226; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 700; Vassiliev, 1998; 315; 
Van, der Meulen, 1999: 133). 
In fact, there was a political consideration behind Ibn Saud's step to exclude states 
which had a colonial outlook, among them Britain, from this concession. Al-Zirikli 
(1977a: 700) and Twitchell (1953: 154) noted that good offers, with more advantages 
than the American one, had been submitted to the King from Germany, Italy and 
Japan with a view to obtaining concessions in Saudi Arabia, but Ibn Saud agreed to 
the American offer because the U. S. had no political ambitions in Arabia. Moreover, 
the British policy of colonialism, especially in Palestine, enraged the King, due to its 
support for the Zionists, which was made clear by the King through many letters sent 
by him to the British Government. ' This might be an important reason why King 
Abdulaziz worked to attract the Americans to the Middle East through commercial 
relations. He believed that the Arabs required another strong ally as another source of 
support in their critical situation in Palestine. He told the Arab High Committee that 
the Arabs should create a strong link with another major foreign power before 
thinking of resisting Britain. To do otherwise would make resistance an unsafe 
venture (Zu'aitir, 1980: 256). 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
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In spite of this, the two sides, King Abdulaziz and Britain, were keen to maintain their 
friendly relations. Therefore, the Treaty of Friendship, which was concluded between 
the two parties in Jeddah in 1927, was renewed on 3 October 1936,1 and again on 3 
October 19432 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 299-300). Furthermore, in order to maintain cordial 
relations with Britain and to achieve an advantageous balance in his international 
relations between America and Britain, Ibn Saud agreed, on 23 December 1934, to 
give the right of mining in most of Saudi Arabia to a British mining company located 
in London under the name of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd3 (al-Sumari et 
al., 1999: 366-3379). In addition, Ibn Saud agreed, in July 1936, to give the oil 
concession along the coast of the Red Sea to a British company called Petroleum 
Concessions Ltd. 4 The granting of these concessions demonstrated that Ibn Saud 
valued his friendly relations with Britain and was concerned to do nothing that might 
damage them. 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 236-240; Public Record Office, 
FO 371/20059, despatch from Prince Faisal to Reader Bullard on 3 October 1936. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-195 1. Pp. 296-298. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/19015, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 24 February 1935; American 
Archives, 890 F. 63/4, despatch from Mr. W. Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, to 
Mr. K. Twitchell, the Manager of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd, on 10 August 1934; 
American Archives, 890 F. 63/5, despatch from Mr. Palmer at the American Consulate in Jerusalem, to 
the American Secretary of State, on 8 August 1934; American Archives, 890 F. 63/6, despatch from Mr. 
K. Twitchell, the Manager of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd, to Mr. W. Murray, Chief of the 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on 13 October 1934; American Archives, 890 F. 63/7, despatch from 
Mr. K. Twitchell, the Manager of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd, to Mr. W. Murray, Chief of 
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on 11 March 1935; American Archives, 890 F. 63/8, despatch 
from Mr. L. Callanan, the American Consul in Aden, to the American Secretary of State on 25 June 
1935. 
4 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp 388-405; India Office, 
L/P&S/12/2149, copy of the Treaty of 1936 between the Saudi Government and Petroleum Concession 
Ltd, dated 9 July 1936. 
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7.4 The Italian and German Influence and the Second World War 
During the 1930s, the spreading influence of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany became 
obvious. Italy became a real threat in East Africa, which lay next to Ibn Saud's newly- 
emerging state. This might have been an important reason for Ibn Saud to grant the 
British companies two concessions in the western coastal region of his realm. His 
action could have been intended to use the British as a barrier against the augmented 
Italian threat in the southern part of the Red Sea. ' This threat became a reality when 
Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935-1936 to secure and control the Red Sea and its coasts 
(Vassiliev, 1998; 322; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 82-83). 
As a result, both Governments, the British and the Italian, entered into negotiations, 
which were concluded in April 1938,2 with the Agreement of Rome, which aimed at 
avoiding any collisions between the two powers in the Mediterranean and the Red 
Sea. That agreement provided for an exchange of information about the movements 
of the armies of the two countries, and also stated that no bases would be established 
in the region except with the knowledge of the other side. The two sides declared that 
they should not threaten each other's interests or interfere in Saudi Arabian and 
Yemeni affairs, as both powers had already secured a strong position in the region. 
They would also cooperate to prevent any other power threatening their interests in 
those two countries3 (Sa'ed, 1964: 391-392). 
' Public Record Office, FO 371/19020, despatch from The British Foreign Office to Albert S. Calvert 
in Jeddah on 14 September 1935; Public Record Office, FO 371/20064, yearly report by Sir Andrew 
Ryan, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, 
dated 29 February 1936. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 00/48, despatch from Mr. Childs at the American State Department, Near 
Eastern Division, on 13 May 1938; American Archives, 890 F. 00/49, despatch from Mr. Childs, at the 
American State Department, Near Eastern Division, on 20 May 1938. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 407/76, despatch by E. Perth, the British Ambassador in Rome, to Halifax, 
the British Foreign Secretary, on 8 April 1938. 
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On 5 January 1939, the Saudi Government, after an intensive study of that agreement, 
sent a memorandum to the British and Italian Governments, declaring that Saudi 
Arabia would not be committed to any agreement, and that the Saudi Government 
was not party to. Therefore, the Saudi Government would not agree to any condition 
that would restrict its independence and freedom with respect to the Italian-British 
agreement or any other agreement. Furthermore, the Saudi Government insisted that 
its relations with them were based on international law and also on its treaties with 
each of them as one sovereign state with another. ' As a result, Britain and Italy, in 
March 1939, separately replied that the agreement only concerned the obligations of 
Britain and Italy and did not impose any commitment on Saudi Arabia. Also, each of 
them acknowledged that its relations with Saudi Arabia were in accordance with 
international law and according to its treaty with Saudi Arabia. 2 
On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, which led to the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The war brought with it new challenges to Saudi-British relations. For 
the duration of the war, King Abdulaziz and the Government of the United Kingdom 
felt the necessity for stronger relations and real friendship. During the difficult days 
of 1940, with the resulting victories of Germany against the Allies, which led to the 
fall of France and Italy's military alliance with Germany, some of King Abdulaziz's 
advisors were content that the Axis power would win, but he did not share their view; 
he looked forward to the ultimate victory of the Allies, and based his actions on this 
belief and hope (Twitchell, 1953: 105; Howarth, 1964: 199). Despite his personal 
views in favour of the Allies, 3 and also his strong belief that Britain would not be 
defeated, the King recognized that neutrality was the best policy to protect the 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 248-249; Public record Office, 
FO 371/24589, yearly report by Hugh S. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax 
dated 18 July 1940; Public Record Office, FO 406/77, despatch from Prince Faisal, the Saudi Foreign 
Minister, to Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, on 5 January 1939. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 249-250; FO 406/77, despatch 
from Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Prince Faisal, the Saudi 
Foreign Minister, on 22 March 1939. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939. 
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internal affairs of his state from interference by either side, or from any attack by the 
victor at the end of the war. Therefore, he officially declared his strict neutrality and 
maintained it in order to avoid bringing his country under the direct influence of 
either side, and resisted all attempts by both sides to involve him' (Twitchell, 
1953: 105; Vassiliev, 1998; 322; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 299). 
At the beginning of the War, and as a result of its outbreak, the German Minister 
Plenipotentiary in Baghdad, Fritz Grobba, was expelled and the German mission was 
closed. Therefore, Hitler asked Mussolini to mediate with Ibn Saud to receive Grobba 
as Minister Plenipotentiary in Jeddah. The German Government wanted to use Jeddah 
as a station for their intelligence activities and Nazi propaganda. 
2 Unsurprisingly, this 
move disturbed the British and they expressed their concerns to the Saudi 
Government. Ibn Saud asked the British their opinion; they informed him verbally 
that they did not welcome the arrival of Grobba, stating that his presence would cause 
many problems for the Allies. 3 However, as the German Government had had no 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Saudi Arabia before, the Saudi Government apologised 
for not accepting the German request with a strong promise to discuss it according to 
the progress of the war or after the end of it4 (Wahbah, 1960: 107-108; Vassiliev, 
1998; 322). 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/23269, despatch from Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 24 October 1939; FO 371/23271, 
cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the 
British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939; Public Record Office, FO 371/23272, despatch from 
the British Foreign Office to Alan Trott in Jeddah on 24 August 1939; Public Record Office, FO 
371/24590, report issued by Halifax to the British Government dated 2 July 1940. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/24587, despatch from the British Foreign Office to Francis S. Bird, the 
British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, on 30 January 1940. 
° Public Record Office, FO 371/27267, despatch from Francis H. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, the British Foreign Office, on 24 October 1941. 
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Why did Ibn Saud ask the British their opinion on whether he should accept the 
German request or not? Taking into consideration that Britain and Germany were at 
war and that the Germans had asked for a Minster Plenipotentiary in Jeddah after 
their Ambassador was expelled from Baghdad by Britain, acquiescence to the 
German request would be considered an act of enmity by Ibn Saud towards Britain 
and all its allies. On the other hand, if he refused the German request, it would be 
construed as a British interference in his affairs. The dilemma was clear from the 
discussion of this matter which took place between Ibn Saud and his advisors, who all 
agreed on neutrality. They concurred in their belief that Saudi Arabia was an 
independent state which had the absolute right to do whatever suited its interests and 
that Britain had no right to interfere in this matter. They also believed that the 
interference of Britain in such a matter would degrade Saudi sovereignty (Wahbah, 
1960: 107-108). 
Nevertheless, the King and his advisors were aware that the countries of the British 
Empire and those within its orbit of influence were the main source of most of Saudi 
Arabia's imports. India was the main supplier of food grain. Moreover, most pilgrims 
came from Islamic countries that were under the dominion of Britain and its Allies 
(Vassiliev, 1998; 322). In addition, Saudi Arabia was surrounded by British 
protectorates and British military bases and the British navy dominated the Red Sea 
and the Gulf (ibid). Also, according to Wahbah (1960: 50) Ibn Saud recognised that 
the British navy was the main supplier of Saudi Arabia with most of its imports, and 
if, for any reason, Britain were to blockade the Saudi ports or stop the transportation 
of pilgrims to the Holy Places, this would cause him trouble; whereas, Germany had 
no real interests in Saudi Arabia that required the presence of a Minister 
Plenipotentiary. It was clear to Ibn Saud that the Allies would take action against 
Saudi Arabia if it became a theatre for German intelligence activities and Nazi 
propaganda against them. Therefore, he found that his interests required maintaining 
friendly relations with the Allies (Wahbah, 1960: 107-109; Vassiliev, 1998; 322). In 
fact, his stance on this problem was a good illustration of Ibn Saud's political merits. 
It served to assert the absolute right of every state to adopt the most advantageous 
course of action in its foreign policy, and thus to maintain and reinforce its interests 
through its international relations. 
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As a result of the War, the Saudi economy deteriorated due to the decline of 
pilgrimage to the Holy Places and the shrinking of oil revenues, which were 
concurrent with the growing costs of imported goods (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 251- 
253; Holden and Johns, 1981: 126; al-Khuwaiter, 1998: 139-140; Vassiliev, 1998; 
323-324). Therefore, the Saudi Government requested a loan from SOCAL. ' The 
King also asked Britain to help him overcome his financial difficulties. 2 The budget 
deficit was so large that Saudi Arabia threatened to cancel the concession, which 
forced the company to seek the help of the U. S. Government. President Roosevelt 
decided to help Saudi Arabia with indirect aid and demanded that Britain negotiate 
with the Saudi Government and allocate necessary funds, using part of the loan of 
around 4.5 million dollars which the United States had recently granted to Britain. Of 
course, the SOCAL representative secretly informed Ibn Saud that Britain would give 
him the loan he had asked for as the U. S. proposed. Finally, after protracted 
negotiations, Britain agreed to give Ibn Saud the loan that he had long been seeking 
(Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 251-253; Vassiliev, 1998: 323-324). 
A question arises here. Did Britain support Ibn Saud only at America's insistence? 
The answer is simply no. The year 1941 was very severe for Britain and its Allies. 
Britain was driven from many strategic locations and its presence in Egypt and the 
entire Middle East was threatened. London itself was at the mercy of German 
bombers. Ibn Saud was carefully following the course of the War and was aware of 
all these events. At that time, Britain feared that its troubles could be aggravated by 
3 the Arabs, whose figurehead was King Abdulaziz, and tried to get closer to him. This 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939; 
Public Record Office, FO 371/27264, despatch from Francis S. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office on 10 November 1941. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/24587, despatch from B. Lacy at the British Foreign Office to C. Syers, 
the British Secretary of Finance, on 8 February 1940; Public Record Office, FO 371/27264, despatch 
from Francis S. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office on 10 
November 1941. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/27261, despatch from Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Hafiz Wahbah, the Saudi Plenipotentiary Minister in London, on 26 May 1941. 
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became clear when the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, asked Hafiz 
Wahbah, the Saudi Ambassador to London, if he believed that Ibn Saud would act 
against the Allies during this crisis, and whether there was any one who was able to 
influence him, either in Riyadh or somewhere in Europe. Wahbah replied that if Ibn 
Saud had been a European leader, he might have acted as Mussolini did towards 
Britain. Wahbah added that the King was an Arab and an Oriental man who believed 
in the great value of friendship. Wahbah insisted that even if the King could not assist 
his friends in time of need, at least he would never stab them in the back. 
Furthermore, Wahbah stated that the King always acted according to his own rights 
and that once his mind was made up no one could change his stance (Wahbah, 1960: 
110-111). 
It is worth asking here what kind of support Ibn Saud provided to the Allies. He did 
not provide them with any military aid. In fact, he was taking financial aid from them, 
as we have seen. The valuable support that Ibn Saud provided to Britain consisted of 
maintaining stability in Saudi Arabia and also in the Arab and Islamic worlds. ' While 
Britain and America experienced a great deal of trouble in tempering the strains in the 
Middle East during their long war, Saudi Arabia was the only country in the Arab 
world which was very stable and did not cause any disturbances to the Allies (Philby, 
1948: 262). There was some sympathy towards the Axis in many places around the 
world, among them the Islamic and Arab countries. In India itself, Britain faced a 
determined campaign of disobedience and non-cooperation headed by the Indian 
Congress and it was possible that many Indian Muslims might have energetically 
assisted a Japanese invasion of India (Twitchell, 1953: 107). 
If Ibn Saud, with his position in the Islamic World, had preached a Holy War or had 
been actively pro-Axis, he could have cut the British supply and communications 
lines by asking Arabs and Muslims everywhere to do so. At that time, it was possible 
that anti-British rebellions would spread and put the region into the hands of Hitler. In 
' Public Record Office, FO 371/27261, despatch from Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Hafiz Wahbah, the Saudi Plenipotentiary Minister in London, on 26 May 1941. 
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fact, Britain had real difficulties with the Iranian Government, in Iraq during al- 
Kalian's revolt and with the Vichy Government in Lebanon and Syria. Britain did not 
have the capability to maintain large numbers of forces in Iraq, Syria and Palestine, 
while Rommel was pressurising their Eighth Army in the North African desert. If the 
Arabs had allied themselves with the Axis, the Allies would have been compelled to 
use huge armies to maintain order in the Arab countries, at a time when they were in 
desperate need of troops. Also, they would have incurred heavy expenses, much 
greater in value than the aid they were providing to Ibn Saud to overcome the Saudi 
economic crisis (Twitchell, 1953: 105- 107; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 961-962). 
However, the supportive attitude of King Abdulaziz towards the Allies was clear 
from his stance during the Battle of al-'Alamain when he sent the Saudi Defence 
Minister, Prince Mansur, to Egypt to speak to the Indian Muslim troops to make clear 
Ibn Saud's support, as a Muslim leader, for the Allies in the hope of encouraging them 
in this decisive battle (Twitchell, 1953: 105). A further example of King Abdulaziz's 
beneficial support was his stance on the anti-British revolt of Rasheed al-Kailani in 
Iraq in April 1941. This revolt was supported by Germany as a major step in its 
advance towards the Middle East, and it placed Britain in a dangerous position. Al- 
Kailani asked Ibn Saud to support him, but King Abdulaziz strongly criticized the 
revolt and refused to help, saying that it would be an act of treachery against Britain, 
to whom he was committed by treaties and strong friendship. Moreover, Ibn Saud 
stated that the Arabs' duty was, if unable to help Britain, to be neutral, and suggested 
to the Iraqis that they cease their hostilities against Britain and negotiate with it 
peacefully' (Twitchell, 1953: 106-107; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 237-237; Dickson, 
2002: 477; Vassiliev, 1998: 322-323). 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/27261, despatch from Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to 
Hafiz Wahbah, the Saudi Plenipotentiary Minister in London, on 26 May 1941; India Office, 
LJP&S/12/3758, Despatch from Dickson, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, to the British Resident 
in Bushire on 3 June 1941. 
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In general, the policy of Ibn Saud was the best possible for his country and for the 
Allies as well. His stance had the implicit agreement of the Allies. ' In fact, an official 
announcement of his sympathy towards the Allies or a declaration of war against the 
Axis in the early stages of the War might have damaged Ibn Saud's influence in the 
Islamic and Arab Worlds and would also have driven the Axis powers to attack Saudi 
Arabia. Had this happened, the Allied forces available in the region would not have 
been sufficient to protect the coasts of Saudi Arabia. 2 It could be said that the attitude 
of Ibn Saud during the War, from its beginning to its end, was more beneficial to the 
Allies than it would have been had he been directly allied with them. 3 Britain itself 
asked for nothing more than his formal and important neutrality and his strong 
resistance to Hitler's temptations to join him. Vassiliev (1998: 322-323) stated that 
Hitler promised Ibn Saud, through the Saudi Ambassador in Switzerland, Fuad 
Hamzah, "the crown of the King of all the Arabs" if he attacked Britain but Ibn Saud 
strongly refused. 
This attitude of Ibn Saud was highly appreciated by the British Government. This was 
acknowledged by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in his appreciative 
address to Ibn Saud during the historic meeting between them on 17 February 1945, 
in Egypt. 5 "It is, " Churchill said, "both an honour and a pleasure _ 
for me to meet one 
who has so greatly proved in deed to be a friend in need" (Philby, 1948: 262; Holden 
and Johns, 1981: 126). Certainly, the British Prime Minister knew about Ibn Saud's 
rejection of the German overtures during the War. He saw the stance of Ibn Saud as 
the absolute proof of the King's friendship, and was moved to utter this cordial 
greeting. However, some historians have offered other reasons for Ibn Saud's policy 
during the War. They regarded his attitude towards Britain, and later America, as the 
logic behaviour of someone who acted in complete accordance with his religious 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/24590, report issued by Halifax to his Government dated 2 July 1940. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Public Record Office, FO 371/27267, despatch from Francis H. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, the British Foreign Office, on 24 October 1941. 
S Public Record Office, FO 371 /45 542, despatch from Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador in Cairo, 
to Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on 3 February 1945. 
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beliefs and in the interests of his people and his country. In their view, Ibn Saud 
calculated that his interests lay with Britain and America and acted accordingly 
(Howarth, 1964: 199). In fact, Ibn Saud's attitude towards these two countries during 
the War demonstrated his political characteristics. 
7.5 The British Position on the Saudi-Hashemite Rivalry 
Saudi-British relations remained very friendly and cooperative through the Second 
World War. Until the end of the War, Ibn Saud was concerned to retain the friendship 
of Britain and acknowledged the importance of Britain in his international relations 
and foreign policy. After the War, Saudi-British relations began to decline gradually 
due to several factors, among them was the British position on the old Saudi- 
Hashemite rivalry. ' Van der Meulen (1999: 71), former Ambassador of Holland to 
Saudi Arabia, recalled that when he asked Ibn Saud his opinion of the British policy 
in the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Saud's replied that "lie had hated the British policy on 
many occasions and he still hated it. " In Ibn Saud considered that Britain had 
machinated against him in 1921, by appointing the sons of Sharif Husain, Faisal and 
Abdullah, to the thrones of Iraq and Trans-Jordan (ibid). Ibn Saud believed that the 
Hashemite House, which ruled in Iraq and Trans-Jordan, had always hated him, as 
they could not forgive or forget his taking of al-Hijaz from them. ' They would work 
to break up his realm, for then they could return to al-Hijaz with the support of their 
friends, the British, who in this regard were merely pretending to be his fiends 
(Graves, 1950: 249-250; Mcloughlin, 1993: 110; Pison 1999: 195-196; Dickson, 
2002: 284; al-Rasheed, 2002: 103). 
'New York Post, Friday, 30 April 1948, "Ibn Saud's Star Wanes"; 
htt2: //www. varchive. orv-/obs/480430-litm. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/62112, despatch from Alan Trott, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 December 1947; New York Post, Friday, 
30 April 1948, "Ibn Saud's Star Wanes"; btter//www. varchive. org/obs/480430. htm. 
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In addition, Ibn Saud may have suspected that Britain planned and supported the 
Hashemites' aspirations to rule in the Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent projects, 
which could not be achieved without British assistance. ' King Abdulaziz saw that 
these projects were designed to benefit the Hashemite House in Iraq and Jordan. He 
was concerned for the stability of his state and was fearful that these kinds of 
integration plans would constitute a real threat to his unified territories and the 
sovereignty of his country2 (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 286-287; Vassiliev, 1998: 330). 
Some have argued that Ibn Saud, as a result, worked against the strategies of the 
Baghdad-Amman Axis by supporting the aspirations of the majority of the people in 
Syria and Lebanon for the independence of their countries as sovereign states, free 
from the rule of the Hashemite House3 (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 286-287; al-Tahiri, 
1991: 405-406; Harrah, 1999: 414-417). 
It was clear to Ibn Saud that the Hashemites, with strong support from Britain, would 
be a real threat to his state. 4 This may be partly why he sought to strengthen his 
relations with another strong power after a long period of deep-seated mistrust of the 
British (Vassiliev, 1998: 327; al-Rasheed, 2002: 103-104). Ibn Saud turned to the 
United States of America, with which he had developed strong commercial and 
political relations after the Second World War. These relations allowed him to discuss 
his fears regarding British policy, in particular Britain's support for the Hashemites. 
Mcloughlin (1993: 181) cited the view of the American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, 
Rives Childs, given in a communication to the State Department: "Ibn Saud was 
Public Record Office, FO 371/62112, despatch from Alan Trott, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 December 1947. 
2 Public Record Office, CO 831/59/12, despatch from Sir Miles Lampson, the British High 
Commissioner and Ambassador in Cairo, to the British Foreign Office on 6 November 1941; Public 
Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/52823, despatch from Laurence B. Smith, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 23 February 1946; Public Record 
Office, FO 371/45237, despatch from Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador in Cairo, to the British 
Foreign Office on 23 March 1945. 
4 Public Record Office, FO 371/62112, despatch from Alan Trott, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 December 1947. 
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genuinely concerned at what he saw as his vulnerability with respect to the 
Hashemites and, in particular, Jordan. Whereas five years ago he felt that he could 
rely on the British to rein in the Hashemites' ambitions he no longer had that 
confidence and felt that it was only the US that could guarantee his security. " 
If Ibn Saud had mistrusted Britain, despite a long period of friendly relations due to 
its support of the Hashemite House, why had he waited so long? It may be that Ibn 
Saud had known about the British policy from its inception, but had not been able to 
take serious action due to Britain's strong international influence. He had therefore 
waited for a suitable time to remove his country from the influence of Britain. Now, 
after he had strengthened his relations with the United States of America, a newly 
dominant international power, the time was ripe (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 261; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 327; al-Rasheed, 2002: 100-104). The King's confidence in his 
relations with his new ally permitted him to express his anger towards the British for 
their support of the Hashemites, as his son, Prince Saud, indicated during an official 
visit to United States in 1947. King Abdulaziz openly acknowledged the existence of 
some political disputes with Britain that had arisen due to its unfriendly policy of 
supporting the Hashemites and other political opponents against him in the region (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 775). 
7.6 The Al-Buraimi Oasis Dispute and Britain's Protection of the 
Gulf Shaikhdoms 
In King Abdulaziz's view, the British policy regarding all of the boundary issues 
between him and his neighbours, the British protectorates, especially after the Second 
World War, was highly unsatisfactory. I This was another major factor, in addition to 
1 India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
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the British position on the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry, which led to the decline of Saudi- 
British relations after the War. However, this was the only factor that led to a military 
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Britain (which was acting on behalf of its 
protectorates). The British view was that it should stand by its protectorates' rights, 
especially the small states in the Gulf region, which were unable to resist Ibn Saud's 
claims without British support. ' For his part, Ibn Saud believed that the British would 
machinate to arrange the annexation of parts of his land to its allies in the small states 
which they had created around him (Dickson, 2002: 284). This situation has been 
discussed in chapter four on Ibn Saud's relation with each of those states. British 
policy on this issue had a direct and important effect on Saudi-British relations and 
eventually caused a military clash between the two sides as a result of their dispute 
over al-Buraimi, which led to the cessation of Saudi-British relations. 
The dispute over al-Buraimi arose because the pacts between Britain and Ibn Saud 
did not specify the borders between Saudi Arabia and those protectorates. The reason 
for this vagueness was that Britain had not been interested, at that time, in the affairs 
of the internal lands of the Arabian Peninsula; its only concern had been to secure its 
strategic position on the coast of the Gulf and to protect its sea routes. The reasoning 
behind the British policy of securing its protectorates in the Gulf from Ibn Saud had 
been indicated in 1930: "Britain holds the front door to these principalities on the 
littoral, but it does not hold the back door" (Zahlan, 1982: 68). This idea of protecting 
the coast of the Gulf by Britain has been advocated by the British Government. 2 
Nevertheless, King Abdulaziz believed that he had the right to bring any part of the 
Arabian Peninsula, the whole of which had once been governed by his ancestors, 
1 India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
2 India Office, L/P&S/11/222, despatch from Hugh V. Biscoe, the British Political Resident in Bushire, 
to the British Indian Government on 18 August 1930. 
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under his authority' (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1397; al-'Uthaimeen, 1999: 292). Furthermore, 
Zahlan (1982: 69-70) noted that King Abdulaziz had stated to the British Agents in the 
region that the peoples of the Gulf Shaikhdoms were his subjects as they had been the 
subjects of his fathers before him, but he accepted that the people of those areas were 
now under the formal protection of the British, and that he ought to comply with his 
treaties with Britain. However, while the rulers of those areas could lay claim only to 
the towns, the internal deserts and the tribes who roamed them had always been under 
his and his ancestor's sovereignty. 2 
Britain changed its policy and started to pay attention to the internal domains after Ibn 
Saud granted the concession to explore oil in the eastern part Saudi Arabia to the 
Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL). 3 This angered the British 
Government, which sought to reactivate the boundary issues after having been asked 
by SOCAL about the specific boundaries of its concession. The British reply was 
based on the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, which had always been opposed by 
Ibn Saud4 (Sinan, 1969: 196-197; Qal'aji, 1965: 587-588; Mcloughlin, 1993: 132; 
Mustafa et al., N. D. 109-110). In 1937-1939, the Sultanate of Oman and the 
Shaikhdoms of the Omani Coast gave the oil concession in their territories to a British 
' India Office, L/P&S/18/B450, report by the India Office on the Gulf dated on 25 June 1935; India 
Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Jeddah 
on 2 February 1948. 
2 India Office, R/15/2/158, despatch from George Cole, the Deputy British Political Agent in Bahrain, 
to T. Fowle, the British Political Resident in Bushire, on 6 July 1935; India Office, R/15/2/465, 
memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
3 India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 335; Public Record Office, FO 406/72, despatch from Sir Andrew Ryan, 
the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 27 
June 1934; India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British 
Embassy in Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
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company (Petroleum Concession Limited). ' This was at a time when these oil 
companies insisted, together with their governments, on defining the borders of those 
areas 2 (Howarth, 1964: 234; Anderson, 1969: 28-31; al-'Aqqad, 1973: 168). 
In order to protect its companies' interests against their American competitors, the 
British Government started to intervene deeply in the internal provinces of the 
Arabian Peninsula, using its strong influence over the Sultan of Oman and the 
Shaikhs of the smaller Gulf states, 3 which had the effect of further prolonging this 
problem. This British policy, especially after the Second World War, was a main 
reason why the boundary disputes reached the level of military action. However, the 
persistence of Saudi Arabia and Britain, on their positions led to many conferences 
being held to specify the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 
even before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. However, the War 
induced both sides to shelve the boundary problems temporarily and cooperate 
against the new threat (Sa'ed, N. D.: 136; Qal'aji, 1965: 588). 
In 1948-1949, further discoveries of oil in the disputed areas led to renewed 
arguments between Britain and Saudi Arabia. This caused a serious dispute once 
again in 1949, as the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) increased its 
activity of exploring and extracting oil in the area. 4 In 1949, ARAMCO employees 
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 337-338; Public Record Office, FO 371/20843, yearly report by Sir 
Reader Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign 
Secretary, dated 28 February 1937; Public Record Office, FO 371/21908, yearly report by Sir Reader 
Bullard, the British Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, dated 
26 March 1937; India Office, L/P&S/12/2073, report from Alan Trott in Jeddah, to Anthony Eden, the 
British Foreign Secretary, dated 1 October 1937. 
2 http: //web. nps. navy. mil/-relooney/3040_1601. htm. 
3 India Office, R/15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
a American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /76, despatch from the American Department of 
State to American Embassy in London on 24 May 1934. 
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appeared in disputed areas, such as al-Dhafrah and Sabkhat Muti, which were 
considered by Britain to be part of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom. On behalf of Abu 
Dhabi, the British Political Agent in Coastal Oman, Stobart, submitted a strong 
protest to the representative of ARAMCO, who was in that disputed area. He asked 
him to withdraw from the areas immediately, as no agreement had yet been reached 
regarding its political annexation' (Lenczowski, 1960: 144; Kelly, 1964: 142-143; 
Sinan, 1969: 201; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1393-1394). 
ARAMCO replied that it had no concerns with the existing argument regarding the 
borders, and that any objection to its activities should be addressed to the Saudi 
Government. The Saudi Government, in view of the critical situation, agreed to 
withdraw from the areas under dispute, emphasising that this would not prejudice the 
rights of Saudi Arabia in that area. Further correspondence was exchanged between 
the Saudi and the British Governments, each party protesting against the trespass 
committed by the other. To solve this problem peacefully, a series of negotiations 
took place in September 1949 between Yusuf Yasseen and, later, Fuad Hamzah, 
representing the Saudi side, and a British delegation. Also, many memorandums 
between the two Governments were exchanged for about one year but nothing came 
of these2 (Sinan, 1969: 201; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1394). 
Early in 1951, further exchanges of correspondence were made, which led to direct 
negotiations between the two parties. A conference was held in London between 8 
and 24 August of that year. The Saudi side was headed by the Foreign Minister, 
Prince Faisal, and Britain was represented by Herbert Morison, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. During this conference each side adhered to its former position. 
Consequently, Prince Faisal suggested calling the governors of the disputed areas to 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 397-398. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 398-405. 
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attend a round-table conference. This was accepted by Britain, and both sides agreed 
to stop all oil exploration activities in the disputed areas. As a consequence, a meeting 
was held in al-Dammam in Saudi Arabia on 28 January 1952, but after long 
negotiations, and due to the insistence of each side that its demands be met, the 
conference ended on 14 February 1952, without any important development. Both 
sides also adhered to the restrictions which had been applied to the area' 
(Lenczowski, 1960: 145; Sinan, 1969: 202-203; Holden and Johns, 1981: 147; al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1395). 
As a result of complaints made to the Saudi Government by the people of al-Buraimi 
against the new British exploration missions to the region, the Saudi Government 
protested to Britain. The Saudi Government informed the British that these 
complaints came not only from the head of the al-Shamsi tribe, a major tribe in the 
area, but also from most of the al-Bulushi Shaikhs. The British replied that the person 
concerned was one of their political officers, who was visiting the area on a normal 
administrative mission. In August 1952, as a response to further complaints by the 
Saudi citizens in the al-Buraimi oasis, the Saudi Government appointed Turki al- 
'Utaishan as Governor of al-Buraiini, the main residential area in these territories, and 
linked him directly to the province of al-Hasa. The Saudi Government also sent with 
him a civilian staff of about 40 people as clerks, technicians, policemen and servants. 
In response, Britain officially protested against this action and demanded the 
withdrawal of al-'Utaishan and his subordinates. Britain indicated that it would take 
any action it deemed necessary if al-'Utaishan was not withdrawn (Lenczowski, 
1960: 145-146; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1396-1397; Holden and Johns, 1981: 147; Vassiliev, 
1998: 346). 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 407-417. 
'- The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 418-422. 
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Discussions again started between the two Governments. The Saudis argued that 
Britain had no authority over al-Buraimi, as they took the view that this area was not 
under the control of any of the rulers protected by Britain. ' Saudi Arabia stated that 
the British activities in the area were the cause of the people's complaints, which had 
forced the Saudi Government to send al-'Utaishan, 2 and reiterated the Saudi desire for 
a peaceful settlement of this dispute. While negotiations were being conducted 
between the two sides, Britain sent a military force from al-Shariqa, which camped 
about 4 kilometres away from Hamasa village (al-'Utaishan's position) and blockaded 
the Saudis, and deadlock ensued. Furthermore, British planes flew threateningly over 
the village of Hamasa. Ibn Saud protested to Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, 
warning him that he would raise the matter with the Security Council of the UN if the 
British forces continued their activities in the area. Eden declared his readiness to 
withdraw the Oman coast forces as soon as al-'Utaishan was withdrawn. Britain 
ceased its flying operations but did not withdraw its forces, and at the same time Eden 
continued to express his desire for a peaceful settlement3 (Sa'ed, 1964: 449; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1396-1398; Holden and Johns, 1981: 147; Vassiliev, 1998: 346). 
There appeared to be a stalemate, and so the Saudi Government asked the U. S. 
Government to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Britain. As a result, Raymond 
Hare, the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia submitted a personal proposal to 
both parties requesting them to put off provocative works, preserve their respective 
positions in al-Buraimi as they were, and resume direct negotiations. Both 
Governments accepted this preliminary proposal and started a new discussion; as a 
result, both agreed to sign an agreement, called the Standstill Agreement, on 26 
October 1952. According to this document, both sides agreed that the forces of both 
should remain in place, that they would not block the provision of material supplies to 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al 'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 418-422. 
2 Ibid: 421. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-lqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 421-424. 
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the other party, and that the local people should return to their normal life. The 
agreement also indicated that it had no effect on the claims of the two sides and that 
negotiations would be resumed to find a solution by friendly means' (Lenczowski, 
1960: 146; Sinan, 1969: 215-217; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1398; Holden and Johns, 1981: 
147; Vassiliev, 1998: 346-347). 
To achieve a practicable and fair solution, King Abdulaziz proposed the formation of 
a committee of three members. The committee was to consist of a member from each 
party, the third being neutral. He suggested that the neutral member be from the 
United States, which was a friend of both parties. This committee would then be 
given the time and the means to visit the region and arrange a referendum among the 
people by which they would choose the government they wanted to be subject to. 
Britain doubted the possibility of solving the problem through direct negotiations and 
rejected the referendum on the pretext that the propaganda of Ibn Saud and the bribes 
would prevent a real knowledge of the citizens' desire (Sinan, 1969: 214; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1398). The British Government believed that the unlawful presence of Turki 
al-'Utaishan in the al-Buraimi Oasis was playing on with the traditional loyalty of the 
tribes. Britain also claimed that he was using his position to extend his influence over 
vast areas. The Saudi answer to this accusation was that the traditional loyalty of the 
people of al-Buraimi had always been to Riyadh for more than 150 years (Holden and 
Johns, 1981: 146; Goldberg, 1986: 12-18; Vassiliev, 1998: 165), and never to "minor" 
rulers on the coast working according to the wishes of a foreign power. 2 
As Arabs, the local people and al-'Utaishan dealt with each other in accordance with 
tradition and both regarded the British as interfering foreigners. The British felt 
slighted when they saw that the local people preferred to talk and deal with al- 
' The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim Ii Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Iqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 425-426. 
2 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 430. 
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'Utaishan. Therefore, The British Prime Minister, Churchill, sent a message to King 
Abdulaziz in April 1953, emphasising Saudi-British friendship, but indicating that the 
burden of the message was unpleasant due to his Government's determination to 
honour its commitments to Ibn Saud's neighbours. Churchill added that the British 
Government would reinforce its forces around al-Buraimi to support its stance. The 
British forces besieged al-'Utaishan in Hamasa with many military posts. 
Furthermore, British forces occupied the al-Jawa Oasis and the British companies 
resumed oil exploration in the disputed areas' (Qasim, 1974: 249-250; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 1399). Of course, this was unpleasant news for the Saudi Government as 
Churchill had told Ibn Saud. 
King Abdulaziz died on 9 November 1953, by which date his relations with Britain 
had reached their lowest ebb. After a long period of friendly relations, Britain chose 
to protect its interests by occupying, by military force, part of Ibn Saud's realm on 
behalf of the Gulf Shaikhdoms, rather than to support its real friend. 
2 The British 
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill has been quoted to have been described Ibn Saud 
as the friend who had given his support to Britain during the darkest days of its 
history, during his speech in the House of Commons on 27 February 1945.3 However, 
this warmth between the two leaders was ended by the al-Buraimi dispute. During 
1953, Ibn Saud regretted that his friend, Winston Churchill, had now displayed 
enmity towards him over al-Buraimi (Mcloughlin, 1993: XVI). Mcloughlin (1993: 
179) cited Philby as saying that "the matter of the dispute with Britain over al- 
Buraimi was one which caused deep upset to Ibn Saud. " Regrettably, this took place 
as a result of a conflict of interests caused by the discovery of oil in al-Buraimi, 
which added a vastly different dimension to the old cleavages (Anthony, 1982: 149- 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Iqleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vo1.1,1955. Pp: 430-432. 
2 Ibid: 420-421. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 420-421. 
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151). Certainly, this was a good example of the influential role of the economic factor 
in the international relations of states. 
King Abdulaziz died when al-'Utaishan was still being besieged in Hamasa and 
British companies were intensively searching for oil in his ancestors' land, which he 
and his people strongly believed that it belonged to them (al-'Ajlani, N. D.: 377; al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1397-1399; Vassiliev, 1998: 347). Metaphorically speaking, it can be 
said that the British-Saudi friendly relationship evaporated by the fires of al-Buraimi 
oil. However, it is important to state that this dispute was not the first between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain. There had been other major disputes, such as that of al-Jahra in 
Kuwait and that concerning the Iraqi borders, which caused Major Glubb to pursue 
the Ikhwan into Saudi territories, as described before. It is worth asking why had the 
two Governments successfully managed many disputes with tolerance and wisdom, 
but had completely failed to control and peacefully solve the al-Buraimi dispute. 
Times had changed: in the old days, a gentleman's agreement had been able to resolve 
boundary disputes between the Gulf states, but this was no longer adequate in the 
days of oil (Howarth, 1964: 234). 
In the past, Britain had been sure of its relations with Saudi Arabia and feared no 
strong competition for its friendship and privileged position in Saudi foreign policy. 
But now, the U. S. had toppled Britain from this prime position and had become the 
new influential foreign power in the Middle East (Woodward, 1962: 399-401; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 261; Sluglett et al., 1982: 54; Vassiliev, 1998: 327&380). 
Also, Britain was forced to put a stop to the ambitions of ARAMCO, whose area of 
operations extended to include most of the oil-rich region (al-'Ajlani, N. D.: 371-372; 
Howarth, 1964: 234; Sa'ed, 1964: 437-440). The Saudi Government was no longer 
dependent on British aid or support in the international arena, due to the Saudi 
membership of the UN and its developing relations with most members of the 
international community. Moreover, the Saudi position in the Islamic and Arab 
worlds had been strengthened, especially after the creation of the Arab League in 
1945, which provided for mutual assistance and support among Arab countries, in 
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case of foreign invasion or threat ('Assah, 1971: 128-131; al-Zirikli, 1977: 1207-1209; 
al-Humoodi, 1998: 528-529; al-Sumari et at., 1999: 193-197). 
The rise of American influence as a leading state in world politics, especially in the 
Middle East, was among the factors which led to a decline in British influence in the 
region (Woodward, 1962: 399-401; Frank, 1985: 588). Therefore, Britain felt that it 
must work to secure its influence in the protectorates in order to guard its strategic 
presence in the Gulf, even if this policy were to lead to a serious dispute with King 
Abdulaziz. It is worth noting that the Saudi Government emphasised that it had no 
quarrel with either the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi or the Sultan of Oman. The dispute was 
with the British Government, which had created the problem due to its desire to 
control the area's oil. The Saudi Government strongly believed that the policy of the 
British Government was solely responsible for these disputes, and that without this 
policy there would have been no problems over the boundaries1 (al-'Ajlani, N. D.: 
371-372; Sa'ed, 1964: 437-440). The Saudi dispute with Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates over al-Buraimi was eventually settled in 1974. 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza' al-Igleemi Bayna Masqat wa Abu Dhabi 
wa Bayna al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah: 'Ardh Hukumat al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Su'udiyyah, Vol. 1,1955. Pp: 413-414; RJ15/2/465, memorandum sent by the British Foreign Office to 
the British Embassy in Jeddah on 2 February 1948. 
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Chapter Eight: Saudi Policy towards the United States of 
America 
This chapter discusses the major lines of policy adopted by King Abdulaziz towards 
the United States of America, with regard to political, economic and security issues. 
8.1 Saudi Response to the Early American Contact 
The Middle East region, including Saudi Arabia, did not occupy an important position 
in the minds of American politicians during the early 1900s, partly because of the 
isolationist policy of the United States and also because American commercial 
interests in the region were limited. -Thus, 
the United States had no clear policy or 
objectives in the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century (Nolte, 1964: 
152). In comparison to other powers, the United States' presence in the Arabian 
Peninsula was new. In general, the Americans entered this region with minor interests 
connected with economic, educational, medical, missionary and cultural purposes 
(Nolte, 1964: 151-152; al-'Uqbi, 1984: 36-37). Perhaps the reason the United States 
politicians did not give a high priority to this region was that they viewed the Middle 
East as being within the sphere of the European powers, mainly Britain, and it was 
the key area for the British Empire's communication with India (Nolte, 1964: 150; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 278; Bryson, 1977: 118; Abu `Ulayyah, 1997; 180-182; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 324). 
However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and many other countries hoped that the 
United States would support them and oppose the Mandate Powers in accordance 
with the principle of self-determination, which was advocated by President Wilson in 
a major speech to the U. S. Congress in 1918 (Hoskins, 1954: 100-101; al-'Uqbi, 
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1984: 37). The U. S. began to take an ever-increasing interest in the region after the 
First World War. Indeed, from that time, the United States' policy of isolation was no 
longer consistent with the interests of the American oil companies, which had by then 
begun to expand their foreign operations around the world, and began to look 
particularly at the Middle East as being a region containing tremendous oil reserves 
and which would well repay future investments. Therefore, the American companies 
protested to their government against the hegemony of Britain over the oil industry, 
which forced the American Government to put pressure on the British Government, 
asking for equal rights for American oil companies in accordance with the principle 
of Open-Door Policy in the lands which were under the Mandate (Lenczowski, 1960: 
20; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 229-230; al-'Uqbi, 1984: 44; Randall, 1985: 13-17). 
Oil companies in the U. S. considered the Agreement of San Remo, concluded in 
April 1920 between France and Britain and whereby the two powers agreed to share 
the oil of the Middle East, as effectively closing this vital market in their faces and 
putting the American economy at the mercy of that of Europe (Speiser, 1950: 114; al- 
'Uqbi, 1984: 37-38; Randall, 1985: 44-46). Therefore, they began to press their 
government to adopt a more active policy in defence of their interests. These 
campaigns continued until the matter reached the U. S. Congress. The pressure exerted 
by the oilmen was meant to force the U. S. Government to intervene against the policy 
of denial imposed on them by Britain, and continued until the Government protested 
to Britain in 1920, demanding an equal opportunity for the American oil companies in 
the Middle East (Speiser, 1950: 114; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 228-230; al-'Uqbi, 
1984: 38; Frank, 1985: 589; Vassiliev, 1998: 313). That protest marked the beginning 
of American involvement in the Gulf region, especially in terms of relations with 
Saudi Arabia, which were overtly and overwhelmingly grounded in economic 
matters, mainly the Kingdom's oil' (Halliday, 1982: 125; Keohane, 1982: 169). This 
came at the time when Ibn Saud desperately needed to end Britain's influence in the 
region for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter. 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /117, despatch by Mr. Knabenshue at the American 
Consulate in Iraq to the American Department of State on 22 June 1939. 
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Despite early American oil ambitions in the region, which led to an American 
company becoming the owner of the oil concession in Saudi Arabia, the United States 
did not recognise Ibn Saud as quickly as other powerful countries, such as Britain, 
France, Holland and Russia. Several attempts were made by Ibn Saud to establish 
diplomatic relations with the United States, but the latter was reluctant to recognise 
him and only did so in May 1931.1 Moreover, the United States did not appoint a 
diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia until March 1942. Previously, the U. S. 
Ambassador in Cairo had been accredited simultaneously to Saudi Arabia 
(Woodward, 1962: 399; Vassiliev, 1998: 325; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 123-124 & 169- 
171). Both Saudi Arabia and the United States established their relationship in a 
deliberate attempt to end the European hegemony, mainly that of Britain, in the 
Middle East. 
8.2 Oil and the Granting of a Concession to an American Company 
On 7 July 1933, a Saudi Royal Decree was issued approving an agreement signed in 
Jeddah on 29 May 1933, by the Saudi Minister of Finance, Abdullah al-Sulaiman, on 
behalf of the Saudi Government, and by Lloyd Hamilton, on behalf of the Standard 
Oil Company of California (SOCAL). 2 The period of concession was sixty years, 
covering the whole of eastern Saudi Arabia as far west as the Dahna desert. Also, 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 01/15, despatch from the American Acting Secretary of State to the 
American Vice Consul in Aden on 22 February 1930; American Archives, 890 F. 01/29A, despatch 
from the American Department of State to W. R Castle, the American Minister in Cairo, on 9 February 
1931; American Archives, 890 F. 01/291/2, despatch from the American Secretary of State indicating 
the instruction of the American President to go ahead with the recognition of Ibn Saud, on 9 February 
1931; American Archives, 890 F. 01/37, despatch from Ray Atherton, the American Ambassador in 
London, to the American Secretary of State, on 8 May 1931. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /15, despatch from G. P. Merriam, the American 
Consul in Cairo, to the American Secretary of State, on 10 June 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 6363 
Standard Oil Co. /16, despatch from G. P. Merriam, the American Consul in Cairo, to the American 
Secretary of State, on 19 June 1933. 
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SOCAL had the priority over Saudi half-rights in the Neutral Zone between Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. The Company was to pay an initial interest-free loan of £30,000 in 
gold sovereigns and, after eighteen months, a second interest-free loan of £20,000, 
also in gold sovereigns. There was, furthermore, to be an annual rental payment of 
£5,000 in gold sovereigns. Then, there were to be two loans of £50,000 in gold 
sovereigns, separated by one-year gap, with the first to be paid as soon as oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities. Thereafter, the Saudi Government would 
receive royalty payments of four shillings in gold, as revenue for each ton of crude oil 
extracted (Longrigg, 1968: 107-108; Holden and Johns, 1981: 118-119; Vassiliev, 
1998: 316-317; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 317-337). 
Saudi oil played a major role in the improvement of Saudi-American relations. The 
primary exploration works confirmed that the areas of concession contained the 
largest oil reserve in the world' (Keohane, 1982: 168; Frank, 1985: 592). Benoist- 
Mechin (1965: 230-231) quoted Harold Ickes, the U. S. Secretary of the Interior, as 
describing the winning by the Standard Oil Company of California of the Saudi oil 
concession as the greatest commercial deal of the modern era. As a result of this 
agreement with SOCAL, the American Government, following its interests, was 
persuaded by Ibn Saud to go for greater political involvement through stronger 
relations with Saudi Arabia (al-Rasheed, 2002: 92). Thus, Saudi Arabia became the 
first independent Arab state to develop important relations with the United States of 
America (Leatherdale, 1983: 211; al-Rasheed, 2002: 104). 
The granting of this oil concession was a remarkable step by Ibn Saud, which served 
to improve Saudi international relations. 2 Only a few months after SOCAL secured 
the concession, the United States Government, on 7 November 1933, signed an 
agreement with Saudi Arabia to exchange and regulate political, economic and 
commercial relations between the two states. 3 An important result of this accord was 
' Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan. In 'Idha'at Programme, on al-'Arabiyyah TV Channel, on 9 June 2004. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /117, despatch by Mr. Knabenshue at the American 
Consulate in Iraq to the American Department of State on 22 June 1939. 
3 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 128-130. 
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the commercial agreement to grant each other a preferential position with regard to 
taxes and fees on exchanged merchandises. This agreement lasted for several years 
after the death of Ibn Saud (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 685-686; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 170 & 
346-349). 
Some historians have argued that the King, by strengthening Saudi-American 
economic relations, created local rivalry in Saudi Arabia, between Britain and the 
United States. ' This reduced British influence in Saudi Arabia but induced both the 
British and the Americans to support King Abdulaziz financially, in order to 
strengthen the stability of Saudi Arabia, develop the country and reinforce Saudi 
Arabia's position in the international community (Woodward, 1962: 399; Abu 
`Ulayyah, 1997; 180-182; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 169). Others have claimed that King 
Abdulaziz, through his relationship with the United States, which was seen as a new 
international power, was able to liberate his country from the British influence 
(Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 261; Vassiliev, 1998: 327; al-Rasheed, 2002: 100-104). Ibn 
Saud's initiation of cordial relations with America was a main factor in the USA's 
displacement of Britain from its prime position in Saudi foreign policy (Woodward, 
1962: 399-401; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 261; Sluglett et al., 1982: 54; Vassiliev, 1998: 
327&380). 
In May 1939, a new concession expanded SOCAL's area of operation to include all 
the sedimentary formation from the west side of the Dahna desert to its boundaries 
with the igneous rocks, which contained no oil reserves. 
2 This new concession 
included the neutral zones in which Saudi Arabia had equal rights with Kuwait and 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 6363/2, despatch from J. Morton Howell, the American Minister in Cairo, 
to the American Secretary of State, on 27 December 1922; New York Post, Friday, 30 April 1948, "Ibn 
Saud's Star Wanes"; http: //www. varchive. org/obs/480430. htni. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /15, despatch from G. P. Merriam, the American 
Consul in Cairo, to the American Secretary of State, on 10 June 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 6363 
Standard Oil Co. /16, despatch from G. P. Merriam, the American Consul in Cairo, to the American 
Secretary of State, on 19 June 1933; American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /113, despatch 
from Bert. Fish, the American Consul in Cairo, to the American Secretary of State, on 21 June 1939. 
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Iraq. It also included the south-eastern border of Saudi Arabia with the Sultanate of 
Oman and the Lower Gulf Shaikhdoms (Twitchell, 1953: 153-154; Hoskins, 1954: 
205; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 699-700). It was clear that this expanded concession had an 
important political meaning. It involved the Americans in neighbouring areas, which 
were within those under British protection. 
' The expansion provoked a severe 
territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and the British Government, which was 
acting on behalf of its protectorates, as was discussed in the previous chapter. 
During the Second World War, the production of Saudi oil almost ceased and led to a 
reduction in oil revenues, owing to the Axis power's threat to the Allies' oil supplies 
and transportation lines. Furthermore, the War discouraged many pilgrims from 
visiting the Holy Places. 2 Thus, the War led to a financial crisis in Saudi Arabia, 
which put Ibn Saud in a very critical position and forced him to ask the Allies for 
foreign aid (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 251-253; Holden and Johns, 1981: 126; al-'Uqbi, 
1984: 68; Vassiliev, 1998; 323-324). Therefore, the Saudi Government requested a 
loan from SOCAL. 3 The budget deficit was so large that Saudi Arabia threatened to 
cancel the concession, which forced the company to call for the help of the U. S. 
Government (Vassiliev, 1998: 323-324). President Roosevelt asked Britain to support 
Saudi Arabia with part of the loan of around 4.5 million dollars, which the United 
States recently granted to Britain, as discussed before (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 251- 
253; Vassiliev, 1998: 323-324). 
The United States was concerned about the expansion of the Axis powers' influence 
in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, which would threaten its huge interests. Saudi 
American Archives, 890 F. 6363 Standard Oil Co. /76, despatch from the American Department of 
State to American Embassy in London on 24 May 1934. 
2 American Archives, 890 F. 404/16, despatch from Bert Fish, the American Consul in Egypt, to the 
American Secretary of State, on 4 October 1939. 
3 Public Record Office, FO 371/23271, cipher telegram by Sir Reader Bullard, the British 
Plenipotentiary Minister in Jeddah, to Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, on 1 December 1939; 
Public Record Office, FO 371/27264, despatch from Francis S. Bird, the British Plenipotentiary 
Minister in Jeddah, to the British Foreign Office on 10 November 1941. 
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Arabia, under the stress of financial crisis, might be obliged to ask the Axis 
governments for financial support, which would put Saudi Arabia, with its Islamic 
and Arab weight, into the balance on the Axis side (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 961-962). 
Therefore, the Americans worked towards strengthening their relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, the American oil companies and their representatives were 
urging the U. S. Government to support Ibn Saud as a strong and true friend of the 
Allies. They warned their government that negotiations were under way between Ibn 
Saud and Britain for a substantial loan, which would strengthen the British position in 
Saudi Arabia and threaten American oil interests, which were vital to the U. S. 
economy (Woodward, 1962,396-397; Holden and Johns, 1981: 128; Vassiliev, 1998: 
324-325). 
SOCAL representatives asked their government to provide direct aid to Saudi Arabia 
and suggested that the Kingdom should be included in the Lend-Lease Act. Under 
this programme, SOCAL would be relieved from providing the funds which Ibn Saud 
needed from its own treasury. As a result, in February 1943, Roosevelt took the 
initiative and instructed his government to include Saudi Arabia in the Lend-Lease 
aid programme at an estimated cost of $99 million. This enabled the American oil 
companies to neutralise the influence of their competitors, especially the British 
companies, with the direct help of the American Government (Speiser, 1950: 115-116; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 253-254; Holden and Johns, 1981: 128; Keohane, 1982: 170; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 324-325). 
President Roosevelt justified his decision and declared that the protection of Saudi 
Arabia was vital to the defence of the United States (Holden and Johns, 1981: 128; 
Vassiliev, 1998: 325). Additionally, Harold Ickes, the U. S. Secretary of the Interior, 
acknowledged that Saudi oil was crucially important to American national security 
(Frank, 1985: 591). Indeed, this showed how successful Ibn Saud was in taking 
advantage of the rivalry between the international powers in the area, especially 
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Britain and the United States of America. ' This rivalry was acknowledged by Harold 
Ickes saying: "When one turns to the question of who the Saudi concession should be 
protected against, it is surprising to find that the perceived enemy was Great Britain 
and the British-controlled companies" (Frank, 1985: 591). 
As more new oil fields were discovered in Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz recognised 
the real importance of the strategic wealth which lay hidden beneath his land. He 
recognised how much its revenues would contribute to the development of his 
country. At the same time, oil would tempt the Great Powers, chief among them the 
United States, to interfere further in the region. In Ibn Saud's view, this was a real 
threat to his state's sovereignty and internal stability. It was true that the United States 
was considered as one of the biggest oil producers and exporters, but at the same 
time, it was the biggest oil consumer. Its demand for oil from overseas sources was 
increasing day by day until it reached its peak when the United States started to 
import oil directly in 1940s (Keohane, 1982: 168; Randall, 1985: 13- 42). In fact, it 
was at this time that Saudi oil became very essential to the U. S., due to the growth of 
its demands and the shrinking of its domestic oil production (Speiser, 1950: 241; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 274-275; Keohane, 1982: 168; Frank, 1985: 590-591). 
By the early 1940s, America had become seriously interested in Saudi Arabia and 
started to forge political link with it. Undoubtedly, the ever-increasing importance of 
Saudi oil for the American economy led to a fundamental change in the United States' 
policy towards Saudi Arabia (Philby, 1955: 337-338; Baram, 1978,218; Keohane, 
1982: 168; Frank, 1985: 590). The United States Government decided to bring to end 
European, mainly British, political supremacy in the region and take it over and 
reinforce, maintain and protect its economic and commercial interests (Woodward, 
1962,399-400; Baram, 1978,218; Holden and Johns, 1981: 128; Vassiliev, 1998: 
326; al-Rasheed, 2002: 104). This improvement of American policy towards Saudi 
Arabia was confirmed by the historical meeting between King Abdulaziz and the 
1 American Archives, 890 F. 6363/2, despatch from J. Morton Howell, the American Minister in Cairo, 
to the American Secretary of State, on 27 December 1922; New York Post. Friday, 30 April 1948, "Ibn 
Saud's Star Wanes'; lsly: //www. varchive. org/obs/480430. htm. 
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American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt on 14 February 1945. This meeting 
constituted a great step towards establishing a strong and stable Saudi-American 
relationship, which has lasted to the present day. 
8.3 The Saudi-American Summit Meeting 
After the Yalta Conference, on 11 February 1945,1 as the Second World War drew to 
a close, with victory assured for the Allies, President Roosevelt announced his desire 
for a meeting with Ibn Saud. Therefore, a telegram was sent to the American 
Ambassador in Jeddah, William Eddy, asking him to arrange matters with Ibn Saud. 
The King consented, and so the Americans arranged to take him by one of their ships 
to meet President Roosevelt, who would be waiting for him on board the U. S. S. 
Quincy in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. On 14 February 1945, the two leaders 
met and discussed several important issues of concern to their countries; at the head 
of the agenda was the Palestine problem (Philby, 1955: 338; Howarth, 1964: 203-207; 
Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 256-257; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1155-1166; al-'Uqbi, 1984: 108- 
117). The discussion between the two leaders on this problem and the increasing 
Jewish immigration to Palestine will be separately discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
During his meeting with Roosevelt, the King agreed that the Kingdom's eastern ports 
could be used by the Allies and consented to the building of an air force base. 
However, he insisted on the condition that Saudi Arabia should under no 
circumstances be occupied and that no part of its territory should be alienated (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1177; Vassiliev, 1998: 226-327). This was to ensure Saudi sovereignty 
which, for him, was the most important factor that he thought it might be threatened 
by the conflict of interest between the Great Powers. As a consequence, the areas 
I ht(D'//Nvww. vale. edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/valta. htm. 
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intended to involve other foreign powers in the Palestine issue rather than restrict it to 
Britain, as a result of its support to the Zionist aspirations. Hence, in November 1938, 
he started to implement his new strategy: his first letter to President Roosevelt 
attempted to influence the American policy on Palestine which was seen in support of 
the Zionists and asked the U. S. for help in opposing British actions in Palestine. This 
letter explained and argued for the historical and natural rights of the Palestinians and 
tried to disprove the Zionist claims (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1103-1108; Abu Zlam, 
1984: 558; al-Musallam, 1985: 130-134). 
The Second World War was about to end, and King Abdulaziz had undoubtedly 
become one of the most influential Arab leaders of his time. President Roosevelt, who 
proposed the summit meeting in the Bitter Lakes in February 1945, as mentioned above, 
believed that he should try to obtain Ibn Saud's approval of the settlement in Palestine 
of Jewish refugees from Germany and Eastern Europe after the end of the War. 
Moreover, Roosevelt hoped that he would be able to convince King Abdulaziz to 
agree to the partitioning of Palestine, and that the King would then be able to 
persuade the Palestinian people and the Arabs generally to agree that the Jews should 
be given a national home there (Hull, 1948: 1522; Howarth, 1964: 203; Benoist- 
Mechin, 1965: 257; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1155; Holden and Johns, 1981: 133). 
Convinced of the justice of his arguments, the President recounted to Ibn Saud, 
during their Summit, in detail, the horrible oppression the Jews had suffered under the 
Nazis and explained the determination of the Zionists to find a land which would give 
the Jews security at last. King Abdulaziz's decisive response was: "If the Jews are to be 
compensated for the outrages perpetrated against them, then it should be the perpetrators 
who carry the cost. If the United States and its allies wished to see the Jews settled on land 
of their own, then it should be German land that is appropriated". When Roosevelt 
broached the issue of Palestine, Ibn Saud was uncompromising. "Why should the 
Palestinians be expected to atone for the sins of the Germans? Why should the United 
States look to its friends rather than to its enemies to make reparations for the crimes 
of its enemies? " (Wahbah, 1960: 168-169; Howarth, 1964: 206-207; Benoist-Mechin, 
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1965: 257; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1158-1163; Holden and Johns, 1981: 137; al-'Uqbi, 
1984: 116-117). 
Despite this difference in views, the meeting was conducted with great courtesy, both 
men showing respect for each other's customs. President Roosevelt was impressed by the 
simple clarity with which Ibn Saud presented the Arab case. It was remarkable how King 
Abdulaziz was able to influence Roosevelt to accept the Arab point of view, or at 
least to assume a posture of neutrality. Upon his return to Washington, President 
Roosevelt told the Congress that he had learned more about Palestine from King 
Abdulaziz than in all the arguments and memoranda he had ever had from his staff 
(al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1165; Holden and Johns, 1981: 137). With regard to Palestine, 
according to Benoist-Mechin (1965: 258) Roosevelt said that Of all those with whom 
he had dealt throughout his entire life, no one had given him less than he obtained 
from this iron-willed Arabian King. 
It is quite clear that King Abdulaziz's meeting with Roosevelt should be judged by 
any standard as a spectacular success. During the Summit meeting, the King was so 
persuasive that the American President pledged not to assist the Jews against the 
Arabs. Moreover, he promised not to make any decision without full consultation 
with both sides. Shortly before his death, these verbal assurances were confirmed in a 
letter, dated 5 April 1945. In this letter, Roosevelt reassured the King that he would take 
no action hostile to the Arabs. It was clear that Roosevelt was committing himself, not as 
an individual, but as the Chief of the Executive Branch of the United States 
Government, which meant that this stated policy was unchangeable (Wahbah, 1960: 
167; Howarth, 1964: 206-207; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1196-1197; Holden and Johns, 
1981: 138; al-'Uqbi, 1984: 159-169). 
However, United States policy did not remain unchanged as Roosevelt had promised. 
Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, changed the United States policy on the 
Palestinian issue and broke President Roosevelt's promises to Ibn Saud (Howarth, 
1964: 207; Holden and Johns, 1981: 142; al 'Ugbi, 1984: 120-121). It was a tragic 
chapter: King Abdulaziz scored an impressive initial victory, but changes in the 
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United States' political scene transformed a promising beginning into a calamity. It is 
evident that this was due to President Truman's sympathy with the Jewish situation. 
In November 1945, Truman summoned his Ambassadors in the Arab countries to 
Washington, and annulled his predecessor's promises with the words "I'm sorry, 
gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands of people who are anxious 
for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my 
constituents" (Howarth, 1964: 207; Holden and Johns, 1981: 142). 
Truman assumed that the United States could support Zionism while maintaining its 
commitments to Ibn Saud. In vain, King Abdulaziz tried to persuade the President to 
renounce this abhorrent policy by reminding him of his predecessor's commitments 
made in correspondence beginning in August 1945. The King also tried to influence 
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry when he met them in March 1946 (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1221-1283; Holden and Johns, 1981: 142-143; al-'Ash'al, 1986: 142- 
144; Harran, 1987: 40-42; Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 130-146). However, 
King Abdulaziz's appeals to Truman proved fruitless. Truman officially endorsed the 
partition of Palestine and supported this policy at the UN in 1947 (al-Ghulami, 
1980: 172-173; Holden and Johns, 1981: 143; Harran, 1987: 42; Abu 'Ulayyah and al- 
Natshah, 1999: 256). 
It could be said that King Abdulaziz's policy towards the U. S. on the issue of 
Palestine was based on determination and firmness. The King made his position 
unmistakably clear and worked to persuade the American Government and public 
opinion to liberate U. S. policy from the influence of Zionist propaganda. According to at- 
'Uqbi (1984: 116-117) and Vassiliev (1998: 343) the King explained the historical and 
natural rights of the Arabs in Palestine, and argued cogently that if Germany had 
committed crimes against the Jews, then Germany should pay for its crimes and 
accommodate the Jews or compensate them for their losses. Moreover, if the West 
was so concerned about settling the Jews, why could they not be distributed among 
the more than fifty Allied states? Not only was Palestine too small to carry the full 
burden, but it had already assumed more than its share, so why not let every country 
carry its fair share? He also emphasised that the Arabs were so determined to resist 
226 
the Jewish state that it could only be established and maintained by force. Arab 
hospitality was reserved for friends and not for enemies. Furthermore, he warned the 
international community, mainly the U. S. and Britain, that there was a real threat to 
peace in the Middle East which would harm their interests. Finally, the only way the 
Palestine dispute could be resolved was by handing the country to the Arabs. Any 
other solution would constitute clear aggression which the conscience of humanity 
could not accept (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 777-778 and 1146-1197; Vassiliev, 1998: 343). 
In the late 1940s, it became clear to King Abdulaziz that the new ally would not be 
different from the old one with regard to Palestine (Howarth, 1964: 207). The Arabs, 
led by King Abdulaziz, were frustrated and disappointed by the attitude of the 
Americans toward the Arab fundamental issue of Palestine. This, in addition to the 
end of the British Mandate and the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, was 
enough to ignite the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, as discussed before. This took 
place around the time when Saudi-American economic relations reached their climax 
by 1946, when the United States of American had started to import Saudi oil due to 
its oil crisis (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 274-275). 
These events had prompted some researchers to ask questions concerning the role that 
oil could have played in the Arab-Israeli war if the Saudi Government had undertaken 
to cut off oil supplies to the countries which supported Israel. Some scholars, among 
them Van der Meulen (1999: 124), criticized the King for not stopping oil supplies to 
the U. S. due to its attitude toward the Zionists during the War of 1948. Moreover, he 
insisted that if King Abdulaziz had done so, he would have decisively raised the 
profile of the Arab issue (Palestine) in the international arena and would have obliged 
the American Government to implement President Roosevelt's promises. However, 
the King's point of view concerning the severing of economic relations with the U. S. 
and Britain was different. According to Abu 'Ulayyah and al-Natshah (1999: 275-276) 
the King believed that it would not have had the strong effect on rich and 
industrialised countries that it would have had on Arab countries. Furthermore, such 
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drastic action would have dragged the Arab countries into political and economic 
dispute with these two states. 
However, this did not mean that Saudi Arabia did not contemplate using this factor in 
order to put pressure on the U. S. with a view to influencing the American stance. In 
fact, King Abdulaziz did play the economic card in November 1946, through his 
Foreign Minster, Prince Faisal. Faisal told Terry Duce, the Deputy of the Operations 
Department of ARAMCO, that if the U. S. did not change its policy toward Palestine, 
the King might be forced to change his attitude toward American economic interests 
in his country, particularly oil interests. Moreover, as a result of the U. N. Resolution 
in 1947, which sanctioned the partition of Palestine, King Abdulaziz stated to the 
American Commissioner that the support of the U. S. for this resolution would harm 
their relations with the Arabs, which would certainly bring them into confrontation, 
especially on economic issues (Hakeem, 1976: 173; Qasmiyyah, 1999: 80; Harran, 
1999: 404). Duce himself acknowledged that U. S. policy on Palestine would ruin its 
good political and economic position in the Middle East, including its oil concessions 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Abu'Ulayyah and al-Natshah, 1999: 147). 
8.5 The Mutual Saudi-American Security Relationship 
During the 1940s, both Saudi Arabia and the United States felt the need for mutual 
coordination of security. In the Second World War, the U. S. deployed its forces in 
Europe and the Far East at the same time. Seeking to establish communications 
between the two fronts, the U. S. believed that Saudi Arabia could be an important 
connection between Europe and the Pacific. This was the reason why President 
Roosevelt had asked King Abdulaziz, during their meeting, for permission to use the 
Saudi Arabia's eastern ports and emphasised that America required an air force base 
1 This was supported by His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz and Bakur al-'Amri during 
my interview with them in Jeddah on 31 December 2003 and on I January 2004. 
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in the eastern province (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 258-260; Vassiliev, 1998: 326-327; 
al-Hummoodi, 1998: 209-210). 
When Germany was about to surrender, America's need for an air base in Saudi 
Arabia, as an intermediate position, increased due to their need to move some of their 
forces to the Far East against Japan. It could be said that this was the starting point of 
the American request to obtain a lease for an air force base in al-Dhahran, 
immediately after the Bitter Lakes meeting. For the Saudi Government, the approval 
of the construction of the airport meant more American aid and contributions, which 
would be provided in the form of materials, technical equipment, training for the 
Saudis and medical services. In addition, it meant, for King Abdulaziz, further 
American involvement in the region. In May 1945, the King agreed that the U. S. 
should build al-Dhahran airport (Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 258-260; Vassiliev, 1998: 
327; al-Hummoodi, 1998: 209-210). After a period of negotiations, an agreement 
between the two countries was achieved on 6 August 1945 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 686). 
The agreement stated that the airport would be returned, with all its constructions and 
equipment, to Saudi Arabia as soon as the Second World War ended. However, the 
Saudi Government acknowledged the American right to use the airport for three years 
after the end of the War. As a matter of fact, the King, in order to ensure Saudi 
sovereignty, insisted that it should be part of the agreement that the Saudi flag be 
raised over the entrance to al-Dhahran, as an indication of his state's independence. 
This agreement was revised and renewed on 23 June 1949, and again renewed on 18 
June 1951,1 to be valid for five years from that date, with the addition of further 
articles to suit the interests of the two sides. Among those articles was the 
acknowledgment by the U. S. of the right of the Saudi Government to practise its full 
authority inside and outside the airport 2 (al-Zirikli, 1977a: 686; Holden and Johns, 
1981: 157-158; al-Sumari et al., 1999: 449-459). However, there were some members 
of the U. S. Congress who were against the establishment of this airport, and some 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 303-311. 
2 Ibid. 
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politicians in the State Department claimed that the airport was only important for the 
American war efforts against Japan. Therefore, they assumed that the airport, which 
would cost America millions of dollars, would cease to be important to American 
national security once Japan surrendered (Miller, 1980: 138). 
Initially, these comments by U. S. politicians made the American Government 
reluctant to proceed with the building of the airport. However, there were some 
American officials who believed that al-Dhahran would be important to U. S. interests 
even after the end of the War for many reasons. It would be at an intermediate 
position on the route to the Far East even for American civil aviation, in addition to 
its importance to the American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Hoskins, 
1954: 272). Also, it would support the Saudi-American relationship and serve the 
mutual interests of the two countries. They also believed that Saudi-American 
relations would be harmed if the USA did not keep to its promises to Ibn Saud after 
he had given his approval. For those reasons, President Harry Truman gave his 
permission to build al-Dhahran airport on 18 June 1945, and a prompt telegram was 
sent to the American Ambassador in Jeddah, William Eddy, authorising him to start 
negotiations with King Abdulaziz (ibid: 138-139). 
Due to the great enmity of Saudi Arabia and the United States towards Communism, 
both countries felt their need for more cooperation against the Communist threat, 
which was represented by the ambitions of the Soviet Union in the region (Wahbah, 
1960: 176; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276-277; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 776; Vassiliev, 1998: 
342). As a result, the United States agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with more 
economic and military aid. This included American participation in building the 
Saudi forces, by furnishing them with modern American weapons and training the 
Saudi officers. ' Hence, it has been maintained that the U. S. became Saudi Arabia's 
main supplier of weapons and military instructors after the Second World War 
(Vassiliev, 1998: 442). Saudi Arabia and the United States adopted similar policies 
towards the Communist bloc. The Soviet threat in the Middle East and the 
1 The Saudi Foreign Ministry, Majmu'at al-Mu'ahadat, 1922-1951. Pp. 303-311. 
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Communist movements around Saudi Arabia may have been an important reason for 
Saudi Arabia and the U. S. to start negotiations with a view to extending the leasing 
period of the al-Dhahran base in early 1951. This led to the renewal of the Agreement 
of al-Dhahran for a further five years with more suitable conditions for both sides, as 
mentioned previously (Hoskins, 1954: 272; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276-278). 
The Saudi-Hashemite rivalry may also have been an important reason behind the 
Saudi-American cooperation on security matters, which led to the King's acceptance 
of the need to extend the al-Dhahran Agreement. King Abdulaziz was apprehensive 
about the ambitions of the Hashemite thrones in Iraq and Jordan as a potential threat. 
Ibn Saud blamed Britain for supporting the Hashemites' aspirations to rule in the 
context of the Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent projects, which they would not 
achieve without the British assistance. ' The King saw that these aspirations would 
constitute a real threat to the stability and sovereignty of his state (Benoist-Mechin, 
1965: 286-287; Vassiliev, 1998: 330). For this reason, the King tried, with the United 
States, to influence British policy in order to change its supportive stance towards the 
Hashemites. On various occasions, he expressed his apprehension to the Americans 
about potential Hashemite attacks, as a result of his feeling that he could not rely on 
the British to restrain the Hashemites' ambitions. He felt that only the United States 
could guarantee his security against the Hashemites (Mcloughlin, 1993: 181). 
Indeed, one important aim of Ibn Saud's policy towards the U. S. was clearly to 
maintain the security of Saudi Arabia against his regional political opponents, who 
were supported by Britain. This was made clear by his son, Prince Saud, during his 
official visit to the United States in 1947. King Abdulaziz acknowledged that he 
needed American political support due essentially to Britain's unfriendly policy of 
supporting the Hashemites and other political opponents against him in the region (al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 774-775). Ibn Saud was keen to influence the American point of view 
on the proposed project of Greater Syria. Also, he wanted to assure the American 
1 Public Record Office, FO 371/62112, despatch from Alan Trott, the British Plenipotentiary Minister 
in Jeddah, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 December 1947. 
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support in case of any attack against his country. In January 1947, the American 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, confirmed to Prince Saud America's full support for 
the intact unification of the Saudi Arabian territories and its entire political 
sovereignty against any external threat. This was achieved as a result of Ibn Saud's 
efforts to maintain the security of his realm, in addition to the Americans' need to 
secure their interests in Saudi Arabia. 
8.6 American Development Assistance to Saudi Arabia 
As a result of friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and the USA, a great amount of 
American assistance was provided to Saudi Arabia in the field of agriculture. In 
response to an invitation from King Abdulaziz, an American agricultural mission, 
headed by Twitchell, arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1942. Its task was to conduct soil 
research and undertake a scientific survey of the water in Saudi Arabia (Twitchell, 
1953: 43; Holden and Johns, 1981: 143). The American Government sent the required 
equipment under the Lend-Lease programme. With American assistance, many water 
wells were drilled in different provinces in Saudi Arabia. The deployment of 
American funds and modem equipment ensured that cultivated areas were improved 
(Twitchell, 1953: 43-47; Abu 'Ulayyah, 1997: 206-207). In 1951, a Saudi-American 
programme was started to extend the cultivated area in Saudi Arabia by establishing 
typical farms and training the people. Also, the programme managed to transform the 
desert land in order to make it suitable for agriculture (Abu 'Ulayyah, 1997: 207). 
However, the main purpose behind the U. S. support of Saudi agricultural 
development was to assist the Saudi Government in achieving greater internal 
stability in this oil-rich country. This would increasingly enable the Americans to 
retain Ibn Saud's friendship. 
Several development plans and projects were accomplished in Saudi Arabia as a 
result of the Saudi-American friendship. Among those projects was the Trans- 
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Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE). It was an important project intended to bring Saudi oil 
from the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia to Sidon in Lebanon, on the Mediterranean Sea. 
This pipeline, which was to be 1,070 miles long, would reduce the distance from the 
ARAMCO oil fields to the markets in Western Europe by 3,500 miles by shipping oil 
from Sidon (al-Mukhtar, 1957: 478-491; Twitchell, 1953: 194-195; Longrigg, 
1968: 206-208; al-Zirikli, 1977a: 1295-1299). The Government of Saudi Arabia strongly 
believed in the importance of this project for its oil exportation, but it was not able to 
fund it at that time. The immense cost of some $240,000,000 for this huge project was 
financed by American companies (Twitchell, 1953: 195; Longrigg, 1968: 208; al- 
Zirikli, 1977a: 1295-1299). Indeed, this project was one of the great projects of the 
King's reign, which created thousands of work opportunities for the Saudis. The 
number of Saudis working on this project at one point reached 15,000 (Longrigg, 
1968: 207). As a matter of fact, TAPLINE was a beneficial project for Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, as it crossed their lands (Twitchell, 1953: 194-199-201). 
Another important project which was achieved in Saudi Arabia was the rail road 
between al-Dammam and Riyadh. Al-Dammam was the nearest port to the capital 
city of Riyadh and many products were imported through its docks. Moreover, the 
need for a railroad increased as more developments took place in Saudi Arabia, 
especially in the inland regions, far away from the ports. The idea of the al-Dammam- 
Riyadh Railway project was conceived in 1946. The first train arrived in Riyadh in 
1951, having crossed 357 miles from al-Dammam to the heart of Saudi Arabia, 
carrying passengers, goods, equipments and oil (Twitchell, 1953: 203-204; al-Zirikli, 
1977a: 839-842). The cost of this project was, however, simply too huge for Saudi 
Arabia to provide alone. Therefore, the Saudi Government asked the American 
Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK) for a loan of around £33 million. The American 
assistance was provided to Saudi Arabia under the fourth clause of the Truman's 
programme (Vassiliev, 1998: 345). 
The friendly political and strong economic relations between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States were supportive factors on the development of Saudi Arabia through 
the many projects implemented during King Abdulaziz's reign. It has been maintained 
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that, since Saudi oil was underpinning Saudi-American relations, all economic, 
commercial, educational, technological and strategic agreements and understandings 
between them revolved, in one way or another, around oil (Keohane, 1982: 169; 
Nakhleh, 1975: 67). However, this was but a part of an American strategic plan to 
strengthen Saudi Arabia as one of the countries whose security was vital to the United 
States and the Free World in their struggle against the Communist threat (Hoskins, 
1954: 272-274; Benoist-Mechin, 1965: 276; Nakhleh, 1975: 46-47). Indeed, it is 
difficult to deny that the main objective of United States policy in the Middle East 
then was to keep the region free of the Soviet threat and of radical political 
movements (Nakhleh, 1975: 51). 
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Conclusions 
The study has demonstrated the effective and charismatic leadership of Ibn Saud. 
Before him, Arabian Peninsula was well known for its political instability and the 
absolute absence of security, which were indispensable for any form of state building 
and development. It was Ibn Saud, as a leader, who was able to convince the people 
of the Arabian Peninsula to follow him and achieve with him their dream of being 
one people living in one country and ruled by one government. During the expansion 
of his authority, he emphasized the meaning of brotherhood among his followers (the 
Ikhwan), so much so that they gave it priority over kinship or loyalty to their tribes. 
For the first thirty years of his era, Ibn Saud worked to consolidate the political 
stability and security of his territories, expanding his authority into areas which had 
never experienced security or peace before. Those lands were lacking in political 
stability, which resulted in a deteriorating economic and security situation. 
Ibn Saud was decisive in dealing with all his political adversaries, in order to 
establish and maintain the unity of leadership for the entire nation, which then led to 
the achievement of political integration in the area. This was a direct result of his 
belief in the importance of these matters for the development of the state and the 
growth of its economy. The achievement of political stability in Ibn Saud's territories 
meant the supremacy of law, peace and security, and the growth of the economy. This 
was the main reason why the people in the other territories looked forward to his 
protection and support. This was evident from the early welcome he received from 
the people of Najd, and was even more so in the attitude of those residents of al-Hasa, 
who wrote to him for years asking for liberation from the Turks, who, in turn, were 
not able to protect al-Hasa from the constant raids of the surrounding Bedouin tribes. 
In the Hail province, which had witnessed instability as a result of disputes within the 
Royal Family (al-Rasheed), the residents contacted Ibn Saud and requested that the 
province be brought under his authority. Likewise, the majority of Asir's people wrote 
to Ibn Saud, on a variety of issues, chief among them the political instability and lack 
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of security there, asking to become part of his dominion. Similar conditions in al- 
Hijaz helped to explain the enthusiastic welcome given to Ibn Saud by the majority of 
the Hijazi people, among whom were highly influential families, including part of the 
Royal family of al-Sharif. Political instability also forced al-Idreesi, the Governor of 
Jaizan, to ask Ibn Saud to protect him by putting Jaizan under his protection, due to 
the growing threat posed by Imam Yahia of Yemen. Thus, while each region of the 
Arabian Peninsula had its particular features that led to its conquest by Ibn Saud, the 
essential common factor that led to conquest was the lack of security and political 
instability. 
In 1932, Ibn Saud's state was politically established as a single political entity with 
one national identity under the name of the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia". By this act, 
Ibn Saud achieved the first united state to consist of most of the Arabian Peninsula, 
which had witnessed disputes for centuries and had never been a long-lasting single 
political entity before. This disunity was due to many factors, among which was the 
isolation of the Peninsula and the absence of an effective leadership in it. As he was 
now the leader of a stable country with a distinctive national identity, Ibn Saud, 
having learned from his early contacts with Britain and Turkey, was ready to establish 
direct relationships with the international community and lay the foundations for 
Saudi international relations for the first time. Before him, most of the Saudi regions 
had no previous contact with the outside world. They had never been colonised, and 
indeed had never been subjected to any kind of foreign power. This was a great 
advantage to the Saudi State in formulating and implementing its foreign policy. 
Moreover, because it had never been colonised, Saudi Arabia was able to retain the 
purity of its culture and to keep its authentic Arabian and Islamic political identity. 
The study has also illustrated how greatly Saudi Arabia had suffered during its 
establishment, from a lack of political structures and an absence of governmental 
institutions, due to isolation and lack of direct contact with other nations. At this time, 
Saudi Arabia was deficient in most areas of governmental and administrative 
organisations (except in al-Hijaz) due to its isolation and the absence of the 
institutions characteristic of a modem state. This lack of political structures and 
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governmental institutions constituted a complex problem during the early stages of 
the emergence of Saudi Arabia. The study illustrated King Abdulaziz's great 
achievement in this regard, as he gradually overcame this problem by welcoming 
many Arab experts in political and administrative matters. He attracted them by 
giving them his support, protection and generous rewards. He also gave them the 
opportunity of promotion to the highest positions and granted Saudi nationality to 
anyone who asked for it, despite the opposition of those among his own people who 
did not share his idea of seeking the help of non-Saudis. 
With the inclusion of al-Hijaz, Ibn Saud's state reached the maximum expansion 
possible in the political circumstances then prevailing. Hence, he felt the need to 
develop and modernise the state. The study has shed light on the methods employed 
by King Abdulaziz to improve the Hijazi governmental institutions and regulations 
according to modern concepts, and indicated how many institutions and regulations 
were established or improved in the new Kingdom, such as the Consultative Council, 
the Judicial System, the Police Authority and the Finance Department. Most 
departments were upgraded to ministries during his era. With regard to his foreign 
policy and international relations, upon being recognised by the international 
community, he developed his foreign policy apparatus and created the institutions 
which would organize and administer these affairs. This was done by establishing a 
Political Committee and a Department of Foreign Affairs, which was upgraded, in 
1930, to a Foreign Ministry. 
The study also demonstrated the decisive role of Ibn Saud when he insisted on 
vanquishing any internal opposition to the modernisation and development of his 
people and state. In internal affairs, Ibn Saud confronted the elites who had political 
ambitions or were, for various reasons, antipathetic to his modem concept of the state. 
There were many opponents to Ibn Saud's foreign policy and his contacts with the 
international community, as they were against development and modernisation. 
Amongst these opponents were some religious and tribal leaders who were influential 
military leaders in Ibn Saud's army. Some of these rivals led a military revolt against 
him although they had provided indispensable military support when he was building 
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his state. They demanded that he maintain the Peninsula's isolation from the 
international community and break all contact even with Arab and Muslim states 
which practised Islamic teachings they considered unacceptable. 
For much the same reason, the rebels also rejected the introduction of modem 
technology and scientific innovations. In addition, they demanded unlimited 
expansion, which would have involved Ibn Saud in military and political disputes 
with the Great Powers, especially Britain and France. As a prudent and judicious 
leader, Ibn Saud knew that any conflict with those powers would have been beyond 
his political, economic and military capabilities. Such a conflict would have cost him 
dear and could have led to the loss of all he had achieved thus far. Furthermore, he 
was involved in treaties with those powers which he wanted to maintain and respect. 
Those who opposed him were not able to recognize these realities as Ibn Saud did, 
because they lacked his knowledge of external affairs and his skilful leadership. For 
Ibn Saud, the options were complicated. He had to decide between two alternatives: 
to go ahead with his plans to develop his newly emerging state and to establish its 
relations with the international community through a foreign policy that would place 
the country in the position it deserved, or to yield to the demands of his adversaries. 
The study showed that the revolts by the rebellious Ikhwan, Ibn Rifadah and Idreesi, 
which had external support and funding, were unable to change Ibn Saud's policy or 
to end his ambition of building and developing his state. If he had agreed to a 
compromise, he would have been compelled to sever all ties with the international 
community. However, King Abdulaziz, with his charismatic and influential 
leadership, chose to implement his plan and go forward to achieve his goals by 
putting the interests of his state and the majority of his people before any other 
option. He accomplished his great ambitions, strengthened by his faith in God, by his 
strong belief in his principles and by the trust of his faithful people, who gave him 
their unlimited loyalty and support. If Ibn Saud had yielded to his adversaries' 
demands, Saudi Arabia would not have become what it is today, a modern and stable 
country. 
238 
In the early 1930s, after King Abdulaziz had succeeded in overcoming his rivals, the 
time was suitable for adopting a more flexible and a broader identity than the narrow 
Ikhwan identity, which was limited to the people of Najd and some other zealots in 
neighbouring regions. It was necessary to abandon the Ikhwan identity for a wider 
and more comprehensive identity, which would unite the people of all provinces, 
including those who followed different Islamic teachings and creeds. This eventually 
allowed Saudi Arabia to achieve further development and establish more healthy 
relations with the international community. However, as a result of his success in 
dealing with troublesome internal factors, King Abdulaziz was able to adopt a foreign 
policy and establish his international relations, in ways that suited the interests of his 
state. 
The study has indicated how the integration of the Saudi national community was 
achieved, which was a long and difficult task for King Abdulaziz. He worked 
tirelessly to establish the Saudi national identity and dedicated his life to the 
development of the Saudi community. It was apparent that he overcame many 
obstacles during his arduous mission towards the unification of his people behind his 
leadership as one community. This enabled Saudi Arabia to relate to the international 
community through an influential and cohesive foreign policy. 
It has been illustrated in this study that, in order to establish constructive relations 
with the international community, Saudi Arabia as well as other newly established 
states should overcome several problems. These problems include the establishment 
of a national identity for the newly emerging state; the building of a political structure 
and foreign policy institutions; the acquisition of an influential leadership; the 
achievement of political stability; the possession of adequate economic resources; the 
handling of colonial legacies; and the attainment of national security. It is true that, 
Saudi Arabia and each of the other newly established states had their own particular 
characteristics which distinguish them from other states, but the factors enumerated 
above would have an impact, in one way or another, on all newly emerging states. 
However, each factor would have its impact on a new state in accordance with its 
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special circumstances. Saudi Arabia has been a good example of a newly emerging 
state which successfully dealt with the negative and positive sides of these factors. 
The freedom Ibn Saud displayed in his foreign policy was evident in his dealings with 
the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula. It also characterised his relations with the Gulf 
Shaikhdoms, which were protected by Britain. This study illustrated the tenacity with 
which Ibn Saud fought to secure his state's interests even when this led to his 
becoming embroiled in a military conflict with Britain, which was acting on behalf of 
its protectorates. It has also been demonstrated that tribal and territorial factors had 
led to several border disputes with most of his neighbours. 
King Abdulaziz also exercised great freedom in his policy towards Arab affairs. With 
regard to Palestine, which was (and still is) the most important unresolved regional 
issue in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims, he was in conflict with Britain as a 
Mandatory Power, especially when he lost his faith in the credibility of Britain due to 
its perceived unlimited support for the Zionists. In fact, Palestine was an essential 
factor in Ibn Saud's relations with foreign powers generally, and with Britain and the 
United States in particular. He persisted in his principled support for the Palestinians 
and in the strong hope that eventually a peaceful settlement would be achieved. The 
establishment and conduct of his relations with other Arab countries, such as Egypt, 
Trans-Jordan and Iraq, were also characterised by a remarkable degree of freedom. 
His relations with them were undertaken for the benefit of Arab causes, although they 
were still subjected to colonial influences. Indeed, the isolation of Saudi Arabia was a 
major factor that led to the Saudi foreign policy being free from the influence of the 
Great Powers, which allowed Ibn Saud to pursue a supportive foreign policy towards 
the Arab liberation movements against the domination of the colonial powers. 
In addition to its new identity as a modern state, Saudi Arabia maintained its Arab 
and Islamic identity in its international relations and foreign policy. It has been made 
clear from the study that Ibn Saud's foreign policy emerged from his principles, 
which were grounded in Arab and Islamic values and traditions, and from his 
influence as leader of a state which always insisted on fulfilling the duties imposed by 
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its Arab and Islamic identity. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia welcomed all the Muslim 
states and organizations which asked for political relations with the Kingdom or for 
help against their colonial masters. Ibn Saud's stance towards the colonial powers was 
unwavering: he opposed them and refused to play by their rules or submit to their 
influence. This was demonstrated by his refusal to join the League of Nations in the 
1930s. Ibn Saud knew that he was the leader of a stable state, which had built 
influential relations with the states and organizations of the international community. 
Also, he believed that his state should use its strong economy and rich oil resources to 
benefit and support Arab and Muslim causes. The King's freedom in his policy 
towards Arab and Muslim affairs was further demonstrated in the many treaties and 
agreements which he signed with many of the Arab and Muslim states and 
organizations. 
Ibn Saud was careful not to become involved in restrictive treaties as others had done, 
and as a consequence of which they lost the freedom to conduct their foreign affairs 
as they had wished. In fact, he never involved himself in any treaty or agreement that 
would degrade the Saudi sovereignty, except for the Treaty of Darin in 1915. 
Nonetheless, this treaty did not last for long as he insisted on abrogating it through the 
Treaty of Jeddah in 1927, when he was about to establish his state's relationship with 
Britain. Ibn Saud's foreign policy towards Britain, as the most influential power in the 
region at that time, was the strongest evidence of Ibn Saud's determination to assert 
his state's independence in the making of foreign policy. This was strongly evident in 
his decision to grant an oil concession to an American company despite the existence 
of a strong Saudi-British friendship. 
Ibn Saud always experienced British pressure with regard to the country's position on 
some regional and international issues. Among those issues were Ibn Saud's boundary 
disputes with Britain regarding its Protectorates in the Gulf, which were regarded by 
him to have been fully or partly under the rule of his ancestors in the past. 
Furthermore, he was in political conflict with the British policy on Palestine. Also, 
Ibn Saud and Britain were always in dispute with regard to the British policy towards 
the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry. Maintaining national security against any potential 
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external threat was one of Ibn Saud's most important concerns. The integrity of his 
territories and the state's national security were the main reasons for his policy against 
any kind of Arab integration, especially those proposed by Britain, which were seen 
as benefiting the Hashemites. Ibn Saud's policy was illustrated by his attitude towards 
the Hashemites and the projects of Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent. In fact, it 
could be said that Britain's policy towards Ibn Saud and the Middle East in general, 
with which Ibn Saud strongly disagreed, was the main impetus behind his looking for 
better and stronger relations with other powers with the aim of self-protection. 
Although there were many political disputes with Britain, Ibn Saud avoided any 
military conflict, which he knew would be beyond his capability to cope with. 
King Abdulaziz was an astute realist, who knew when to bend to political pressures. 
Well aware of the prevailing political circumstances, he knew well how not to expose 
all his great achievements to military threats. Unfortunately, Ibn Saud's apprehension 
of military dispute with Britain became a reality when Britain invaded al-Buraimi on 
behalf of Oman and Abu Dhabi. However, this happened under more advantageous 
international circumstances. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Ibn Saud had, by then, 
consolidated his political position. He was one of the most influential Arab and 
Muslim leaders. Also, he was the King of a state which had good and constructive 
relationships with most of the international community and organizations as a 
member of the UN. Also, his state had strong economic and mutual commercial 
relations with many influential powers, including the U. S., which would have helped 
him in terms of protecting mutual interests. However, during al-Buraimi dispute with 
Britain, which directly threatened Saudi Arabia's national security, the U. S. 
Government's posture was neutral. 
Furthermore, the British influence and hegemony in the Gulf, started to decline after 
World War Two, partly as a result of the augmenting American influence and 
interests in the region. Ibn Saud was confident that the U. S. would act according to its 
interests, and that if dispute with Britain escalated to the point of threatening his 
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state's sovereignty, the U. S. would support him. ' Therefore, he threatened to refer his 
problem to the UN, with the confidence that he would be politically supported by the 
international community. However, Ibn Saud died in 1953, at the climax of his rage 
against the British policy in al-Buraimi due to the fact that this part of his country was 
occupied by Britain. Ibn Saud was provoked to engage in a military conflict with the 
British after he had tried to avoid it for many years, but he was forced to engage in it 
due to the direct military threat to his national security. Indeed, the death of Ibn Saud 
would not allow us to envisage how he would have acted against Britain, as the 
British threat greatly escalated from mere political disputes into a full-scale military 
attack on his territory. 
Ibn Saud's ambition to build and develop his state was frustrated by the only obstacle 
which he had been unable to overcome: the Kingdom's lack of economic resources 
before the discovery of oil. He strongly believed that he ought to rely on his own 
economic resources. He also knew that he would not be able to accomplish this 
without the support of the developed countries, which had the necessary technology 
and experience. He started to offer concessions in his territories to foreign powers and 
companies. To attract them, he offered large areas of land and full protection for their 
enterprises. At first, these companies were reluctant for many reasons, prominent 
among was the factor of political instability. When Ibn Saud accomplished and 
maintained political stability in his state, the circumstances became more suitable for 
those companies to gain concessions in Ibn Saud's land. It was now in Ibn Saud's 
power to select the offer that would suit him best. The most important consideration 
for the King was to maintain his full independence and to avoid any restrictive 
treaties. He insisted that the only kind of concessions that would be given by his state 
would be based on mutual interest and economic benefits for both. He also insisted on 
being provided with substantial loans in advance as part of the concessionary 
agreement in order to use those loans to build his state. 
1 This was supported by Bakur al-'Amri during my interview with him in Jeddah on 2 January 2004. 
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Ibn Saud decided to grant an oil concession in his territories to the Americans due to 
many reasons. The U. S. Government's support for the right of nations to self- 
determination was a major reason for Ibn Saud's preference for the American offer, 
even though it was not the best in purely economic terms. Although there was no 
direct colonial or imperialist policy that had been practised on Ibn Saud or his 
territories, he detested imperialism and always opposed it. Therefore, he was very 
cautious regarding the influence of the imperial powers and was unwilling to grant 
them concessions. In addition, the American companies were relatively free from the 
interference of their government in comparison with the others. Indeed, Ibn Saud's 
apprehensions about his national security and political stability were major factors 
behind his move to improve his relations with the U. S. However, granting the oil 
concession to SOCAL had a negative impact on Saudi-British relations. 
The study also illustrated that the oil concession was the only way to entice the 
United States into the region in order to reduce the influence of Britain. Indeed, early 
Saudi-American relations were limited to the economic sphere. In fact, these relations 
were with American companies and remained so for many years, even after the 
exchange of diplomatic representation between the two countries. Furthermore, the 
Saudi-American economic relations started even before the American recognition of 
Ibn Saud. However, the increasing interests of American companies in Saudi Arabia 
forced them to put pressure on successive U. S. Governments to improve relations 
with Saudi Arabia in order to protect American interests from Britain. With time, 
Saudi-American relations improved until the United States became the first Saudi 
Arabian trading partner as a result of mutual interests, especially during and after the 
Second World War. In the end, the United States became a major foreign player in 
Middle Eastern issues. 
The importance of this relationship was clearly demonstrated during the Saudi- 
American Summit between King Abdulaziz and President Franklin Roosevelt in 
1945. During this Summit, Saudi-American relations were consolidated further 
through the extension of the oil concession period and of Saudi-American military 
cooperation. Ibn Saud agreed to let the Americans use the eastern Saudi ports and to 
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lease to them an airport site in al-Dhahran for use against the Axis forces. However, 
he insisted on the condition that Saudi Arabia should, under no circumstances, be 
occupied and that no part of its territory should be alienated. This was to ensure that 
Saudi national security was not threatened by the conflict between the Great Powers. 
By doing so, he felt that he was securing his safety in the face of his enemies, which 
were supported by Britain, and also against the Communist threat. He believed that 
the United States, at least, had no imperial ambitions which might threaten his 
national security. 
In addition to his need for strong allies against some Great Powers regarding Saudi 
national security, Ihn Saud was in desperate need of American technology. At the 
same time the Americans were more enthusiastic than others in providing their 
support and thus gaining a strong ally in the region, who became vital to the security 
of their interests there later on. The Americans provided aid to Ibn Saud through 
many loans, in accordance with the lend-lease programme, and became the first 
country to develop Saudi Arabia, including its army. This was chiefly due to the 
apprehensions of both states regarding the growing threat posted by the USSR. 
However, due to his constant unease regarding the influence of Great Powers on his 
national security, Ibn Saud preferred to deal with the American banks and companies 
rather than through direct contact with the United States Government. Even when he 
agreed to inter into military cooperation with the Americans, such as leasing al- 
Dhahran airport, he insisted that this cooperation should be restricted to a specific 
period and particular circumstances. 
This study showed that the strong Saudi economy, resulting from the discovery of 
huge oil reserves, played a significant role in Saudi foreign policy, and enabled Saudi 
Arabia to play a more influential role on regional and international levels. The 
economic factor was one of the major factors that led to most of Saudi Arabia's 
territorial disputes with its neighbours over oil-rich boundary areas. 
The study also showed that when Ibn Saud died in September 1953, he left behind 
him a solid political entity with a distinct national identity. Saudi Arabia had become 
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one of the richest countries in the world due to its huge oil reserves. Ibn Saud left a 
great political legacy, which his successors benefited from by adhering to his 
principles in general and to his foreign policy in particular. They followed his legacy 
in strictly maintaining Saudi political stability and national security. This was 
illustrated by the Saudi attitude during al-Wadi'ah dispute with South Yemen in 1969, 
and towards Iraq in 1990. 
Also, Ibn Saud's successors consolidated his policy of friendship towards the Gulf 
States, which led to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. They also 
followed his Arab and Muslim political legacy. However, the Saudi Islamic foreign 
policy, after King Faisal ascended the throne in 1964, was improved in order to serve 
Saudi interests through the establishment of the Muslim World League and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Saudi Arabia practised more influential 
policy, resulting from its strong economy. Moreover, Saudi Arabia maintained Ibn 
Saud's stance against Zionism and continued its unlimited support for the 
Palestinians. At the same time, it continued its attempts to find a peaceful solution to 
this problem as Ibn Saud had always hoped. Also, Ibn Saud's sons continued his 
policy of adamant opposition to those states which had adopted Communism. They 
worked against the Communist bloc and all its propagations and policies in the 
Middle East and the entire Muslim world. The Saudi hatred of the atheists was a 
sanctified legacy of Ibn Saud. In fact, Saudi policy towards the Communists was also 
a result of their increasing threats in the Middle East and against Saudi Arabia in 
particular. 
Ibn Saud's successors also followed his policy of strengthening their political and 
economic relations with the Free World. This policy resulted from their belief that 
strong relations, especially in the economic field, with the Free World would make 
Saudi stability very important to those countries. Indeed, this was true. During the 
Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, the international community became alarmed by the 
severe threat to the security of the Gulf countries. This was confirmed more in 1990, 
by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the imminent threat to Saudi Arabia. The Free 
World responded quickly to the Saudi request to maintain its national security and 
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liberate Kuwait. In fact, the quick international response, headed by the U. S., was a 
clear result of Ibn Saud's old policy and the consolidation of this policy by his sons. 
The attitude of the international community against the danger posed by Iraq to Saudi 
Arabia was a clear example of international cooperation for the purpose of 
maintaining mutual interests. 
Although Saudi Arabia, during the war against Iraq in 1990-1991, requested 
international military support to liberate Kuwait and protect Saudi national security, it 
maintained its old policy of refraining from involvement in protective or restrictive 
treaties. Saudi Arabia agreed only on cooperation and exchanging political, economic 
and military support. The Kingdom agreed on using its territories only to defeat the 
Iraqi army and liberate Kuwait, under the condition that all foreign troops should 
leave when the Saudis asked them to do so. After the liberation of Kuwait, the 
coalition forces left Saudi Arabia, except for several thousand U. S. troops, which 
remained there with full Saudi acceptance, due to the Saudi need. However, the 
American military presence in Saudi Arabia was ended in September 2003, when 
American troops moved out to al-'Udayd Base in Qatar. ' 
The loyalty of King Abdulaziz's successors to his legacy did not mean that there were 
no changes at all. In fact, there were some major changes to Saudi policy regarding a 
number of political issues. For example, Saudi policy towards the ending of the 
enmity with the Hashemites has been modified. Furthermore, being convinced of the 
necessity for Arab and Muslim solidarity against Communism and Zionism, Saudi 
Arabia, under King Faisal, felt that all efforts should be aimed against those threats. 
In order to achieve this, Saudi Arabia worked to end all its boundary disputes with its 
neighbouring states, even if that meant giving up part of its territories to its 
neighbours, as it did with the United Arab Emirates and Oman over al-Buraimi in 
1974. Believing that it should play a leading role in Arab and Muslim affairs, the 
Saudi leadership placed Arab and Muslim interests above its own self-interests. 
lhttp: //ctuerv. nytimes com/gst/abstract html? res=F6061EFA355EOC718EDDA00894DB404482; http: // 
www. almokht-, ar. cotiVhtmUnews/I424/07/27/i/10898.1)ht). 
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These changes in Saudi attitude were good indicators of the flexibility of its foreign 
policy on major international issues. They illustrated the acceptance by the Saudi 
political leadership of the principle of development and progress. Therefore, and due 
to major events, such as the establishment of the European Union and the 
disintegration of the USSR and the subsequent abandonment of their old ideology by 
the former Communist states, important changes in Saudi foreign policy were 
adopted. Among these changes was the strengthening of Saudi relations with states 
such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and China. Saudi relations with such 
countries have witnessed real diplomatic, economic and technological cooperation. 
Of course, this improvement in Saudi foreign policy ought to be seen within the 
general framework of King Abdulaziz's political legacy. 
It has been clearly shown how King Abdulaziz's personal leadership played a 
dominant role in the making and implementation of Saudi foreign policy over the 
period under study. It has also been demonstrated how King Abdulaziz was the 
ultimate decision maker in the foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia, and never allowed any 
intrusion from anyone, even those who were closely related to him, such as his 
brothers or sons. He was decisive in maintaining the unity of leadership, which led to 
the elimination of the rivals who intervened in his affairs, especially on foreign 
issues. This was shown through his policy towards the rebel Ikhwan leaders. Also, 
although he welcomed many advisors to Saudi Arabia, this study has shown that these 
advisors were never directly involved in policy making. 
It became clear from this study that King Abdulaziz was an appropriate leader for 
Saudi Arabia, as a newly-emerging state at that time. Such leadership was a vital 
factor for the people of the Peninsula to relay on rather than follow contradictory and 
less-discerning rivals. Without an influential charismatic leadership, such as that of 
King Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia as a political entity would have remained a dream 
buried under the sands of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Guided by a set of research questions, this study has attempted to provide a better 
understanding of the process of Saudi foreign policy making under King Abdulaziz. It 
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has thrown light on the problems experienced by Saudi Arabia as a newly-emerging 
state while making and implementing its foreign policy. These problems have been 
variously shared by other newly-emerging states. It hoped that this study would 
advance knowledge about, not only the Saudi case, but also the cases of other newly 
established states. 
Although several studies have been carried out on Saudi foreign policy, most have 
covered either earlier or more modern periods or only part of King Abdulaziz's era. 
Furthermore, other studies have focused only on Saudi bi-lateral relations with 
specific countries. This study has dealt with the entire period of King Abdulaziz. In 
this way, the work would hopefully make a modest contribution to the existing 
literature on Saudi foreign policy making during the period under study. 
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Interviews: 
His Highness Prince Abdulrahman Ibn Abdullah. In Riyadh, on 7-10 January 
2004. Prince Abdulrahman is a nephew of King Abdulaziz and a senior member of 
the Saudi Royal Family. The Prince is the son of Prince Abdullah, who was one of the 
princes closest to the King and was one of the most prominent members of the 
Political Committee; this enabled his son to gain detailed knowledge of Saudi policy 
making. Prince Abdulrahman, like his father, is well known for his wisdom and wide 
knowledge. Therefore, he is considered to be an extremely reliable source of 
information about the history of the Saudi Royal Family. 
His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz. In Jeddah, 31 December 
2003- 1 January 2004. Prince Mamduh is the Head of the Saudi Centre for Strategic 
Studies. He was the Governor of Tabuk province until 1993, when he was appointed 
to his present position. He is well known for his strong moral principles and 
exemplary religious behaviour. He also has a wide knowledge of Saudi internal and 
external affairs. This is due to his close and strong relationship with his older brothers 
who were, and are still, charged with formulating and implementing Saudi policy by 
virtue of their influential positions. Also, he is well known for his great modesty and 
the easy and direct access to his court, which attracts the intellectual and educated 
elites. 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Mubarak. In Riyadh, on 17 January 2004. Shaikh Ahmad 
represented his country, Saudi Arabia, as an Ambassador to several countries before 
his retirement in 1995. His last position was as Saudi Ambassador to Qatar. During 
King Abdulaziz's reign he was the Director of Education in Jeddah. He is one of the 
notables of al-Hasa province. Furthermore, he is well known for his great knowledge 
of religious, historical and political affairs. 
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Dr. Abdulaziz al-Khuwaiter. In Riyadh, on 19 January 2004. Al-Khuwaiter is the 
Saudi Minister of State and a member of the Saudi Council of Ministers. He was the 
formerly the Minister of Education and served his country and his government in 
many official and influential positions for many years. Also, he is commonly known 
for his strong relationships with the influential members of the Saudi Royal Family, 
mainly King Fahd. Furthermore, al-Khuwaiter is highly regarded as the author of 
several published books and articles about King Abdulaziz and Saudi affairs. 
Prof. Bakur al-'Amri. In Jeddah, 31 December 2003- 2 January 2004. Al-'Amri was 
formerly Dean of the Faculty of Economy and Administration in King Abdulaziz 
University in Jeddah. He also was also Professor of Political Sciences in the same 
university. He is now the Head of the Customs Appellate Court in Makkah Province. 
When I met him, I found his vast knowledge of Saudi affairs and foreign policy- 
making extremely valuable for my study. 
Dr. Lateefah al-Salloom. In Riyadh, on 11 January 2004. Al-Salloom is the Delegate 
Member to the Assessment Centre for Girls' Colleges, in the Ministry of Education of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. She is well known for the energy and commitment 
with which she serves her people and her country. Also, she is the author of several 
published books and articles about King Abdulaziz and Saudi Arabia in general. 
Indeed, she is an outstanding example of the highly educated and socially active 
Saudi woman. 
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